

The Role of Hezbollah in South Lebanon

and its Relations with the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)

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Abstract

One can point out several reasons why the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) have not been able to implement its mandate for more than 40 years. One of them would be the existence of an Islamic militant and terrorist group, Hezbollah. In fact, Hezbollah has filled the political vacuum since Israeli withdrawal from South Lebanon in 2005. Currently, Hezbollah has gained popularity amongst Shiite Muslims, contributing to security, social and economic development. Hezbollah is now also politically recognized, making a coalition party. However, its status as a terrorist group has been consistent, threatening the international security. As far as Hezbollah is deployed in South Lebanon, Israel would continue challenging Hezbollah's military intimidation and threat, which might result in another major warfare between them. In fact, one can identify several international agreements and UN resolutions on the disarmament of Hezbollah, although they have not been effective nor promising. In South Lebanon, Hezbollah took advantage of the cozy relations and even conspired with the local villagers, who helped conceal Hezbollah's sizeable and sophisticated military equipment and prevented UNIFIL from entering their personal properties. Such behaviors obviously decline the operational effectiveness of UNIFIL and increase the risk of the next warfare with Israel. Therefore, one can suggest multiple solutions to tackle this issue.

Keywords: Hezbollah, UNIFIL, South Lebanon, Israel, LAF

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1. Introduction

The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) has been deployed in South Lebanon in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 425 since 1978. UNIFIL has been stationed in Lebanon for more than 40 years despite the name of "the Interim Force". While UNIFIL has been positively evaluated as a peacekeeping operation with the function of inducement, UNIFIL has been considered to be ineffective, not having the warfare between Israel and the Lebanese militants nor protecting local civilians. One of the biggest reasons

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why UNIFIL cannot be the interim force is the existence of Hezbollah. When Israel unilaterally withdrew from Lebanon in 2000, Hezbollah filled the resulting power vacuum. The problem is that Hezbollah is not the official state military of Lebanon but a Shiite Islamist militant group which has the infamous history of terrorist crimes targeting the Israeli and Western people and organizations abroad. The Hezbollah militants have stayed between the Litani River and the Blue Line, the area of UNIFIL deployment in South Lebanon.

This paper will deal with Hezbollah with reference to UNIFIL. The first part of this paper will focus on the introductory description on Hezbollah. Despite the history as a terrorist group, Hezbollah has gained “grassroot” popularity and currently consistent political status in the parliament and government. The second part will argue the issue of the disarmament of Hezbollah. In fact, there are the multiple legal frameworks demanding the disarmament of Hezbollah. Nevertheless, the international community have not succeeded in the disarmament of Hezbollah. This has influenced the operational effectiveness of the peacekeeping tasks in UNIFIL. The third part of this article will therefore refer to the relations of UNIFIL staff with Hezbollah and the local villagers in South Lebanon. This article will describe how vulnerable UNIFIL soldiers have been in their relations with the local people who take sides in Hezbollah.

In the conclusion, this paper will suggest several solutions to the issue of the deployment of Hezbollah and the inevitably “not interim” mission of UNIFIL. The solutions suggested here are multiple, focusing on 1) building the capability of Lebanese national army; 2) maintenance of robust UNIFIL capabilities; 3) more positive assistance to local people by the international community; and 4) developing the Middle East peace process, especially the diplomatic relations between Israel and Lebanon.

2. Hezbollah in Lebanon

Hezbollah, a revolutionary resistance group sponsored by Iran¹, was formed in 1982 in Lebanon. The formation of Hezbollah represented the realization of Iranian campaign to spread the message of the Islamic revolution. It opposes Israel and Western powers operating in the Middle East. Hezbollah has been designated as a terrorist group by many countries including the US.² In 1985, Hezbollah released its first manifesto which vowed to expel Western influence from Lebanon, calling for the destruction of the state of Israel and pledging allegiance to Iran. Militarily, Hezbollah is called “the world’s most heavily armed non-state actor”.³ Hezbollah launched several terrorist attacks to the Israeli-related buildings abroad.⁴ In fact, some terrorist attacks by Hezbollah were so successful that Israel did not even know how it happened and for years insisted on saying that the explosion was caused by a “gas leakage”.⁵ It is estimated that Hezbollah has tens of thousands of members and its supporters worldwide. Hezbollah sent more than seven thousand fighters to the Syrian Civil War in 2013, joining Iranian and Russian soldiers supporting the Assad regime in the Syrian Government.

Hezbollah currently has its status not only as a military but also as a political organization in Lebanon. Hezbollah first entered Lebanon’s parliament in 1992 when it won eight of 128 seats in the state’s first elections since 1972. In February 2006, Hezbollah and the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) formed a political alliance, adding FPM’s parliamentary seats.

There are two political coalitions in Lebanon. The first coalition is represented mainly by Sunnis, Druze and

Christians that united following the assassination of Rafic Hariri in 2005. This is the so-called “March 14” group, named after the protest for the assassination on 14 March of the year. This group won the parliamentary elections of May 2005 by capturing 72 of 128 seats. The second coalition is mainly from the southern Lebanese Shia community, including Hezbollah and Amal in addition to the Christian community. This group is called the “March 8” group.⁶ In 2008, Hezbollah and its allies got 11 out of 30 cabinet seats. The following year, Hezbollah won 10 seats in the parliament, and The March 8 Movement got 58 seats, while the ruling March 14 Movement 71 seats.⁷ At the national elections in 2018, Hezbollah got 13 seats in the state’s 128-member Parliament, while the Amal Movement which used to be its rival but now its coalition partner got 10 seats. Thus, Hezbollah increasingly exerted its political power. In particular, in UNIFIL’s area of operation, Hezbollah and its allies win more than 70 percent of votes.

It is to be noted that Hezbollah’s social and humanitarian contribution to the south Lebanese community has played a significant role in enhancing its identity and gaining support in the state. For example, Hezbollah spent \$300 million for its construction sector to repair damaged or destroyed homes after the 2006 war. Hezbollah has also contributed to all levels of Lebanon’s educational system, as well as its youth camps and religious programs. On primary school level, Hezbollah’s Islamic Institution for Education overseas the Mahdi schools. They are a network of private schools where students learn the core subjects as well as Hezbollah’s ideology. By 2006, approximately 14,000 students attended Hezbollah’s school. Hezbollah also created its youth wing, called the Mahdi Scouts. The scouts offer outdoor recreational and educational programs, as well as religious and ideological instruction. Some 60,000 youths participate in the Mahdi Scouts. Hezbollah has also published Mahdi magazine, targeting Lebanese youth, which includes cartoon depictions of deceased Hezbollah fighters and stories of suicide and other attacks against Israel.⁸

Meanwhile, the economic contribution of Hezbollah to South Lebanon has had the mixed results. The southern part of Lebanon is relatively an economically vulnerable area with a life of poverty and misery. In particular, the Shiite Muslim who is the majority in the area has suffered from their poverty. There is a stark contrast in the housing level between the local Shiite Muslim and people from Beirut who bought expensive villas in South Lebanon.⁹ Therefore, it can be argued that many local militia employed by Hezbollah would appreciate their monthly income which they receive even though their income amounts to US\$300-700 per month.¹⁰ However, the economic impact of Hezbollah is far from positive on the macro level. As Hussain Abdul-Hussain simply put it, “Foreign investors are simply unwilling to bring their money into a country that lives in a state of perpetual war, with Hezbollah currently involved in regional entanglements in Syria, Yemen and Iraq, while also threatening to go to war with Israel.”¹¹

3. The Issue of the Disarmament of Hezbollah

Thus, Hezbollah has claimed that it has had played a significant role as a protector of Lebanon on their domestic security, political status, and social and even economic contribution to the state. However, in terms of the national defense force in Lebanon, the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) has been recognized as an official national defense force. It has been financially supported by the US, and UNIFIL has provided a peacekeeping training program to LAF. Above all, the continuous military crimes by Hezbollah as a terrorist group in and outside the state, and the serious damage inflicted on the state due to the conflict with Israel, for example in

1993, 1996 and 2006, convinced the international community that Hezbollah should be disarmed.

There are in total five international agreements and resolutions concerning the issues of Hezbollah's disarmament. The first one is the Ta'if Agreement. This agreement was designed to end the civil war in Lebanon and reassert Lebanese authority in South Lebanon occupied by Israel. This agreement was negotiated in Ta'if, Saudi Arabia in September 1989, and approved by the Lebanese parliament on 4 November 1989. This agreement covered not only the ending of the Lebanese civil war, but also political reform in Lebanon and a framework for beginning of complete Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon. This agreement transferred the power away from the Presidency and vested it in a cabinet equally divided between the Muslims and Christians.¹² Although the agreement provided a time frame for Syrian military withdrawal, the actual withdrawal did not take place until 2005.

The Ta'if Agreement also demanded the disbanding of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias. However, it is to be noted that Hezbollah was allowed to stay armed in its capacity as a resistance force rather than a militia for fighting Israel in South Lebanon. It means that Hezbollah was exceptionally expected to be committed to ending Israel's occupation as an Islamic resistance group. The position of Hezbollah enjoyed wide support in Lebanon, where the Israeli occupation was seen as an impediment to the state's recovery.¹³

Hezbollah continued attacks on Israel during the state's 18-year occupation from 1982 through 2000. Particularly, in April 1996, there were notable confrontations between Hezbollah and Israel, called the Grapes of Wrath operation by the Israelis 16-day conflict with Hezbollah. This operation was conducted in response to Hezbollah's deadly attacks on Israeli soldiers in Lebanon and rockets into Israeli territory. In May 2000, Israel finally withdrew from Lebanon. In October 2001, the Middle East peace process began in Madrid. This development threatened to halt Hizballah's struggle with Israel and thus cut off one of the main sources of the organization's legitimacy and power.¹⁴ Then, in 2004, UN Security Council Resolution 1559 was authorized. It was the second international agreement or resolutions concerning Hezbollah's disarmament. Resolution 1559 (2004) called upon all remaining foreign forces to withdraw from Lebanon, and also called for the disbanding and disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias.

On 18 April 2006, Secretary-General Kofi Annan submitted his third semi-annual report on the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1559 (2004). The report stated that Lebanon was still in a fragile and vulnerable state. This led to the adoption of the supporting resolution, UN Security Council Resolution 1680 (2006), which was the third international agreement or resolution concerning the issues of Hezbollah's disarmament. Resolution 1680 (2006) expressed regret over Lebanon's failure to implement the disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias per Resolution 1559. Therefore, Resolution 1680 reiterated the call for full implementation of 1559.

In July 2006, a huge scale of 34-day military conflict took place between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon, Northern Israel and the Golan Heights. During the war, Hezbollah fired approximately 4,300 rockets at Israel, killing 39 civilians and 120 Israeli soldiers. Israel attacked both Hezbollah military targets and Lebanese civilian infrastructure. The war killed about 1,200 and displaced one million Lebanese people. The war led to the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1701 (2006), which was the fourth international agreement or resolution concerning Hezbollah's disarmament. UNIFIL was strengthened with the advent of many European

troops in accordance with Resolution 1701. The Resolution restricted Hezbollah's presence south of the Litani River and asserted the authority of the Lebanese army in South Lebanon. This resolution also asserted that there shall be no weapons in Lebanon without the consent of the Government of Lebanon.

The fifth international agreement or resolution concerning Hezbollah's disarmament was the Baabda Declaration in 2012. It was issued by the National Dialogue Committee on 11 June 2012. This agreement was virtually between the various Lebanese political groups. The agreement essentially demanded to distance Lebanon from the Syrian conflict across the borders in order to avoid the negative spillover of such tensions into the country. In addition, the agreement enforced and respected the Ta'if Agreement and Resolution 1701.¹⁵

Thus, one identified a number of international agreements and resolutions concerning the disarmament of Hezbollah. It is to be noted, however, that among them Ta'if Agreement in 1989 and UN Security Council Resolution 1701 in 2006, which are both the influential and significant agreement and resolution in the peace process in Lebanon, have a conciliatory stance with Hezbollah. Both of them accept the deployment of Hezbollah forces in South Lebanon.

In fact, as Hezbollah has been increasingly recognized as a protector of the state of Lebanon from Israel's aggression, it has approval as a legitimate resistance armed group. During the war between Israel and Hezbollah in July 2006, President Emile Lahoud praised Hezbollah as Lebanon's main liberator from Israel. In July, 2009, Michel Aoun said that Hezbollah's weapons will no longer be a problem when the causes behind its existence disappear. In November, 2009, the Lebanese parliament voted to allow Hezbollah to keep its weapons. And in October 2016, President Michel Aoun became the first Lebanese president to openly align himself with Hezbollah.¹⁶

Nevertheless, the UN in New York has adopted a strict approach towards Hezbollah's developing armament. In April 2019, UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres issued a warning remark concerning the maintenance of Hezbollah's sizeable military capabilities. He called on the Lebanese Government and Army to take all necessary measures to prevent Hezbollah from possessing arms and to work on making it a merely civil political party in Lebanon.¹⁷ Nevertheless, in his official report to Security Council on the situation of UNIFIL in July 2019, Guterres accepted that the maintenance of arms by Hezbollah is outside the control of the state of Lebanon.¹⁸ He also said in November 2019 that Hezbollah has posed a threat to the UNIFIL mission stationed on the Israel-Lebanon border.¹⁹

On the whole, there are multiple legal frameworks of the disarmament of Hezbollah and the current UN Secretary-General has consistently called for the government to disarm it. However, in reality, its disarmament would be difficult. It is partly due to a lack of political will by the international community resulting in lack of the effectiveness of the resolutions and agreements on this issue. This is also partly due to the immaturity of the military capability of LAF and the virtual approval of the deployment of Hezbollah in South Lebanon. Furthermore, the strong dependency of Shiite Muslim people on Hezbollah in the security sector in South Lebanon is a significant factor supporting its deployment in South Lebanon. However, the current situation surrounding Hezbollah in South Lebanon is not compatible with the basic policy of the operation conducted by UNIFIL.

4. Hezbollah and UNIFIL in South Lebanon

Secretary Council Resolution 1701 (2006), which authorized the redeployment of “new UNIFIL”, gave one the impression of it having a mandate to disarm Hezbollah. It calls for:

*full implementation of the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords, and of resolution 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006), that require the disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon, so that, pursuant to the Lebanese cabinet decision of July 27, 2006, there will be no weapons or authority in Lebanon other than that of the Lebanese state.*²⁰

However, in the aftermath of the passage of resolution, the UN and the contributing states to UNIFIL disclaimed responsibility for disarming Hezbollah.²¹ Then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan said that “dismantling Hezbollah is not the direct mandate of the UN.” He implied that the UN could only help the Lebanese Government disarm Hezbollah.²² Thus, one could identify lack of enthusiasm among the UN and troop contributors on this issue.

Meanwhile, Hezbollah agreed to disarm its forces south of the Litani River, the area of UNIFIL’s operations, but not to pull its forces out of South Lebanon. Mohamad Chatah, a senior adviser to the Lebanese Prime Minister Siniora, said “Hezbollah individuals are people who live in the south and they will not leave homes and villages, but an armed Hezbollah will not be in the south.”²³ In reality, Hezbollah no longer holds visible military positions in the area of UNIFIL. They are officially back north of the Litani River. Instead, the Hezbollah fighters in South Lebanon conduct their military operations in civilian cloaks. Mobilizing Hezbollah militias at UNIFIL’s area of operation would be a violation of Resolution 1701 (2006) whether they were wearing military uniforms or civilian clothes.

In fact, Hezbollah’s armaments have not been as enthusiastically supported as previously in Lebanon after the Israeli withdrawal from South Lebanon in 2005 and especially after the 2006 war. Since then calls from political factions for Hezbollah to handover their weapons to the LAF have been increasing at national and international levels. However, Hezbollah has claimed that the LAF has not been regarded as a credible deterrent against Israel yet, and therefore that Hezbollah is the only force to win the war against the enemy state. Hezbollah has also been distrustful that the March 14 Movement, its political rival, would use those confiscated weapons against it.²⁴

It is generally agreed that Hezbollah accepts the presence of UNIFIL as long as the latter does not interfere too closely with the former’s military operations. Hezbollah can give local consent to Resolution 1701 in the sense that it largely refrain from obstructing UNIFIL militarily.²⁵ Nevertheless, Assaf Orion, in his paper “Hiding in Plain Sight: Hezbollah’s campaign Against UNIFIL”, expressed how vulnerably UNIFIL personnel have been treated by the locals and Hezbollah fighters who are ostensibly wearing civilian cloaks.

In fact, there are many cases in which UNIFIL soldiers have been refused to enter the public or private properties while they were conducting their patrol. The local civilians refused UNIFIL soldiers’ entry because they claimed that the areas were religiously sensitive, or that the streets were narrow or secondary roads as inadequate for patrolling. They also claimed that UNIFIL should patrol only near the Blue Line while it is LAF who should be responsible for patrolling the villages.²⁶

The local villagers also disliked the photo-taking by UNIFIL staff during the patrol. Some villagers angrily seized UN equipment including cameras, maps, documentation and military equipment from UNIFIL staff. Finally, by 2019 UNIFIL accepted the demand for the prohibition of photography. It is assumed that much of Hezbollah's military assets are hidden at private properties in South Lebanon. General Gadi Eisenkot, the then Israeli army Chief of Staff revealed in 2017 that Hezbollah has a military presence in 240 villages in southern Lebanon, including forces and weapons in "almost every third or fourth house" inside civilian population centres.²⁷ Consequently, it became more difficult for UNIFIL to collect information and evidence on violations.²⁸ Orion concluded as follows:

*The underlying message is clear: UNIFIL's presence is tolerated as long as it adheres to the "southern Lebanon rules" dictated by Hezbollah. ... Each aggressive incident establishes the power relations between UNIFIL and locals as well as the dictated rules of the games: Keep to the trail, keep your eyes shut, keep your reports mild and reassuring – or else.*²⁹

Furthermore, the LAF has not been so cooperative with UNIFIL although both of them have been conducting joint training in order to enhance the former's capability as peacekeepers in South Lebanon. Ran Porat in his paper "How Hezbollah neutralized UNIFIL" pointed out that LAF, in fact, betrayed UNIFIL in conducting their duty of patrolling. LAF soldiers stood by and even assisted Hezbollah by blocking UNIFIL patrols or by mutual coordination of activities along the border. Occasionally, information provided from UNIFIL to LAF was afterwards shared with Hezbollah.³⁰ Porat also argued that expecting the LAF to disarm Hezbollah, in accordance with Resolution 1701 is unrealistic. LAF could not confront the Shi'ite-led Hezbollah because of the latter's politically influential power³¹

Since most of the villagers in South Lebanon are Hezbollah's enthusiastic supporters, some of them have been reluctant to join the development projects sponsored by UNIFIL. It is because by not participating in UNIFIL's aid projects, locals reject UNIFIL's objective to disarm Hezbollah and delegitimize it as a resistance party. In this context, Susann Kassen in her paper "Peacekeeping, Development, and Counterinsurgency" described that the southern Lebanese villagers marginalized the so-called 'Quick Impact Projects' (QIPs) sponsored by UNIFIL. UNIFIL's QIPs are small-scale and short-term development projects carried out with local municipalities. However, Kassen argued that QIPs are political activities with the Western-designed vision of peace in South Lebanon.³² Her argument is based on the analysis that in QIPs UNIFIL is enthusiastic to do these projects with non-governmental, "grassroots" organization, as well as individuals who are not politically affiliated with Amal or Hezbollah. Therefore, it is considered that QIPs are highly related to UNIFIL's disarmament plans. QIPs are directly linked to military aims, and to the security concerns of the troop-contributing countries of UNIFIL such as France, Spain, and Italy.³³

Consequently, according to deputy mayor in the village of Kheir, the municipality sends only specific people to UNIFIL events of QIPs to keep UNIFIL from building its preferable relations with their villagers. There is a very apparent sense of indifference among villagers about being involved in QIPs.³⁴ Kassen also argued that the villagers feel threatened as UNIFIL deliberately avoids addressing the history of this region and takes a pro-Western, pro-Israeli stance on the conflict, thereby severely limiting its influence and legitimacy in its area of operations.³⁵

On the whole, the villagers put a more supportive and dependent stance on Hezbollah than on UNIFIL. Consequently, the development programs sponsored by UNIFIL, which would be regarded as competing as ones by Hezbollah, have been marginalized and even segregated by local villagers.

5. Are There Any Solutions? : as a concluding remark

Hezbollah, which originated as a revolutionary resistance group, has also been deeply rooted in the south Lebanese society, contributing to the security, and social and economic development. The group now occupies a significant number of parliamentary and cabinet positions in the Lebanese politics. However, its status as a terrorist group has been consistent, threatening the international security. As long as Hezbollah is deployed in South Lebanon, Israel would continue challenging Hezbollah's military intimidation and threat, which might result in another major warfare between them. This article demonstrated that several international agreements and UN resolutions on the disarmament of Hezbollah were not so effective and promising. To make the matter worth, Hezbollah became a so-called "nuisance" for UNIFIL. Hezbollah took advantage of the cozy relations and even conspired with the local villagers, who helped conceal Hezbollah's sizeable and sophisticated military equipment and prevented UNIFIL from entering their personal properties. Such behavior obviously reduces the operational effectiveness of UNIFIL and increase the risk of further conflict with Israel.

Are there any solutions to this problem: how can the influence of Hezbollah be mitigated in South Lebanon so that UNIFIL would play a better role? There would be no clear solution and panacea to tackle this issue. However, the following four scenarios can be suggested.

First, LAF should be better equipped and trained so that it can strengthen the military capability so that it will be able to replace Hezbollah. Therefore, the international community including the UN and the great powers such as the US should pay more attention to it. The US claimed that there seemed be no distinction between LAF and Hezbollah in the real operational ground, threatening to cut the financial aid to LAF. Therefore, the Lebanese Government should draw a clear line on Hezbollah between its legitimate political entity and the illegitimate resistance and terrorist group, so that the great powers would continue supporting LAF financially and militarily. The government should also strongly demand LAF not to cooperate with Hezbollah.

Second, UNIFIL should continue deploying in South Lebanon with its current robust capability. Since 2006 in the aftermath of the war, UNIFIL has been redeployed with a more sizeable strength of more than 10,000 troops. New UNIFIL includes thousands of troops from European contributing states with more sophisticated equipment and special force units such as the maritime force. New UNIFIL has surely played a more significant role as a deterrent than previously in South Lebanon, mitigating the potential of the outbreak of major conflict between Israel and Hezbollah. If Hezbollah has less opportunity to launch offensive operations against Israel, Iran's financial support to Hezbollah would be decreased. It would weaken Hezbollah's whole capability.

Third, the international community and especially the Lebanese government should pay more attention to the situation of economic poverty and social vulnerability surrounding the Shi'ite community in South Lebanon. Their vulnerable situation has meant that they have depended on Hezbollah's aid and development programs and even have been recruited as Hezbollah forces. In fact, there is a huge gap in quality of life between

the people in the northern and southern areas in Lebanon. Therefore, more public investment should be encouraged to be provided to South Lebanon by the government. As a result, new employment would be created in which Hezbollah fighters would be able to find peaceful jobs. It would function as disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR).

Fourth, the international community should encourage Israel and Lebanon to enhance their diplomatic relations. On this matter, it should be noted that at the time of writing Israel has reached diplomatic agreements with several Arab states such as UAE, Bahrain, and Sudan, with the mediation of the US. It is a good sign for relations between Israel and Lebanon. If they reach a diplomatic agreement, Hezbollah will get lose legitimacy and become weaker.

Among the above four scenarios, the first and second ones, which have a micro view, can be put into practice relatively in a short term, while the third and fourth ones, which have rather a macro view, need the wide support from the international community with longer visions. Ideally, all of them should be considered with a good balance by all of the stakeholders and the international community.

Endnotes

- ¹ It is estimated that Hezbollah has received financial support amounting to \$700 million annually from Iran.
- ² For example, in April 1983, the US embassy in Beirut was bombed, killing 63 people. In October of the same year, the US and French barracks were also bombed by suicide attacks, killing 305 people. A US court concluded that Hezbollah was behind the attacks.
- ³ For example, the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in London estimated in 2017 that Hezbollah had up to ten thousand active fighters and some twenty thousand reserves, with an arsenal of small arms, tanks, drones, and various long-range rockets. Kali Robinson "What is Hezbollah?" Council on Foreign Relations, 1 September 2020. <http://www.cfr.org/background/what-hezbollah>. Accessed on 29 October 2020
- ⁴ For example, the bombings of the Israeli embassy in March 1992, and the car bombing of the Israeli embassy in London and a Buenos Aires Jewish community center in 1994, attributed to Hezbollah.
- ⁵ Augustus Richard Norton *Hezbollah: A Short History* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2018), p. 68
- ⁶ Augustus Richard Norton "The Role of Hezbollah in Lebanese Domestic Politics", *The International Spectator*, Vol. 42, No. 4, December 2007, p. 486
- ⁷ Counter Extreme Project "Hezbollah's Influence in Lebanon", April 2018, p. 15
- ⁸ Ibid. pp. 29-33
- ⁹ The author's personal impression during field research in August 2019.
- ¹⁰ Author's field research in South Lebanon, in August 2019.
- ¹¹ Hussain Abdul-Hussain "Lebanon must turn on Hezbollah to save its economy" *Arab News* 45, 9 July 2020. <https://www.arabnews.com/node/1702226> accessed 1 November 2020
- ¹² Taif Accords, UN Peacemaker, <https://peacemaker.un.org/lebanon-taifaccords89>. Accessed on 19 October 2020
- ¹³ Augustus Richard Norton *Hezbollah: A Short History* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2018), p. 71
- ¹⁴ Eyal Zisser "Hizballah in Lebanon: between Teheran and Beirut, between the struggle with Israel, and

the struggle for Lebanon” in Barry Rubin *Lebanon: Liberation, Conflict, and Crisis* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), p 159

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16 Counter Extreme Project “Hezbollah’s Influence in Lebanon”, April 2018, pp. 12-13

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18 UN Document S/2019/574 *Implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) during the period from 18 February to 24 June 2019, Report of the Secretary General*, on 17 July 2019, para. 30

19 *Jewish & Israel News Algemeiner*, 27 November 2019

20 UN Document S/RES/1701, *The situation in the Middle East*, 11 August 2006

21 Quoted from *International Herald Tribune*, 14 February 2017

22 Quoted from *Jerusalem Post*, 19 April 2014

23 Quoted from CNN News, 16 August 2006

24 Vanessa Newby *Peacekeeping in South Lebanon: Credibility and Local Cooperation* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2018), pp. 78-79

25 Ibid. pp. 79-80

26 Assaf Orion “Hiding in Plain Sight: Hezbollah’s campaign Against UNIFIL”, Policy Note, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, November 2019, p. 3

27 Ran Porat “How Hezbollah neutralized UNIFIL”, policy paper, the Australian Centre for Jewish Civilisation at Monash University, 19 December 2019, p. 2

28 Assaf Orion “Hiding in Plain Sight: Hezbollah’s campaign Against UNIFIL”, Policy Note, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, November 2019, pp. 3-4

29 Assaf Orion “Hiding in Plain Sight: Hezbollah’s campaign Against UNIFIL”, Policy Note, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, November 201, p. 4

30 Ran Porat “How Hezbollah neutralized UNIFIL”, policy paper, the Australian Centre for Jewish Civilisation at Monash University, 19 December 2019, p. 3

31 Ran Porat “How Hezbollah neutralized UNIFIL”, policy paper, the Australian Centre for Jewish Civilisation at Monash University, 19 December 2019, p. 4

32 Susann Kassem “Peacekeeping, Development, and Counterinsurgency: The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon and ‘Quick Impact Projects’” in Karim Makdisi and Vijay Prashad (eds.) *Land of Blue: The United Nations and the Arab World* (Oakland: University of California Press, 2017), p.463

33 Susann Kassem “Peacekeeping, Development, and Counterinsurgency: The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon and ‘Quick Impact Projects’” in Karim Makdisi and Vijay Prashad (eds.) *Land of Blue: The United Nations and the Arab World* (Oakland: University of California Press, 2017), pp. 467-468

34 Susann Kassem “Peacekeeping, Development, and Counterinsurgency: The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon and ‘Quick Impact Projects’” in Karim Makdisi and Vijay Prashad (eds.) *Land of Blue: The United Nations and the Arab World* (Oakland: University of California Press, 2017), p. 468

35 Susann Kassem “Peacekeeping, Development, and Counterinsurgency: The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon and ‘Quick Impact Projects’” in Karim Makdisi and Vijay Prashad (eds.) *Land of Blue: The United Nations and the Arab World* (Oakland: University of California Press, 2017), p. 471