

# A Comparative Analysis on UN Peace-building

国連平和構築における比較分析

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## 概要

この論文は、東ティモールとカンボジアにおける平和構築活動の比較分析を主目的とする。東ティモールの平和構築は、UNAMET から始まり、その後 Interfet（非国連ミッション）、UNTAET、UNMISSET、UNOTIL そして現在の UNMIT と続いている。当国の平和構築は UNTAET そして UNMISSET 期における熱狂的な国際社会の支持にもかかわらず、その後の 2006 年に起きた政治危機、そして 2008 年のクーデターの失敗を見るようにその評判は徐々に色褪せていったと言える。しかしこのパターンはまさに国連ミッションにおいては東ティモールのその 8 年前に設立されたカンボジアミッションの傾向と一致している。両国における平和構築活動の民主化活動への失敗は、過去の国連平和ミッションにおける教訓に対する対応の不適切さが指摘される。

**キーワード：**国際連合、平和構築、東ティモール、カンボジア、民主化

## Abstract

This paper focuses on the entire peace-building process in Timor-Leste, by comparing with that in Cambodia. Peace-building in Timor-Leste started in UNAMET, following Interfet (non-UN mission), UNTAET, UNMISSET, UNOTIL and UNMIT. Despite the seeming successful completion of UNTAET and UNMISSET, continuing fragile stability, such as the crisis in 2006 and an unsuccessful coup in 2008, has convinced that peace-building in Timor-Leste has not been as successful as had been expected. It is to be noted that this pattern has much similarity to the case in Cambodia in the UNTAC and post-UNTAC periods. The failure in democratization in both states poses a serious question on the effectiveness of the so-called “lesson-learned” strategy in peace operations.

**Keywords:** United Nations, peace-building, Timor-Leste, Cambodia, democratization

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## 1. Introduction

United Nations (UN) peace-building is a relatively new peace operation with multi-functional sectors. The current post-Cold War period especially identifies the increasing demand for post-conflict peace-building.

One can see several theories and arguments on the new advent of peace-building. For example, David Roberts argued that while some state-building efforts have not produced the anticipated results in terms of the rule of law and democracy, the solution is not to rethink the approach per se but to develop the existing model until it does succeed. He encourages internally legitimate plural-indigenous systems with long-term sustainability.<sup>1</sup> Roland Paris argued that peace-building sees its significance in rapid democratization and marketization, and as a result immediate liberalization generated a number of destabilizing side-effects. He therefore suggested longer and more penetrative operations.<sup>2</sup> Simon Chesterman's argument is similar to Paris. He pointed out that UN transitional administrations are still immature enough to have several contradictions between ends and means, bringing about inconsistency, inadequacy, and irrelevancy in UN peace-building.<sup>3</sup> Meanwhile, David Chandler stated using from the case of the Balkans, that state-building non-Western states without self-government

would result in the institutionalization of weak states which have little relationship with their societies and lack legitimate authority.<sup>4</sup>

Similarly, there is much “lesson-learnt” type of literature about UN peace-building. After writing such literature, however, few authors analyzed the next cases on UN operations to confirm whether the lessons which they gave were in fact learnt or not. Unless such lessons are sent to the UN and put into the agenda when it sets up the next mission, the UN will have another “partially-successful” or “unsuccessful” operation or receive similar lessons to the previous ones again. In reality, this negative tendency has frequently happened in UN peacekeeping and peace-building.

In this context, this paper will deal with two states having experienced UN peace operations as post-conflict peace-building measures, Cambodia and Timor-Leste. Both states have commonalities in the background of UN-led peace-building: long-term foreign occupation and extremely brutal human rights violations equivalent to ethnic cleansing. The international community tried to democratize both states by conducting general elections or referenda, and then by initiating huge scale multi-functional UN peace operations.

In fact, the UN peace operations in Cambodia, the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), was said to be a huge success when it completed its mandate and departed from Cambodia in September 1993. This reputation was mainly due to the successful conduct of UN-led democratic elections in May 1993. However, despite such enthusiasm for the successful election, the reputation of UNTAC has been gradually tarnished by the subsequent political and democratic stalemate in the state. In fact, according to one survey conducted in 2004, only 30% of the Cambodian people assessed UNTAC positively.<sup>5</sup> This was also recognized by a number of academic literature critical of the comprehensive assessment of the peace-building process in Cambodia by the international community.

This paper will mainly focus on the utility of such lessons-learnt type of literature on the Cambodian peace-building process for Timor-Leste, which has a similar background to Cambodia and started about seven years after the Cambodian peace-process. Therefore, it can be argued that the case of Timor-Leste is the best position to

learn from the lessons of Cambodia suggested by academics and practitioners.

The conclusion of this paper will give a negative view to adhering on the lesson-learned analysis and will encourage to broaden a wider view to adapt to post-conflict peace-building.

## 2. Legitimacy of Research: Commonalities in the Background of Peace-building between Cambodia and Timor-Leste

First of all, both Cambodia and Timor-Leste have long histories of foreign occupation. Cambodia became independent from France in 1953. During the Vietnam War in the 1960s, Cambodian territory was used by Vietnamese guerrillas to move supplies and establish bases to fight against the US and South Vietnamese troops. Consequently, Cambodia suffered many casualties due to the secret bombing from the US military. In 1978, Vietnamese troops invaded Cambodia to overthrow the Maoist Khmer Rouge regime, with tens of thousands of Cambodian people fleeing to Thailand as refugees. A new government was established in Cambodia by the Vietnamese. The Vietnamese-led Government ruled Cambodia until the early 1990s. Timor-Leste had been colonized by Portugal for about 400 years until 1974, when civil wars broke out among the factions which supported independence and integration with Indonesia. In December 1975, more than 1,000 Indonesian troops landed in the capital of Dili, and occupied the territory of Timor-Leste. Without any international recognition of Indonesia's annexation of Timor-Leste, in May 1976 the Indonesian Parliament approved Timor-Leste as the 27<sup>th</sup> province of the state. Since then, a constant size of 15,000-20,000 Indonesian troops had been deployed in Timor-Leste until 1999.

It should also be noted that both Cambodia and Timor-Leste experienced the history of genocide and resistance. As Ben Kiernan put in his book *Genocide and Resistance in Southeast Asia*, two cases of genocide and extermination in Cambodia and East Timor began in the same year, 1975. The Khmer Rouge regime led by Pol Pot ruled Cambodia from 1975 to 1979, and Indonesia's Suharto regime ruled East Timor (Timor-Leste) from 1975 to 1999. Both regimes inflicted casualties in similar proportions. Each caused the deaths of about one-fifth of the population.<sup>6</sup> Despite such serious violations of human rights, the UN Security Council remained amazingly quiet to both Cambodia

and Timor-Leste. In terms of Cambodia, after the Soviet use of their veto in 1976, the UN Security Council did not take up the issue of Cambodia again until 1990.<sup>7</sup> Similarly, the UN Security Council had treated the East Timorese issue as an internal Indonesian matter. Indeed, only two UN Security Council resolutions<sup>8</sup> were adopted on Timor-Leste during the Cold War era.

In Cambodia, under the Khmer Rouge's rule, all foreigners were expelled and embassies closed. The use of foreign languages was banned. Newspapers and television stations were shut down. Money was forbidden. All businesses were shuttered, religion banned, education halted, healthcare eliminated, and parental authority revoked. Millions of Cambodians were forced into slave labor in "the killing fields".<sup>9</sup> The final figure of mortality due to forced labor, torture, execution, malnutrition, or disease in Cambodia was approximately 1.7 million.

Indonesia's rule in Timor-Leste had also been maintained in the most brutal way by Indonesian military. In the two months after Indonesia's invasion of 1975, 60,000 East Timorese people for independence were claimed killed by Indonesian troops, and from the time of the invasion in 1975, the Indonesian forces were directly responsible for one of the worst levels of mortality of any society in post-War history.<sup>10</sup> Many East Timorese were, before they were killed, ill-treated or tortured in custody. Forms of torture included beatings with iron bars, batons and fists, burnings with lighted cigarettes, slashing with razor blades and immersion for long periods in fetid water.<sup>11</sup> Estimated mortality of Timor-Leste was approximately 170,000.

Furthermore, in both cases, most of the brutal killings occurred in the five-year period from 1975 to 1980. Cambodia and East Timor not only shared the experience of genocide but also civil war.<sup>12</sup> Such serious human rights violations combined with huge scales of mortality and civil wars were almost totally ignored during the Cold War by the international community. Then, in the post-Cold War period, both Cambodia and Timor-Leste engendered deep sympathy and led to international interventions in the form of UN peace operations.

Since the Vietnamese military invaded and ruled Cambodia in 1979, a civil war had prevailed. In 1982, the Khmer Rouge, FUNCINPEC (Front Uni Nationale Pour Un

Cambodge Independent, Neutre, pacifique, et Cooperatif) led by Sihanouk and his son Nordon Ranariddh, and the KPNLF (Khmer People's National Liberation Front), a pro-Western group led by Son Sann, joined forces and created the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK). After several years of military stalemate, a negotiation process began. After several negotiations among the four factions initiated by western powers and ASEAN countries, the Paris Accord was signed to settlement of the entire Cambodia conflict, on 23 October 1991. The Paris Accord had two primary goals: to end international involvement in the war; and to transform the military conflict into a political contest.<sup>13</sup> To achieve these goals, the Paris Accord mandated UNTAC, commencing in February 1992, for the peace-building process in multi-dimensional sectors such as military functions, civil administration, elections, human rights, refugee repatriation, and economic rehabilitation.<sup>14</sup>

Meanwhile, in the post Cold War period East Timor's independence also gained international support after witnessing a significant level of human rights abuses by Indonesian troops. Furthermore, several factors affected international responses and encouraged the process of self-determination by the East Timorese people. These included: the so-called 'Santa Cruise massacre'<sup>15</sup> of November 1991, and the replacement of the Suharto regime in 1998 followed by the East Asian currency crisis. On 5 May 1999, the "5 May Agreement" was signed by Indonesia, Portugal and the UN, enabling the UN Secretary General to hold a referendum on Indonesia's autonomy package. The Agreement led to the UN Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) and the following UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) in October 1999. It was the first operation in which the UN took control of the departments of Government in Timor-Leste such as Finance, Justice, Infrastructure, Economic and Social Affairs etc. UNTAET took on a huge variety of responsibilities, such as responsibility for policing as well as for elections, executive, legislative and judicial sectors, and treaty-making. Thus, both Cambodia and Timor-Leste accepted peace operations which were the largest in UN history and both operations played a significant role in "Transitional" functions ("Authority" and "Administration", respectively).

### 3. The Case of Cambodia

#### 3-1 Lessons Learnt from UNTAC

Much of the literature on peace-building in Cambodia concludes that UNTAC was a partial success. It is generally accepted that international attention to Cambodia and the advent of UNTAC contributed to the termination of long-lasting civil wars in Cambodia at least. One of the most important factors indicating the successful operation of UNTAC was its conduct of the general election in May 1993. About 90% of registered voters participated. The electoral process was rather peaceful, and the Khmer Rouge did not disrupt the voting process. FUNCINPEC took over 45 percent of the vote and won 58 of the 120 seats in the new Constituent Assembly. The Cambodian People's Party (CPP) finished in second place and got 38 percent of the vote and 51 seats. The Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party (BLDP) finished in third, getting only 4 percent and 10 seats. Yasushi Akashi, Special Representative of the UN Secretary General, declared that the election was totally free and fair, and appealed to all sides to respect the outcome of the vote.<sup>16</sup> States' holding successful general elections by the UN or by themselves is generally regarded as a symbol of a democratic society. It was also significant for UNTAC that 372,000 refugees were successfully repatriated from the camps in Thailand and near the border, with the support of other humanitarian and relief agencies and NGOs. The success of UNTAC contributed to enhancing, or at least, maintaining, the reputation of UN peace operations themselves, since several other UN operations established at nearly the same period, such as ones in Somalia (United Nations Operations in Somalia: UNOSOM II) and in the former Yugoslavia (United Nations Protection Force: UNPROFOR), had been seriously criticized for their peace-keeping and enforcing performances.

As UNTAC has been considered as a partial or "qualified" success, international society can learn a number of lessons from UNTAC. The first lesson is on rapid deployment and preparedness. Trevor Findlay agreed that UNTAC's late deployment was one of the biggest flaws of the Cambodian mission.<sup>17</sup> The plan for UNTAC was not presented to the Security Council until 19 February 1992, four months after the Paris Accord, and UNTAC itself was not fully deployed until almost nine months after the signing of the Paris Accord. Lise Howard pointed out several causes for the delayed



deployment of UNTAC: France and Australia's rivalry over the leadership in Cambodia's peace process; the delay of logistics preparation due to inclement weather; the difficulty in managing UNTAC in addition to two other large UN operations in Somalia and the former Yugoslavia; and the subsequent slow procedures for deciding budgets for UNTAC.<sup>18</sup> It can also be argued that the delays were due to UNTAC's slow discovery of the realities that Cambodia suffered complete devastation of its infrastructure and human resources after two decades of war, a genocidal regime, foreign occupation and international isolation.<sup>19</sup> Michael Doyle argued that late deployment lost the momentum derived from popular support, from the commitment of the parties, and from the psychological weight associated with a large operation moving rapidly towards an agreed goal.<sup>20</sup> James Schear also claimed that the delay in UNTAC deployment, most damagingly, contributed to a sense of political drift and disarray allowing the four Khmer factions, in particular the Khmer Rouge and the Hun Sen regime (CPP), to hedge positions on full compliance with the Paris Accord.<sup>21</sup>

The second lesson to be learnt, which is related to the first, is the difficulty for UN peace operations to ensure a sufficiently neutral political environment for the election. The creation of "a neutral political environment conducive to free and fair elections" was a key provision of the Paris Accord.<sup>22</sup> However, such a neutral political environment seemed to be difficult to create in Cambodia given the state's historical background:

*The agreement between the Cambodians which the Paris Accords embodied were extremely fragile, not only because of the bitterness and animosities aroused by decades of civil war but also because fundamentally they were the product of efforts made by the international community rather than by Cambodia themselves. To a great extent the Accords were pressed on a mostly reluctant Cambodian elite by an international community eager to be rid of the Cambodian problem.*<sup>23</sup>

On 11 January 1993, less than five months before the elections, Mr. Yasushi Akashi in UNTAC declared that the neutral political atmosphere indispensable for free and fair elections had not yet been achieved. Hendrickson argued that UNTAC could not neutralize the power of the CPP. Therefore, the Khmer Rouge, which had been "instinctively suspicious and emotionally unprepared for a (Cambodian) settlement",<sup>24</sup> refused to



participate in the elections and in the demobilization process. Thus, the Khmer Rouge's departure from the Cambodian peace process prevented UNTAC from implementing one pillar of its mandate of the cantonment, disarmament, and demobilization of 70 percent of local forces.

The third lesson learnt from UNTAC is the significance of civilian components including civil police in a peacekeeping and transitional mission. Since most of the states requesting post-conflict peace-building missions desperately need to enhance the domestic rule of law and to retrain local police forces, there is currently an increasing demand for civil police in UN peace-building. However, in the early 1990s policing was a relatively new experience for the UN. In fact, there were many problems with civil police in UNTAC. UNTAC's 3,600-strong civilian police component (CIVPOL), drawn from 32 UN member states, was not fully deployed until the end of 1992. The quality of police personnel was extremely uneven. Many came from constabulary and paramilitary backgrounds and were not adept at community-based police techniques. A significant number could speak neither English nor French, the operation's two official languages as well as the native language of Khmer. Yasushi Akashi also admitted that thirteen of the 14 states which contributed more than 100 CIVPOLs were developing countries, where police forces are often associated with indiscipline, human rights abuses and corruption.

The fourth lesson is the so-called "exit strategy". Many involved in UNTAC claimed that UNTAC departed from Cambodia too early. For example, Ashley claimed that there was still no effective institution and no legal enforceable legal provision when UNTAC left.<sup>25</sup> A Force Commander of UNTAC, Sanderson, supported Ashley from the viewpoint of democracy-building. He argued that although the UN stayed in Cambodia after its role as the transitional authority was concluded this presence merely assured the international community that surrounding nations stayed out of Cambodian affairs, complying with the Paris Accord. This was, however, much less than many Cambodian people expected.<sup>26</sup> Such an early withdrawal of UNTAC negatively influenced the democratization process in its aftermath in Cambodia as mentioned in the next section.

### 3-2 Cambodia in the post-UNTAC Period

UNTAC terminated its mission and withdrew its personnel in September 1993.

However, the political environment in Cambodia in the aftermath of withdrawal was far from democratic. Even after the 1993 election, the ongoing hostility between Hun Sen's CPP and Ranariddh's FUNCINPEC in the Coalition Government resulted in political stalemate in Cambodia. Furthermore, the Coalition Government was extremely unwilling to accept political opposition. The Government's response to Sam Rainsy and his Khmer Nation Party (KNP) was a significant indicator of this attitude. Rainsy protested against Government-level corruption after he had served as the first Finance Minister in the Coalition Government for two years following the 1993 election. The Government did not accept Rainsy's party as legitimate, claiming that KNP did not file proper the documents. Similarly, the BLDP was not allowed to hold a party congress in Phnom Penh for seemingly technical reasons.<sup>27</sup> These repressive attitudes of the Government towards opposition contrasted with the UN policy in the 1993 election where as many as twenty parties participated. In 1996, there was a serious incident at the office of the BLDP in which three grenades were thrown, resulting in many injuries.<sup>28</sup>

In early 1997, there were outbreaks of military clashes between the CPP and FUNCINPEC in Phnom Penh and some other cities. Civil war finally broke out in July 1997. Hun Sen ransacked FUNCINPEC offices and newspapers. Civil rights activists estimated that extra-judicial killings continued for days. Ranariddh was virtually ousted. FUNCINPEC forces collapsed, and the conflict was resolved by the superior force of arms. However, the international community including ASEAN supported Ranariddh's claim that the war had been a pre-emptive coup by Hun Sen. Therefore, Ranariddh returned to Phnom Penh under international protection and took part in internationally-monitored elections in June 1998.<sup>29</sup> However, after the 1998 elections<sup>30</sup>, Ranariddh no longer played a leading role in Cambodian politics, and Hun Sen increasingly dominated.

In his paper "Democracy in Cambodia - One Decade, US\$5 Billion Later: What Went Wrong?", Ronald Bruce St John attributed the above events to Cambodian culture. He argued that in Cambodia the Western concept of a loyal opposition was an imported idea alien to traditional culture in a country where no government had ever given up power without fighting. Cambodian leaders traditionally considered domestic politics as "a zero-sum game".<sup>31</sup> Hun Sen could not tolerate any form of opposition and dissent. In the end, as Roberts pointed out, the democratization process in Cambodia

merely changed the vehicle for communicating hostility and confrontation, from war to elections at the elite level.<sup>32</sup>

The democratization process in Cambodia has also faced difficulties due to limitation of the human rights and widespread corruption in many sectors. For example, freedom of the press was significantly curtailed in the post-UNTAC period. A number of Cambodia journalists, who took an anti-government line, were killed, injured, or arrested and some of them received severe sentences for trivial offences.<sup>33</sup> Meanwhile, the judicial system was controlled by politicians. As Woods put it:

*Without the restraint and accountability of the courts, the executive branch continues to gain power and can imprison or release an accused as it wishes. ... Dissenting political parties are persecuted and, politically, the people are caught between fear and inaction.*<sup>34</sup>

In fact, one could see multiple forms of corruption in Cambodia. They included, for example, bribery in the manufacturing and service sectors, non-payment of taxes, government-sponsored smuggling, and so-called “ghost” and non-existent soldiers and civil servants drawing salaries.<sup>35</sup>

One of the objects of establishing UNTAC was democratization in Cambodia. Cambodia’s democratization seemed to be significantly improved by the successful completion of the UN-led election in 1993. However, in retrospect, it was clear that the UN overestimated the effectiveness of the “democratic” elections contributing to the building of a democratic state. Cambodian politics has been going back to its old system of a one-party state. Furthermore, Cambodia has been suffering from social injustice and corruption. Elite politics has hardly changed since the democratization initiatives taken by UNTAC.

#### 4. The Case of Timor-Leste

##### 4-1 A Comparative Analysis

UN peace-building should evolve. As mentioned above, this paper identified a lot of commonalities in the peace-building process between Cambodia and Timor-Leste. Meanwhile, UN peace-building in Timor-Leste, which started in 1999 and therefore had

about a seven-year gap with that of Cambodia, should have learnt several lessons from UNTAC.

First, the UN peace-building process in Timor-Leste has been a longer term mission than Cambodia. While the UN spent less than 2 years for its two peace missions, United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC) and UNTAC in Cambodia, the UN has been involved in Timor-Leste for more than seven years, as Table 1. indicates. There have been five UN missions in Timor-Leste. Such a long commitment of the UN to Timor-Leste indicates not only the organization's stronger will but also presumably lessons learnt from previous missions such as UNTAC.

Table 1.

Cambodia

Peace Missions	Duration	Mandates
UNAMIC	Oct.1991-Mar. 1992	Assisting the Cambodian parties to maintain their Ceasefire
UNTAC	Feb. 1992-Sep. 1993	Comprehensive peace-building including conducting elections

Timor-Leste

Peace Missions	Durations	Mandate
UNAMET	Jun. 1999-Oct. 1999	Conducting referendum
INTERFET	Sep. 1999-Oct. 1999	Suppressing the rebellion after the referendum
UNTAET	Oct. 1999-May. 2002	Comprehensive nation-building toward independence
UNMISSET	May 2002-Aug. 2005	Training troops and police after independence
UNOTIL	Aug. 2005-Aug. 2006	Good office mission in the stabilized period
UNMIT	Aug. 2006-	Suppressing riots and training police

INTERFET: International Force for East Timor (Non-UN Mission)

(Source: Compiled by the Author)

UNMISSET: United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor

UNOTIL: United Nations Office in Timor-Leste

UNMIT: United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste

Second, when one compares UNTAC in Cambodia and UNTAET in Timor-Leste, UNTAET has more extensive power than UNTAC, as can be seen from Table 2. Indeed, UNTAET was the first UN mission that had treaty-making powers.

Table 2.

Mission	Date	Police	Elections	Executive	Legislative	Judicial	Treaty
UNITAG (Namibia)	1989-1990		Yes				
UNTAC (Cambodia)	1992-1993	Yes	Yes	As necessary			
UNMIK (Kosovo)	1999-	Yes	Yes (OSCE)	Yes	Yes	Yes	
UNTAET (Timor-Leste)	1999-2002	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

(Source: Chesterman S. *You, the People: Transitional Administration, State-Building and the United Nations*, An International Peace Academy Report, November 2003)

UNITAG: United Nations Transition Assistance Group

UNMIK: United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo

Table 3. indicates the comparison in authorized maximum strength of personnel between UNTAC in Cambodia and UNTAET in Timor-Leste. It can be concluded that both missions were authorized with massive strength and that UNTAC started its mission with larger strength than UNTAET. However, there was a huge difference in population between the two countries, and as can be seen from the factor of population per UN Military, UNTAET was a relatively more extensive mission. (While a PKF soldier in UNTAC was supposed to protect 813 Cambodian people on average, in UNTAET a soldier took responsibility of protecting only 111 East Timorese.)

Table 3.

Authorized Maximum Strength and National Populations

	Cambodia (UNTAC)	Timor-Leste (UNTAET)
Military	16,440	9,150
Civilian Police	3,500	1,640
International Civilian Staff	1,149	1,288
Contributing States	46 states	47 states
National Populations (,000)	13,363 (2004)	1,019 (2004)
Populations per UN Military	813	111

(Source: <http://www.un.org/> Author's Calculations)

The key conclusion that can be drawn from the above three Tables is that the UN made a stronger commitment to peace-building in Timor-Leste than Cambodia. The UN has spent more time, assumed more responsibilities and committed more forces to the former than the latter.

Why did the UN decide to give such a strong- or maybe the strongest- commitment to Timor-Leste? Several reasons can be considered to answer the question. First of all,

UN peace-building in Timor-Leste had to fill a political, economic and social vacuum created by the militia campaign in 1999. In short, it had to start from scratch. It was totally different from the case of Cambodia. Therefore, the UN required a larger scale of military strength and civilian personnel to initiate nation-building in Timor-Leste.

Second, the UN peace operations which had been established before UNTAET, such as that in the former Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR) and Rwanda (United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda: UNAMIR) had been universally criticized in terms of operational effectiveness and implementation. These operations gave the international community the lessons that extensive peace operations, especially led by Chapter VII of the UN Charter, require more robust mandates. This was also recognized by the UN official report, the “Brahimi Report”<sup>36</sup> of August 2000.

#### 4-2 Is Peace-building in Timor-Leste learning from Cambodia?

##### 4-2-1 Rapid deployment and preparedness?

As mentioned earlier, UNTAC in 1992 had a serious problem on rapid deployment and preparedness. This lesson was not learnt in peace-building in Timor-Leste.

In September 2002, a large and extensive conference on UNTAET, “The United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor” (UNTAET): Debriefing and Lessons, was held and co-sponsored by the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), the Institute of Policy Studies (IPS) of Singapore, and the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA), in Tokyo. Several participants from UNTAET accepted the fact that UNTAET commenced without proper planning.

The planning of UNTAET followed the pattern of the UN administration in Kosovo. However, Takashima Kawakami, Director of the International Peace Cooperation Division in the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, pointed out that the degree of the burden of the UN’s mission in East Timor was different from that of Kosovo. In Kosovo, tasks were divided into four categories, three of which were under the responsibility of UNHCR, OSCE and the EU, and security was in the hands of the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR). However, in the case of Timor-Leste, UNTAET took responsible for everything, including the military sector, which was handed over from INTERFET.<sup>37</sup> Furthermore, UNTAET was the first UN mission with a mandate to

enforce peace under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and to build capacity and to govern simultaneously. Despite early predictions of deployment, there was an underestimation of the time required to plan. It was initially planned that UNTAET be set up by November 1999,<sup>38</sup> although actual deployment occurred one month earlier. Accordingly, the planning was initiated by an *ad hoc* team within the UN Headquarters as a matter of urgency and was under enormous pressure. At the time, the UN was also involved in the planning and setting-up process of two other UN peacekeeping operations, namely the UN Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMISIL) and a mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC). According to Bob Breen, a researcher at the Australian National University, there were limited administrative capabilities in UN Headquarters for preparation of UNTAET.<sup>39</sup> There was also unnecessary internal friction between the Department of Political Affairs (DPA)<sup>40</sup> and Department of Peace Keeping Operations (DPKO) regarding the planning of UNTAET. In fact, the DPKO was not confirmed in its role until September 1999. The sudden departure of all Indonesian administrators and experts from Timor-Leste had a negative impact on proper planning and the establishment process of UNTAET.

As a result, the *ad hoc* planning team had to improvise staff tables and profiles, and was not capable of producing a transitional administration plan. They were not provided with time to visit East Timor to receive a briefing from UNAMET staff to help assess the local situation, or to analyse and anticipate any possible difficulties for UNTAET.<sup>41</sup> Furthermore, the Special Representative of the Secretary General arrived in Dili almost four weeks after the adoption of Security Council Resolution 1272 of 25 October 1999. Many of the key staff and much of the logistical support did not arrive until the early months of 2000. Therefore, as James Batley, Assistant Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade for the Australian Government, put it, “For many weeks ... UNTAET was a skeleton operation at best.”<sup>42</sup> It was inevitable that UNTAET would take several months to establish a proper roadmap for its operations. The delay in setting up UNTAET forced several professionals to return to regular jobs or find alternative employment to secure an income.

Recruiting international and local staff gave rise to several serious problems. Kawakami pointed out that no organisation in East Timor was able to provide experienced civil administrators, whose participation would have made a significant



difference in the work of the administration. Furthermore, there were only a few full-time staff members on the teams.<sup>43</sup> The relationship between the East Timorese and international community underlined the gap in understanding and expectations; the East Timorese expected UNTAET to come in and solve their problems overnight, whilst international staff were still deciding what to do after their arrival. Thus, the extreme gap in the conception towards UNTAET led to a perception by the East Timorese of UNTAET as “neo-colonizers”.<sup>44</sup>

It is debatable whether the initial timetable for UNTAET was adequate and proper. The schedule to East Timorese official independence on 20 May 2002 was so hectic that some Timorese leaders would have preferred a five-year transition to independence. Bishop Carlos Ximenes Belo also expressed the concern that the political timetable was so short that there was likely to be a highly volatile electorate at the time of the election. The timetable was essentially created by UN Headquarters and UNTAET, which thwarted subsequent East Timorese attempts to revise it.<sup>45</sup> The lack of inflexibility by UNTAET on the transition timetable negatively influenced the following administrative and political process towards independence.

Thus, there were many problems on rapid deployment and preparedness in the peace-building process in Timor-Leste. As mentioned previously, the mandate of UNTAET was the biggest and most ambitious ever. Unfortunately, this was not properly appreciated by the UN Headquarters. However, such improvisation, an underestimation of the scale of the problem and an immaturity within UN Headquarters had already been experienced in UNTAC in Cambodia in 1992, as has been stated before.

#### 4-2-2 Political settlement and democratization?

In Cambodia, the hostility between two major political parties, the CPP and FUNCINPEC, led to deterioration of the political settlement in the state even after the withdrawal of UNTAC. A similar situation can be identified in the case of Timor-Leste.

In Timor-Leste, after peace- and nation-building was initiated by the involvement of the UN in 1999, it became clear that the revolutionary leader Xanana Gusmao and the key members of Fretilin, which Gusmao previously led, displayed hostility to each other. When Timor-Leste became independent and Gusmao became the first president

in May 2002, the new state adopted a semi-presidential system. This political system has four organs of governance: the government, the president, the parliament and the courts, and it became disproportionately imbalanced in terms of powers, with the government being extraordinarily strong compared with the other three. Especially, the power of Gusmao as president became minimized in the state's constitution because of this rivalry. In particular, political rivalry between President Gusmao and Prime Minister Alkatiri negatively influenced capacity-building on governance. President Gusmao supported pluralism in the political system in Timor-Leste, favoring a multi-party system, while Prime Minister Alkatiri tried to enhance authoritarian tendencies in the ruling party of Fretilin. Although Gusmao's policy of a multi-party system should be widely supported for the principle of democracy in general, in Timor-Leste the single party policy of Alkatiri also gained broad support from many Timorese people who had experienced the history of bloody party struggle for independence during the Indonesian occupation period. Gusmao and Alkatiri also had different views on how state-building should be conducted in their new nation. Gusmao preferred depending on more international troops and organizations, while Alkatiri supported the policy of "Timorization". Although Timorization was broadly supported in 2002 and 2003, the rapid downsizing of international advisors in civil services diminished the speed of capacity-building.

The above hostility and political instability in Timor-Leste chronically brought about serious civil unrest and riots. On 4 December 2002, a large scale riot erupted among local people in the capital of Dili. This riot resulted in two deaths. In January 2003, pro-Indonesian militiamen murdered six East Timorese villagers with the aim of destabilizing the newly-independent state.<sup>46</sup>

Above all, political unrest in Timor-Leste was revealed by a series of events culminating in a political, humanitarian and security crisis in April and May 2006, what came to be known as the "2006 Crisis". The crisis originated in January 2006 when the group called "the petitioners" claimed mismanagement and discrimination within the military, the F-FDTL. In February 2006, 418 petitioners held a march on the Presidential Palace, requesting President Xanana Gusmao to respond. On 24 April 2006, 594 dismissed soldiers and their supporters started four days of demonstrations in the capital of Dili after negotiations between the soldiers and senior police officers in

PNTL. On 28 April, several youths broke through the lines of the police and attacked the Government Building. It triggered the deterioration of security in the entire area of Dili. The anger and distrust among the Timorese led to the spread of huge riots throughout the city of Dili. As a result, many public and private buildings were seriously damaged, and about 15,000 Timorese people sought refuge in churches, public buildings and the UN facilities in Dili, while others left for the districts.<sup>47</sup>

In the national congress of the ruling Fretilin party on 17-19 May 2006, Prime Minister Alkatiri was re-elected Fretilin's Secretary-General. However, the voting method was changed from a secret ballot to a show of hand-raising. Therefore, many citizens in Dili showed suspicion in terms of the legitimacy of the vote. Meanwhile, the then Interior Minister Rogerio Lobato was alleged to distribute the weapons of PNTL to two militia groups to use them against their political opponents. He was sentenced to seven years and six months imprisonment for this allegation in March 2007. F-FDTL also began to arm civilians on 24 May 2006. This was done on the order of Brigadier General Ruak and with the knowledge of the Minister of Defence, Rogue Rodrigues, and Prime Minister Alkatiri.<sup>48</sup> Alkatiri was also forced to resign after this allegation in June 2006. Furthermore, in May 2006, the solidarity in F-FDTL was ruined when Major Alfred Reinado, the head of the military police in F-FDTL, refused an order from army leaders to act against the 594 petitioning soldiers. He and his followers instead left the army and took to the mountains, armed with guns.<sup>49</sup> There was increasing confrontation between the F-FDTL and PNTL. This confrontation culminated on 25 May 2006, when members of F-FDTL opened fire on PNTL officers when they were escorted by UN officers from the PNTL headquarters. This incident resulted in the killing of eight PNTL officers and injuring more than 25.<sup>50</sup>

Furthermore, in February 2008, the new President Jose Ramos Horta was shot and seriously injured in an attack by the rebel leader Alfred Reinado, who was himself shot dead. An assassination attempt was also made on the new Prime Minister Xanana Gusmao.

*The Economist* argued, "Timor-Leste has collapsed through a combination of incompetent and faction-ridden government, deep poverty and lingering political splits that go back to the independence struggle."<sup>51</sup> The UN Secretary-General mentioned in

his report to the Security Council that the causes of the crisis in Timor-Leste stemmed from political, institutional, historical, social and economic dimensions.<sup>52</sup> Political stalemate in Timor-Leste can also be recognized by the fact that about 100,000 Timorese people still remain in the refugee camps to which they fled in the 2006 Crisis.<sup>53</sup>

It can be noted that the case of Timor-Leste has another significant commonality with that of Cambodia. Both UNTAC in Cambodia and UNTAET and UNMISSET in Timor-Leste collected highly positive evaluations as successful cases of UN operations when they completed their mandates and withdrew. However, despite such applause in the early stage, the entire peace-building process could not be improved as expected in both states, especially in terms of political stability and democratization. Gradually, the assessments of the two UN peace operations by practitioners and academics have been deteriorating. Eventually, they were called “a partial success” at best. Arguably, the case of Timor-Leste will be more serious, since the UN peace-building efforts were initiated with financially and physically stronger commitments than Cambodia.

Furthermore, it is to be noted that one of the main causes of political instability in Cambodia was identified in the case of Timor-Leste. That is, the hostility between Gusmao and Fretilin led by Alkatiri in Timor-Leste in early 2000s is comparable with that between Hun Sen and Ranariddh in Cambodia in the late 1990s. In Timor-Leste, although Fretilin could not be a government party, it did not accept itself as a “loyal opposition”. Fretilin started as a political party aiming at the independence of East Timor from Indonesia by means of guerrilla warfare. Therefore, such a belligerent tradition discouraged Fretilin from giving up without a fight, similar to Cambodian political parties.

In terms of democratization, the judicial issue has also been problematic in Timor-Leste, which is similar to Cambodia. A key issue which one can identify is the premature departure of the international mission from the justice sector of Timor-Leste. The Serious Crimes Unit (SCU) and Special Panels for Serious Crimes were established in 2000 by UNTAET, and mandated to conduct investigations, prosecutions, and judicial proceedings relevant to serious crimes committed in 1999 in Timor-Leste. Since the SCU commenced its mission, 95 indictments have been filed with the Special Panel, indicting 391 persons. Among them were numbers of Indonesian National Military

(TNI) including General Wiranto, six high-ranking TNI commanders, and the former Governor of East Timor. On 18 February 2005, the Commission of Experts to Review the Prosecution of Serious Violations of Human Rights in Timor-Leste in 1999 (COE) was established following the request of the UN Security Council to the Secretary-General. The report of the COE concluded that the serious crimes process in the SCU has not yet achieved full accountability.<sup>54</sup>

However, the SCU prematurely withdrew from Timor-Leste. In accordance with Security Council Resolution 1543 of 14 May 2004, the SCU completed all investigations by November 2004, and concluded all trials in the Special Panels by 20 May 2005.<sup>55</sup> As an alternative measure, the Governments of Indonesia and Timor-Leste established the Commission of Truth and Friendship (CTF) on 11 August 2005. The CTF is tasked with establishing the conclusive truth of the events prior to and after the referendum of 1999, with a view to promoting reconciliation and friendship.<sup>56</sup> The Governments claimed that the question of justice and accountability must be considered within the context of the political realities of each country and with a view to forging a healthy bilateral relationship. However, the Commission of Experts (COE) found that the CTF contradicted international standards of denial of impunity for serious crimes.<sup>57</sup> The Secretary-General also viewed that it would be deeply regrettable if due to the CTF the reconciliation process foreclosed the possibility of achieving accountability for serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law.<sup>58</sup>

At the same time, the Commission for Reception Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR), with the UN's backing, investigated crimes against humanity for the period from Indonesia's invasion in 1975 to the killings as it withdrew in 1999. Its extensive final report, published in 2005, called for prosecution of serious crimes, although it has been virtually ignored by the Government of Timor-Leste as well as the international community.<sup>59</sup>

## 5. Results of Questionnaires

In 2004, the Japanese Ministry for Foreign Affairs conducted a survey by questionnaire to the people of the states which experienced post-conflict peace-building, including Cambodia and Timor-Leste. Among the questions was “the extent of

significance of issues which, they think, states face” in post-conflict peace-building. The results are as indicated in Table 4.

Table 4.

The Extent of Significance of Issues Which States Face in Post-Conflict Peace-building, As a Result of Questionnaires

\* the number of respondents: Cambodia 102, and Timor-Leste 103

Issues	Cambodia (%)	Timor-Leste (%)
Maintenance of Peace Agreement	63	64
Withdrawal of Militias	38	58
Refugee Repatriation	19	56
Reintegration with Minority People	18	69
De-repression of Under-privileged People	89	85
Maintenance of Basic Human Rights	78	83
Supply of Foods and Basic Items for Life	76	72
Reconstruction of Collapsed Houses	19	80
Restoration of Farming and Irrigation System	80	77
Restoration of Roads, Railways and Harbor Facilities	81	63
Improvement of Medical System	84	83
Improvement of Educational System	87	85
Demining	78	46
Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration	33	60
Prevention of Combatant Activities	26	56
Conduct of Free and Fair Elections	93	86
Improvement of Military and Police System	55	71
Improvement of Civil Administration	76	72
Improvement of Judicial System	89	64
Restoration of Industries	54	67
Attracting Foreign Investments	80	63

(Source: Japanese Ministry for Foreign Affairs, *Prevention of Conflicts: the Reality and Future*, March 2005)

The survey was conducted in 2004, when Cambodia was already in the stability and development period, 11 years since UNTAC had left. Therefore, the results show a clear difference in the extent of significance of issues which people considered to be resolved and not. For example, the issues of Refugee Repatriation and Reintegration with Minority People have already been almost solved in Cambodia. Meanwhile, since Timor-Leste was still in the early stage of the peace-building process in 2004, almost all of the issues on the list were still seen as important and needing to be tackled. However, it is highly noteworthy that both Cambodian and East Timorese people considered that issues relating to democratization, such as Conduct of Free and Fair Elections, Maintenance of Basic Human Rights, and Improvement of Judicial Issues,

were significant ones which their states were yet to tackle. This means that it is highly probable that democratization issues will remain for the next decade or so in Timor-Leste, following the pattern of Cambodia, unless the Government of Timor-Leste as well as the international community pays more serious attention to democratization.

## 6. Conclusion

This paper initially introduced several theories of peace-building by David Roberts, Roland Paris, Simon Chesterman and David Chandler. This paper, which focused on the case of peace-building process in Cambodia and Timor-Leste, showed that the arguments of their theories had legitimacy. Peace-building requires a longer-term commitment with proper and adequate channels and measures.

However, the case of Cambodia and Timor-Leste has posed a question on whether UN peace-building is properly learning lessons suggested by practitioners as well as academics. In fact, Timor-Leste is in the best position for this comparative analysis, since both states have so many commonalities in the background of peace-building. Furthermore, the international efforts for peace-building in Timor-Leste was more significant than Cambodia in the scale of missions, extensiveness of mandate, and duration. However, the issues of rapid deployment and strategic planning, and the democratization in the post-election period in Cambodia were clearly repeated in Timor-Leste. Especially, both states have suffered from hostility among politicians and parties and the following chronic riots, rebellions and civil wars, and highly unjustified judicial issues which were politically neglected. Therefore, this paper might indicate the failure to enhance the effectiveness of peace-building by depending on lessons learnt from previous missions.

In this context, what is the key to understanding “the failure”? Presumably, it cannot be explained by theory and lessons. They must be related to quite a new approach, that is “the clash of culture.”

For example, in terms of strategic planning in post-conflict peace-building, one might claim that developments on the ground change so rapidly that proper planning would be impossible. However, the UN has traditionally *ad hoc* and improvising culture.



UN peace operations, which started from UNEFI in 1956, have inherited the so-called “Hammaraskjold’s legacy” as *ad hoc* missions. Such UN’s *ad hoc* culture clashes with that of host governments and their citizens, which have mostly had dependent culture as a legacy from the colonial periods. Therefore, as mentioned earlier, there was a cultural gap in which local people expected UN missions to come in and solve their problems overnight, whilst international staff are still deciding what to do after their arrival.

However, UN peace operations have evolved, and currently more multi-functional and therefore preparatory peace-building is highly demanded. Furthermore, a great disadvantage for the UN is that the UN traditionally does not have a strategic intelligence unit. Although such a unit would be costly, it would help in improving early warning capabilities and specifying the precise timing and scale of personnel dispatch of UN peace-building. In a similar context, contrary to UN culture as a improvising nature, a new type of peace-building would need to establish stand-by agreements between the UN and host governments.<sup>60</sup>

“The clash of culture” was also identified in the democratization process. The UN, which has been highly influenced by western culture, regarded free and fair elections and referenda as a significant stepping stone to democracy, whereas such elections and referenda were traditionally nonexistent and culturally new for host governments. Furthermore, many states which accept post-conflict peace-building led by the UN have culturally gained their governing position through violently overthrowing an oppressive predecessor. Therefore, in their politics, the existence of legitimate opposition has been unfamiliar or unaccepted. This actually has happened in Cambodia and Timor-Leste as mentioned in this paper. Corruption, bribery and lack of transparency and accountability in governance might also be much more difficult to solve for the UN in its missions than expected. This is also due to cultural gaps between the UN and host governments.

UN peace-building will not be successful even if it is financially and physically improved, unless it learns lessons from previous missions. However, it is not enough. Peace-building is a more human-related mission than traditional peacekeeping. Such a mission should pay more attention to the cultural aspect of indigenous people in host governments. UN culture should also be reconsidered if it does not meet the demand for current post-conflict peace-building.

Notes

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