

The History and Potential of China's Participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations

中国における国連 PKO 参加の歴史および今後の潜在性について

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Abstract :

UN peacekeeping operations have played a significant role as a conflict resolution in the post-WW II period. In terms of China, it is a relatively new contributor to UN peacekeeping. China, which is a permanent member of the UN Security Council, was rather passive with regard to middle powers-led UN operations during the Cold War period. It also adhered to the traditional norms of state sovereignty and non-intervention. However, since the end of the Cold War, China has reviewed its peacekeeping policy and has had stronger commitments to UN operations. For example, China indicated its enthusiasm towards UN peacekeeping in their participation in Cambodia (UNTAC) and East Timor (UNTAET). At present, China's current record of UN peacekeeping operations is remarkable. China actively sends its personnel to UN peacekeeping mainly to Africa including in Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC), Liberia (UNMIL), and the Sudan (UNMIS). It stems from the states' flexible peacekeeping policy. This policy is due to a good balance between political realism and liberalism, or domestic and international perspectives in its participation in peacekeeping operations. Furthermore, it is recommended that China should pay more attention to security, especially in Asia by peacekeeping. For example, China should take the initiative and establish a regional peace-building mechanism.

Keywords: China, peacekeeping operations, state policy, state sovereignty, non-intervention

概要 :

国連平和維持活動 (PKO) は、第二次世界大戦以降の国際紛争解決において重要な役割を果たしてきた。中国の PKO への参加は、その設立創成期から始まったとは言えない。中国は国連安全保障理事会の常任理事国であるために、東西冷戦期においてミドルパワー主体であった PKO には必然的に消極的であった。中国は、また伝統的に国家主権や内政不干渉の政策を採っていたのもその一因である。しかし東西冷戦終了後、中国は、それまでの PKO 政策を見直し、PKO に積極的な姿勢を打ち出している。その結果中国はカン

ボジアや東ティモールにおけるPKOに参加を果たし、現在の中国は世界有数のPKO派遣大国となり、主にアフリカ諸国への派遣が目覚しい。そのような中国のPKO参加への柔軟的な姿勢は、政治的な現実主義や理想主義、あるいは国際的あるいは国内的な視野のバランスの取れた政策によることができよう。そして昨今のPKO派遣における様々な統計を考慮した場合、中国はアジアを中心とした国際安全保障体制に更なる注目を寄せるべきである。たとえば中国は、アジア地域の平和構築体系の設立において中心的な役割を果たすことが期待される。

キーワード：中国、国連平和維持活動、国家政策、国家主権、内政不干涉

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1. Introduction:

This paper examines UN peacekeeping policy from the dispatching side, and focuses on China. UN peacekeeping operations, which were initiated as a replacement for the totally ineffective post-WWII collective security environment, have played a vital role in the maintenance of international peace and security. The continuing significance of UN peacekeeping operations for conflict resolutions can be recognised by the fact that there are currently more than 90,000 military and civilian police forces serving in 17 operations around the world.¹ Currently, China adopts a “UN-centred policy”, and therefore aspires to be a positive contributor to peacekeeping operations. However, the state used to be passive or on occasion inactive towards UN peacekeeping during the Cold War period, mainly due to its own domestic factors that influenced troop mobilization for peacekeeping. In fact, it was not until the 1990s that China started dispatching its troops to UN peacekeeping operations after solving its own domestic restraints. This paper recommends China’s further commitment to UN peacekeeping, especially in the Asia-Pacific region. This paper begins by introducing the two key foreign policy approaches, and several positive factors that encourages the states to participate in UN peacekeeping. This paper then applies them to the case of China.

2. UN Peacekeeping as a Foreign Policy

Naturally, participation in peacekeeping operations is considered to be an important component of foreign policy for contributing states. Furthermore, when one considers the theory of peacekeeping from the viewpoint of the contributing side, the following two points should be considered. First, UN peacekeeping operations can provide each member state with an opportunity to contribute in their own way. That is to say, all of the UN member states have an equal chance to participate in peacekeeping as far as they have the will and capability to do so. In fact, according to statistics from the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in the UN, there is a nearly equal distribution of contribution to peacekeeping by each power.²

Secondly, and more importantly, the UN is a non-persuasive in nature when deciding which states contribute. As Alan James notes, “it is a great mistake to conceive of the UN as the prime mover ...It is very far from the case that the world organisation simply speaks, and the relevant states then hasten to comply with its wishes, in the manner of ciphers.”³ It is normally state contributors rather than the UN which show a keen interest in participating in peacekeeping missions. It is true that contributing states are usually finalised at the UN Security Council, followed by the host states' approval of the candidate states' service as peacekeepers, and that an official invitation is always made from the UN. However, a formal invitation is always based on the understanding of some informal discussion that has already taken place between UN officials and delegates from the member states that are keen to participate. Therefore, the policy of peacekeeping operations adopted by the dispatching side depends on the discretion of the governments of the contributing states. In sum, a strong motivation to commit to peacekeeping operations will enable any state to become a positive contributor.

How are states motivated to participate in peacekeeping? In answering this basic question, one can apply a basic theory of international relations, that is, the classical debate between idealists, who advocate a collective approach to international conflict, and realists who favour the self-help approach.

In terms of the idealist perspective, it is generally agreed that state policy is essentially “good and altruistic”, and therefore states are “capable of mutual aid and collaboration through reason and ethically inspired education.”⁴ Peacekeeping operations, which sometimes lead to enormous casualties, must also have a sense of “altruism.” Likewise, a peacekeeping operation is an activity of international “aid and collaboration”, providing civilian and military personnel to conflicting areas. Idealists believe that universal moral principles can guide policy, and therefore international organisations such as the UN will address the major problems facing the world today. In reality, the ma-

majority of international peacekeeping operations have been authorised and operated by the UN. Therefore, according to basic theory, UN peacekeeping operations have to be based on an idealistic approach. Idealists expect international peacekeeping operations to be an appropriate instrument for the improvement of long-term global peace and security rather than short-term stability.

Andreas Anderson argues that in regard to state participation in peacekeeping operations, there is a viable alternative to explanations based on *Realpolitik*. He emphasises that the purpose of peacekeeping is not only to end conflict but also to prevent its recurrence by promoting democracy. He mentions that among the substantial contributors to peace support operations, well-consolidated democracies show the greatest propensity to participate. He also notes that among the states in conflict, non-democratic states undertake a disproportionate number of operations.⁵

According to the idealist perspective, states which participate in peacekeeping operations in a positive manner should be regarded as “internationalist” rather than “nationalist.” Their peacekeeping policies are the result of governments’ overall foreign policy direction. In other words, as David Wainhouse claims, “Participation in a peacekeeping operation is a voluntary act and if a state has no special interest in a situation it will usually have a fairly high degree of general interest.”⁶ A similar premise is posited by Boutros Boutros-Ghali: “all states ... have a strong interest in preventing a global pattern of violence, in checking the disease of conflict, and in deterring would-be aggressors.”⁷

Meanwhile, the school of political realism is influenced by the notion of the “national interests.” National interest is considered to be an analytical tool used to identify foreign policy objectives. In other words, once a government identifies national interests, it establishes objectives, which then direct state policies. Therefore, a state consistently adhering to its national interests is likely to maintain its political balance and continue to progress towards its goal.⁸ Contributions to peacekeeping operations can also be supported by this realist theory. Alan James argues that in peacekeeping operations the question of which states should be invited to contribute to an operation, or whose offers should be accepted, is often intensely political. He is clear that in relation to any decision to establish peacekeeping operations, political factors are both most visible and most important, and that without such authorisations, peacekeeping operations would not exist at all.⁹

David Bobrow and Mark Boyer consider peacekeeping operations as “impure public goods” that have continued to be provided by the self-interests of contributing states associated with maintaining some modicum of international system stability. In addition, they insist that UN peacekeeping operations are “club goods”; where by some highly supportive participants remain members of UN PKO club for reasons pertaining to their status within the UN.¹⁰ These goods are, therefore, not universally motivated.

Laura Neack also strongly supports the realist account regarding a state's participation in peacekeeping operations. She focuses on the fact that peacekeeping forces seem heavily dominated by one group of states, the so-called "middle powers", that are willing to put considerable strength behind their participation. Her main argument is that the particular interests that have been served by UN peacekeeping are those of western states, who benefit from the status quo, and of a few non-western states that lay claim to some prestige in international affairs through their UN activities. Interestingly, she points out that such middle power states are among the top 13 major weapons' exporters to the developing world, which has frequently requested and accepted international peacekeeping operations at the same time. She sees arms sales and peacekeeping as tied to the same mission: the pursuit of national interests.

Furthermore, the term "national interests" was explicitly mentioned by the US in the context of peacekeeping operations. On 4 May 1994 Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25) was signed by then US President Bill Clinton. PDD-25 thoroughly pursued national interests, ensuring that US peacekeeping policy becomes more selective and cost-effective.¹¹

Thus, one can identify both liberalist and realist influences on peacekeeping policy by contributing states. Each contributing state has adopted both perspectives, and whether its peacekeeping policy focuses more on liberalism or realism depends on the state in question.

Apart from discussion on the theory of international relations, there are several considerations which motivate states to participate in peacekeeping operations. States consider the participation of peacekeeping from international perspectives. As general foreign policies, for example, great powers tend to express their concern for international stability and decide to send troops to peacekeeping operations as "world policemen". Middle powers have also adopted a high profile on peacekeeping as an instrument of their central foreign policy. It is because middle powers, which have no colonial experience and adequate military equipment, consider that peacekeeping provides them with the best opportunity to show originality in their diplomacy. Neutral powers also believe that they can contribute usefully and effectively to international peace and security by their commitment to UN peacekeeping operations.

States are also motivated to show their commitment to UN peacekeeping by domestic considerations. For example, participation in peacekeeping operations is attractive because it can bring significant financial profits, especially for several developing states in that they may desire to profit from the reimbursement of the costs of troop contributions. Presumably, the massive scale of participation of UN peacekeeping from South Asian states such as Pakistan, Bangladesh and India is attributed to this category.¹² Likewise, activation of a nation's military by joining peacekeeping operations is also a significant factor in terms of motivation. Such states may be attracted to

peacekeeping, because they can enlarge their military by increasing the number of personnel, and making improvement to military equipment and facilities at the expense of the UN. UN peacekeeping will also provide troops with an ideal practical environment for their training.

Thus, it can be pointed out that participating in peacekeeping should be positively assessed by each state. Each contributing state embraces the characteristics of internationalism (international ambition and responsibility) and/or nationalism (domestic concern) in terms of participation in peacekeeping. The difference in peacekeeping policy among each power is the difference of the balance between their concern for international stability or for domestic interests. There is a tendency for bigger states to value their commitment to peacekeeping with respect to international stability, and for the smaller states to prioritize domestic interests. This is because international stability, although it is indirect, is a significant responsibility as a world policeman or for the promotion of world trade for great powers. Peacekeeping policy for great powers is just one of many foreign policies, and the effects which the great powers expect by participating in peacekeeping are more diversified. Meanwhile smaller states' peacekeeping policy is more significant than the great powers because they expect more tangible and direct effects from peacekeeping.¹³ The next section explores the nature of peacekeeping policy in China.

3. Chinese Peacekeeping Policy Based on Domestic and International Perspectives

China's commitment to UN peacekeeping operations was relatively late. One of the basic reasons is that UN peacekeeping was essentially a Western activity during the Cold War period. Indeed, there were even direct clashes between the UN and Chinese forces during the Korean War in the 1950s. Several observers attribute the hostility of the Soviet Union to the UN peacekeeping operations in the Sinai (UNEF I) and the Congo (ONUC) to the fact that no socialist countries were included in their make-up.¹⁴ When the UN India-Pakistan Observer Mission (UNIPOM) was created in 1965, then UN Secretary General U Thant invited Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Hungary, and Poland to provide military personnel to help supervise the cease-fire, but all the Eastern Europeans declined to participate.¹⁵ In those days, China declined to burden the annual budget with UN peacekeeping. China considered that UN peacekeeping operations simply protected the interests of the Western powers.

Even after the membership of the People's Republic of China in the UN became official in 1971, China was inactive in peacekeeping. China, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, continued abstaining from Security Council voting on UN peacekeeping. Another main reason for China's inaction in peacekeeping was the state's strong advocacy of Westphalian norms

of state sovereignty and non-intervention. China's support of state sovereignty and non-intervention was partly motivated by the fact that China was the sole representative of developing countries in the UN Security Council, supporting the completion of the decolonization process in the Third World. China also condemned the Soviet Union for violating the state sovereignty of Czechoslovakia in the UN General Assembly in 1974. Furthermore, China considered that UN peacekeeping could be used to interfere in its own domestic disputes including the Taiwan Question.¹⁶

Since Deng Xiaoping took power in 1978 and advocated a more market-oriented economy, China's foreign policy has been gradually shifting. China advocated its historical "independent foreign policy of peace", which reviewed its traditional foreign policy and promoted peaceful relations with the West and the rest of the world. This new foreign policy was initially adopted during the 12th National Congress of the Communist Party of China. Xia Liping, a China analyst, assessed the "independent foreign policy of peace" as follows:

*"Peace" means that China began to formulate its foreign policy from the viewpoint of whether it is beneficial to international and regional peace, instead of the viewpoint of pursuing military superiority, while "independence" means that China began to formulate its foreign policy according to its national interests and the common interests of peoples of all the countries in the world.*¹⁷

The "independent foreign policy of peace" encouraged the Chinese Government to review its peacekeeping policy, too. China's significant shift to pro-UN peacekeeping stance was recognized by its vote in favour of Security Council Resolution 495 authorizing the extension of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) in 1981. China started paying UN peacekeeping dues a year later.¹⁸ It sent a fact-finding mission to the Middle East to study the peacekeeping operations there.

What encouraged China to move to a more pro-peacekeeping policy? Of course, the state's shift of foreign policy to a more market-oriented economy is one of the main factors. China started valuing the Bretton Woods system during this period: China joined the IMF and the World Bank in 1980. As Yin He puts it, "After re-evaluating the UN regime, the Chinese leadership began to understand that this international organization could serve as an ideal platform to broaden its global horizon and create a favourable international environment for its prioritized economic development reform policy."¹⁹ As mentioned before, China was in a unique position in that it behaved as a developing country on one hand, and having a strong voice in the decision that the UN Security Council was addressing on the other. Now China could adopt an equidistant policy with regard to the US and the Soviet Union. Therefore, China, which was the great political power and a champion of developing countries, considered it best to become ostracized by the international commu-

nity because of UN peacekeeping operations.

There was a significant increase in demand for UN peacekeeping in the post-Cold War period. The very late 1980s and the early 1990s witnessed the collapse of the Soviet Union and the demise of the bi-polar system in international politics. As a result, the former communist countries in the Central and Eastern Europe wanted to become involved in the Western military and political system. An overflow of internal ethnic and religious conflict, which occasionally involved the brutal genocide of innocent civilians led to the collapse of states and changed the scope of conflict resolution by the international system. These events prompted several significant adaptations to UN peacekeeping operations in the quantitative and qualitative spheres. The number of UN peacekeeping operations deployed significantly increased from only 11 in January 1988 to 28 in December 1994.²⁰ The unanimity among the Security Council's permanent members, including China, facilitated successful peacekeeping operations in former Cold-War-related spots such as Afghanistan, Iran-Iraq, Namibia, Angola, and Nicaragua.²¹

In terms of a qualitative change in peacekeeping, the vast majority of its operations in the post-Cold War period became ones for internal conflicts, which were called "second-generation peacekeeping." They were multi-functional to support the implementation of a comprehensive settlement including the missions of conducting elections, human rights verification, supervising existing administrations etc.²² This kind of peacekeeping was seen in most new operations in the late 1980s and the 1990s, such as in Angola (UNAVEM), Namibia (UNTAG), El Salvador (ONUSAL), Western Sahara (MINURSO), the former Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR), Cambodia (UNTAC), Somalia (UNOSOM) etc. A significant achievement of UN peacekeeping operations for international conflict resolution was the fact that the UN operations themselves won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1988.

Thus, the remarkable progress of UN peacekeeping operations reflected the China's foreign policy on conflict resolutions. In November 1988, China became a member of General Assembly's Special Committee for Peacekeeping Operations. Then in the following year, China sent twenty civilian officials to the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) to assist with a general election in Namibia. In 1990, China finally dispatched military personnel to the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO), which was the state's first official participation in UN peacekeeping operations. In 1992 and 1993, China participated in the United Nations Transitional Administration in Cambodia (UNTAC), sending 800 PLA engineering units. In 1997, China joined United Nations Standby Arrangement System (UNSAS).²³

With the increasing number of UN peacekeeping operations, it was essential that the UN persuaded more states to join UN peacekeeping. According to statistics from *the Blue Helmet 1996* (UN edition), in total 112 states out of the whole 181 member states of the UN participated in at

least one UN peacekeeping operation or more. According to one criterion by the number of UN operations which states participated²⁴, 25 states became categorised as “positive contributing states”. By dividing them into three classes; great powers (the permanent members of the UN Security Council), the Western states, and the Third World states, the 25 positive states can be profiled as can in Table 1.:

Table 1. The so-called “positive contributing states” to UN peacekeeping in 1996

The great powers (2 states)	France (17 operations), Russia (16)
The Western states (12 states)	Australia (16 operations), Austria (20), Belgium (15), Canada (33), Denmark (19), Finland (19), Ireland (26), Netherland (20), New Zealand (18), Norway (25), Poland (20), Sweden (26)
The Third World states (11 states)	Argentina (22 operations), Bangladesh (22), Brazil (16), Egypt (17), Ghana (20), India (21), Indonesia (19), Jordan (26), Malaysia (19), Nigeria (19), Pakistan (21)

Sources: *The Blue Helmets: the Review of United Nations Peace-keeping*, the UN, 1996

This classification can indicate that each power category equally had some significant contributors in 1996. Therefore, it can be concluded that there was no longer an ideological factor in the preference for participation in UN peacekeeping in the 1990s. In other words, during this period UN peacekeeping operations became broadly accepted as an effective tool for conflict resolution. China was not an exception. According to *the Blue Helmet 1996*, China had already dispatched eight UN peacekeeping operations in the international field although its contribution was the least significant among the permanent members of the Security Council.²⁵ Most of the Chinese missions in UN peacekeeping operations in the 1990s were military observers in such places as Western Sahara (MINURSO), Mozambique (ONUMOZ), Liberia (UNOMIL) and Iran-Kuwait (UNIKOM).

However, there was a dilemma in China's peacekeeping policy during the 1990s. Most of the UN peacekeeping during this period were internal missions which required rebuilding collapsed states after totally devastating religious or ethnic conflicts. And it was an international organization, namely, the UN, which played the main role in state-building or peace-building. However, China's positive involvement in state-building missions was not compatible with its basic foreign policy of state sovereignty and non-intervention. Therefore, China's provision of 800-strong PLA engineering units to UNTAET was not repeated. Pang Zhongying, in his article “China's Changing Attitude to UN Peacekeeping”, also pointed out this issue as follows:

*This was partly due to China's rigid attitude towards the principles of state sovereignty and its concern about the use of force in peacekeeping operations. These issues only served to highlight the emerging contradictions and ambiguities with regard to China's position on the nature of peace operations.*²⁶

Zongying maintained that China's 2000 Defence White Paper provided a good summary of China's principles for conducting UN peacekeeping in the post-Cold War period. The White Paper adhered to the aims and principles of the UN Charter and insisted on the settlement of disputes by peaceful means, such as mediation, good offices and negotiation. It did not support the use of military means for achieving humanitarian ends.²⁷ Therefore, China expressed reluctance to dispatch its forces to the so-called peace enforcement operations based on Chapter VII of UN Charter, such as ones in Somalia (UNOSOMII) or former Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR).

The current trend of UN peacekeeping has not been compatible with the Chinese conservative policy for peacekeeping. For example, in August 2000, the Report of the Panel on the United Nations Peace Operations, or the "Brahimi Report" as it is often called, recommended that the rules of engagement in peacekeeping should be sufficiently robust and not force UN contingents to cede the initiative to their attackers.²⁸ It meant that the use of force was expected to be applied more frequently in UN peacekeeping. The concept of human security as well as state security has been strongly advocated especially since the UN Millennium Summit in September 2000. It was understandable that the implementation of human security would require more external involvement into domestic affairs from the international community.

The concept of human security developed into another concept called "Responsibility to Protect (R2P)", which provided a legal and ethical basis for "humanitarian intervention". The principle of R2P was formed by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in December 2001, and officially endorsed in the World Summit in September 2005. As the 2005 World Summit outcome document puts it:

*The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapter VII and VIII of the Charter, to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner ...*²⁹

China endorsed the 2005 World Summit outcome document. The Chinese Government considered that the norm of non-interference would not provide cover for genocide and mass atrocity crimes, and force can be a necessary last resort to protect besieged populations. However, China's endorsement of R2P does not signify a radical shift in its non-interference policy, nor does it override its rhetorical commitment to sovereignty. China also maintains that protecting civilians is not the sole remit of the Security Council but requires integrated strategies across various UN bodies and regional organizations. Furthermore, China's endorsement of R2P is not tantamount to a full endorsement of humanitarian intervention; the Chinese Government has adamantly been averse to

non-consensual military intervention, even when state leaders are themselves the perpetrators of mass atrocities.³⁰ It can be recognised by the fact that in such cases as Zimbabwe and Myanmar, China has resisted calls from human rights advocacy groups and some Western governments to pursue intervention based on humanitarian justification.³¹ Therefore, Beijing's engagement of R2P is more nuanced than its declaratory statements.

Nevertheless, China's current record on participation in UN peacekeeping is remarkable. In August 2007, General Zhao Jingmin was appointed as the force commander of the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), the first Chinese national to have held such a position.³² At the time of writing, China contributes a total of 2,153 peacekeepers to 10 UN operations. The number of Chinese personnel in UN peacekeeping is ranked 13th among all of the contributing states, and is now top among the five permanent members of the Security Council (Table. 2). China has sent its personnel to all four continents where there are UN missions. This is a significant departure from China's early policy towards UN peacekeeping.³³

Table 2. Ranking of Military and Police Contributions to UN Operations (Top 50: June 2009)

Rank	Country	Number	Rank	Country	Number
1	Pakistan	10,603	26	Argentina	857
2	Bangladesh	9,982	27	Togo	821
3	India	8,607	28	Zambia	723
4	Nigeria	5,960	29	Philippines	592
5	Nepal	4,148	30	Niger	579
6	Rwanda	3,584	31	Turkey	564
7	Jordan	3,231	32	Chile	543
8	Ghana	3,159	33	Austria	522
9	Egypt	2,956	34	Tunisia	504
10	Italy	2,690	35	Ireland	465
11	Uruguay	2,533	36	Bolivia	441
12	Ethiopia	2,394	37	Republic of Korea	390
13	China	2,153	38	Gambia	377
14	Senegal	2,127	39	Ukraine	375
15	South Africa	1,983	40	Portugal	345
16	France	1,879	41	Russia	328
17	Indonesia	1,617	42	Guatemala	288
18	Morocco	1,561	43	United Kingdom	283
19	Benin	1,349	44	Germany	282
20	Brazil	1,346	45	Fiji	268
21	Poland	1,149	46	Monglia	258
22	Spain	1,094	47	Belgium	246
23	Sri Lanka	1,040	48	Peru	233
24	Malaysia	913	49	Yemen	226
25	Kenya	881	50	Slovakia	212

Sources: Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPO), the United Nations
<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributor/index.shtml>

In particular, China's commitment to participation in peacekeeping in African states is significant. As many as 1,634 personnel are deployed in 6 states in Africa, including Western Sahara (MINURSO), Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC), Sudan (UNAMID and UNMIS), Liberia (UNOMIL) and Cote d'Ivoire (UNOCI). In other words, three out of four Chinese peacekeepers are concentrated in Africa.

It is considered that there are some reasons for China's enthusiasm for African missions. Xulio Rios raises three reasons. The first is the promotion of cooperation with the African Union for economic integration and social development. The second one is the development of forms of military cooperation in the region. The third one is to give a good impression of China's influence on the African continent which is rich in national resources and raw material.³⁴ Yin He has a different and more positive view. He argues that China's active participation in peacekeeping in Africa is partly attributed to its comprehensive policy towards this war-torn and poverty-stricken continent. He also claims that another reason is due to the comparative indifference of the West with regards to peacekeeping operations in Africa.³⁵

What motivates China to contribute to UN peacekeeping at the present time? As mentioned before, a market-oriented economy would still be one of the reasons. Peacekeeping might be a low cost way of demonstrating commitment to the UN and to international peace and security for China.³⁶ Peacekeeping contributes to modernising the practice of Chinese armed forces through communication with troops from other countries.

However, China's motivation with regard to UN peacekeeping should also be based on more international perspectives. China's strong commitment to UN peacekeeping might be attributed to its strong desire to strengthen the capacity of the UN, resulting in pressure on recent US unilateral policies. China's participation in UN missions has also been welcomed since many Western states preferred non-UN missions such as ones led by NATO and the EU. Political liberalism was also identified in China's willingness to participate in UN peacekeeping. In an interview, Major General Zhang, the Deputy Chief of General Staff for PLA, answered "... In addressing grave issues involving international peace and security, we are a responsible country. ... Chinese peacekeeping activities demonstrate our country's image as a responsible superpower."³⁷ Such international perspectives of China have responded to the climate change of the international political stage and conflict resolutions especially since the 1990s. Such flexible policies have been required to great powers like China by the international community. On the whole, Chinese peacekeeping policy has both domestic and international perspectives, and both the approaches of political realism and liberalism.

4. Necessity of Further Commitments of China to UN Peacekeeping Operations:

As stated before, there has been increasing demand for international peacekeeping especially since the end of the Cold War. This demand has been encouraged by the emerging theories and advocacies such as Boutros Ghali's *Agenda for Peace* in 1992³⁸ and *the Brahimi Report* in 2000. The increasing demand of peacekeeping has also been promoted by emerging concepts such as humanitarian intervention and "Responsibility to Protect (R2P)". While a number of peacekeeping operations have been deployed to meet the demand, they have faced various challenges.

For example, 2006 was the most challenging year for UN peacekeeping operations since the 1990s. The crises in South Lebanon and Timor-Leste in 2006, for example, offered an opportunity to reconsider the effectiveness of UN operations, namely, UNIFIL and UNOTIL. As a result, the size of UNIFIL expanded, and UNOTIL was replaced by a more robust operation, named, UNMIT. However, the strengthening of UN peacekeeping led to another problem: the overstretch of globally-extended peace operations despite their limited capacity. The *Annual Review of Global Peace Operations* argued:

*UN operations were under "acute and worsening strain", and its editors warned that one more large mission might take the organization "past the point of overstretch". As the year [of 2006] progressed, similar warning proliferated: in October, the UN's Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations gave a press conference reflecting on the risk of overstretch arising from the "enormous" technical and administrative problems confronting his department.*³⁹

The technical and administrative problems can be partly solved by China's further assistance. The logistic units including engineering and transportation by Chinese peacekeeping forces are well-known for their high level of skill.

Another problem with current peacekeeping operations is a lack of geographical balance in their dispatch. According to statistics on the deployment of UN military personnel by region in October 2006, the African region accounted for 75.3% of total UN peacekeeping all over the world. (Table 3.)⁴⁰ In this sense, China should have a stronger voice in order to invite more UN missions to volatile areas in the Asia-Pacific region, such as Aceh or the Solomon Islands.

Table 3. Deployment of UN Military Personnel by Region: 31 October 2006

Region	Troops/ Military Observers	% of Total
Africa	54,587	75.3
East Asia and the Pacific	31	0.1
Central and South Asia	54	0.1
Middle East	10,147	14
Europe	1,017	1.4
Central and South America	6,652	9.2
North America	—	—

Sources: *Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2007*, Center on International Co-operations

Furthermore, it is to be noted that there is clearly “a geographical division of labour” in the origin of UN military staff by region. For example, about 80% of the military staff in UN peacekeeping operations in the Middle East are from European countries (Table 4.), and more than 50% of the military staff in UN operations in Africa are from Central and South Asian countries. (Table 5.) It is easily recognised that security in the Middle East is significant for the national interests of European countries. However, such a lack of balance in the origin of UN military personnel will result in the problem of technological and operational inequality in UN operations. Therefore, the international community should expect China’s further commitment to UN operations, as the representative of the great powers in Asia, in order to achieve better geographical balance.

Table 4. Origin of UN Military Personnel in the Middle East by Region: 31 October 2006

Region	Troops/ Military Observers	% of Total
Africa	640	6.3
East Asia and the Pacific	468	4.6
Central and South Asia	914	9
Middle East	—	—
Europe	8,104	79.9
Central and South America	8	0.1
North America	13	0.1

Sources: *Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2007*, Center on International Co-operations

Table 5. Origin of UN Military Personnel in Africa by Region: 31 October 2006

Region	Troops/ Military Observers	% of Total
Africa	17,943	32.9
East Asia and the Pacific	2,414	4.4
Central and South Asia	28,468	52.2
Middle East	2,197	4
Europe	1,551	2.8
Central and South America	1,957	3.6
North America	57	0.1

Sources: *Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2007*, Center on International Co-operations

Other data which encourages the more positive participation of China in UN peacekeeping is the increasing number of non-UN peace operations which have been established outside of Asia. For example, according to the datum on the global deployment of military personnel to peace operations in October in 2008, UN operations account for less than half (48%) of the entire peace operations. NATO operations are catching up with the UN, accounting for 40%. The peace operations led by other organizations such as the EU, the AU and ECOWAS, all of which are outside of Asia, account for 12%.⁴¹ This is a significant indicator that UN operations might be replaced by regional peace operations as a main actor of peacekeeping. However, it is not probable that regional organizations will set up their own peacekeeping operations in Asia in the near future. This means that all of the conflicts or post-conflict situations in Asia will be solved and managed by UN-led operations, but at the same time UN peacekeeping will be able to invite fewer non-Asian personnel as peacekeepers in the future than at present. Therefore, China will have to place higher priority on participation in UN peacekeeping.

On the whole, the above data is evidence that although there is increasing demand and supply for peacekeeping, one can identify imbalance and inequality on the dispatch side. This imbalance and inequality is not suitable for peacekeeping in Asia. UN peacekeeping, except for ones in the Middle East, have already been marginalized or will be more seriously marginalized. This encourages China to play a more active role as UN peacekeepers in Asia.

Meanwhile, it is considered that China has considerable potential to contribute to post-conflict peace-building by the UN. Although peace-building missions originated as early as the 1960s, the demands of state-building have increased in the post-Cold War period when a number of internal conflicts in Asia and Africa necessitated the building of newly-democratised states. UN peace-building requires not only security-building but also capacity-building and confidence-building. Post-conflict security-building emphasises human security such as refugee repatriation, DDR⁴², and the protection of human rights by peacekeeping forces. Capacity-building in UN operations should include a variety of elements such as good governance, law enforcement and judicial frameworks, democratisation, social and economic development, infrastructure, medical services and education. Confidence-building will also be needed by local people in the post-conflict peace process. Therefore, it can be said that post-conflict UN peace-building is multi-functional, requiring a variety of non-military and civilian sectors. In this sense, peace-building is a highly suitable UN operation which China would be willing to commit. UN peace-building requires strong civil-military relations. Furthermore, since peace-building operations require a strong regional commitment to confidence-building, a post-conflict peace process in Asia-Pacific region requires China's commitment for regional peace and security. In December 2005, the Peace-building Commission was established

by the UN General Assembly and Security Council. This Commission, which was established on the recommendation of the High-level Panel on Threat, Challenges and Change in 2004⁴³, is an inter-governmental advisory body which helps states in peace-building. China is the member of the Peace-building Commission, as a permanent member of the Security Council. Therefore, China should take an initiative in establishing regional peace-building mechanism.

5. Conclusion:

Peacekeeping operations have been a significant instrument in conflict resolution for international peace and security. Many UN member states have recognized this significance, and have expressed the will to contribute to UN peacekeeping as a duty of member states, and also as a part of their desire for international peace. States can also serve their national interests by dispatching personnel to UN peacekeeping from the international and domestic perspectives.

This paper indicated that China, which has adopted a “UN centred policy”, had domestic restraints on dispatching their troops to UN peacekeeping during the Cold-War period. The norms of state sovereignty and non-intervention prevented China from participating in all of the UN peacekeeping missions during the Cold War period. However, China’s shift to a pro-peacekeeping policy has been remarkable. China’s support of the norms of state sovereignty and non-intervention was compromised by the current trend of internal UN peacekeeping. China also recognised the significance of applying itself to the current concepts of conflict resolution emerging from the international community such as the Brahimi Report, human security and “Responsibility to Protect”. Thus China’s flexible policy on UN peacekeeping stems partly from China’s economic interests in the world, including Africa. However, this flexibility stems mainly from a good balance of domestic and international perspectives by China regarding international peacekeeping. This balance has been required by great powers such as the permanent members of the UN Security Council.

Meanwhile, several issues can be identified by the current trend of international peacekeeping itself. While the number of international peacekeeping operations has increased, one can identify the overstretch of peacekeeping operations beyond its capacity. This is mainly due to an excessive adoption of international and liberalists viewpoints. International peacekeeping has suffered from a lack of a geographical balance of operational sites and of the origin of UN military staff, which is mainly due to an excessive to domestic and realists perspectives. Furthermore, the advent of strong non-UN peace operations will lead to the regionalization of peacekeeping. In this sense, it is highly recommended that China shows a strong commitment to UN operations in Asia as positive and consistent peacekeepers.

Notes :

- 1 United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/bnote.htm>. accessed on 8 August 2009
- 2 United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), *Contributors*, New York, February 2005, <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors>
- 3 James A. "Comparative Aspects of Peacekeeping, the Dispatching End, the Receiving End", paper written for the National Centre for Middle East Studies, Cairo and the Jaffee Centre for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, 1996, p. 1
- 4 Kegley C. W. and Wittkopf E. R., *World Politics: Trend and Transformation* (New York: St Martin's Press, 2001), p. 29
- 5 Anderson A. "Democracy and UN Peacekeeping Operations, 1990-1996", *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 7, No. 2, Summer 2000, p. 1
- 6 Wainhouse D. W. *International Peacekeeping at the Crossroads* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), p. 562
- 7 Boutros-Ghali B. "UN Peacekeeping: An Introduction", *Brown Journal of World Affairs*, Vol. 3, No. 1 1996, pp. 17-21
- 8 Lerche Jr. C. O. and Said A. A. *Concepts of International Politics in Global Perspective*, 3rd edition (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1979), p. 28
- 9 James A. *Peacekeeping in International Politics* (London: Macmillan 1990), p. 12
- 10 Bobrow D. B. and Boyer M. A., "Maintaining System Stability: Contributions to Peacekeeping Operations", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 41, No. 6, December 1997, pp. 723-729
- 11 US State Department, "The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations", 16 May 1994, p. 801. The summary of the key elements of the directive states:
In proving our capabilities for peace operations, we will not discard or weaken other tools for achieving US objectives. If US participation in a peace operation were to interfere with our basic military strategy, winning two major regional conflicts nearly simultaneously, we would place our national interest uppermost.
- 12 In June 2009, Pakistan, Bangladesh and India are ranked the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd, respectively, in the ranking of military and police contribution to UN operations, with the number of personnel dispatched being 10,603, 9,982, and 8,607, respectively. United Nations Peacekeeping, Monthly Summary of Contributors of Military and Civilian Personnel, Department of Peacekeeping Operations. <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/>. accessed on 26 July 2009
- 13 Ishizuka K. "Peacekeeping and National Interests: Positive Factors Influencing Potential Contributing States", *Kyoei University Journal*, Vol. 1, 2002, pp. 27-28
- 14 Burns E. L. M. "The Withdrawal of UNEF and the Future of Peacekeeping", *International Journal*, Vol. 23, Part 1, 1967, p. 12
- 15 Cox A. M. *Prospect for Peacekeeping* (Washington D. C.: The Brooking Institution, 1967), pp. 27-32
- 16 He Y. "China's Changing Policy on UN Peacekeeping Operations", Asian Paper, Institute for Security and Development Policy, Sweden, July 2007, pp. 17-18
- 17 Liping X. "China: A Responsible Great Power", *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 10, No. 26, 2001, p. 18 Quoted from He Y. "China's Changing Policy on UN Peacekeeping Operations", p. 22
- 18 International Crisis Group "China's Growing Role in UN Peacekeeping", Asia Report No. 166, 17 April 2007, p. 5
- 19 He Y. p. 21
- 20 The United Nations, *Statistics on United Nations Activities Related to Peace and Security, 1988 to 1994* (New York: the United Nations, 1995)
- 21 Blodgett J. Q. "The Future of UN Peacekeeping", *The Washington Quarterly*, Winter 1991, p. 212

- 22 Goulding M. “The Evolution of United Nations Peace-Keeping”, Cyril Foster Lecture 1993, the Examination School, Oxford University, 4 March 1993
- 23 See International Crisis Group “China’s Growing Role in UN Peacekeeping”, p. 5, and He Y. “China’s Changing Policy on UN Peacekeeping Operations”, p. 24
- 24 According to *the Blue Helmet 1996*, the total number of contributions by states to UN operations between 1948 and 1996 is 905. Therefore, the average number of peacekeeping operations per contributing states per contributing state was 8.1 operations. While there are some criteria for selecting “positive contributing states” to UN peacekeeping operations, if one now focuses on the frequency of dispatch of the states to UN operations, one can assume that the states which contributed to at least 16 UN operations, double the average, can be called “a positive contributing state” to UN peacekeeping operations.
- 25 Both the US and the UK joined 13 operations according to *the Blue Helmet 1996*.
- 26 Zhongying P. “China’s Changing Attitude to UN Peacekeeping”, *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 12, No. 1, Spring 2005, p. 76
- 27 Ibid. p. 74
- 28 UN Document A/55/305-S/2000/809 *Identical letters dated 21 August 2000 from the Secretary-General to the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council*, 21 August 2000, para. 49
- 29 The 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, World Health Organization, 15 September 2005, para. 139
- 30 Teitt S. “China and the Responsibility to Protect”, Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, 19 December 2008, pp. 6-18
- 31 Gill B. and Huang C. “China’s Expanding Peacekeeping Role: its Significance and the Policy Implications”, *SIPRI Policy Brief*, February 2009, p. 6
- 32 Ibid. p. 3
- 33 Ling B. “China’s Peacekeeping Diplomacy”, *International Relations and Institutions* 47, China Rights Forum, No. 1, 2007
- 34 Rios X. “China and the United Nations peace missions”, FRIDE (Fundacion para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Dialogo Exterior), Comment, October 2008, p. 2
- 35 He Y. p. 43
- 36 International Crisis Group “China’s Growing Role in UN Peacekeeping”, p. i
- 37 Ling B. “China’s Peacekeeping Diplomacy”, *International Relations and Institutions* 47, China Rights Forum, No. 1, 2007
- 38 UN Document A/47/277-S/24111, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping*, 17 June 1992
- 39 Center on International Cooperation at New York University, *Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2007: Briefing Paper*, New York University. p. 2
- 40 Ibid. p. 5
- 41 Center on International Cooperation at New York University, *Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2009: Excerpted Form*, New York University, p. 3
- 42 DDR stands for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants.
- 43 UN Document A/59/565, 2 December 2004

Abbreviations:

AU: African Union
DDR: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
DPKO: Department of Peacekeeping Operations
ECOWAS: Economic Community of West African States
EU: European Union
ICISS: International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
IMF: International Monetary Fund
LDP: Liberal Democratic Party
MINURSO: United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
MONUC: United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
ONUC: United Nations Operation in the Congo
ONUMOZ: United Nations Operation in Mozambique
ONUSAL: United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador
PDD-25: Presidential Decision Directive 25
PKO: peacekeeping operations
PLA: People's Liberation Army
R2P: Responsibility to Protect
SIPRI: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
UN: United Nations
UNAMID: African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur
UNAVEM: United Nations Angola Verification Mission
UNDOF: United Nations Disengagement Observer Force
UNEFI: United Nations Emergency Force I
UNFICYP: United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
UNIFIL: United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNIKOM: United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission
UNIPOM: United Nations India-Pakistan Observer Mission
UNMIL: United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNMIN: United Nations Mission in Nepal
UNMIS: United Nations Mission in the Sudan
UNMIT: United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste
UNOCI: United Nations Operation in Cote d'Ivoire
UNOMIL: United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia
UNOTIL: United Nations Office in East Timor
UNOSOM: United Nations Operation in Somalia
UNPROFOR: United Nations Protection Force
UNSAS: United Nations Standby Arrangement System
UNTAC: United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
UNTAET: United Nations Administration in East Timor
UNTAG: United Nations Transition Assistance Group
UNTSO: United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation
WW II : World War II