

Ireland and UNIFIL

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Abstract

This paper will focus on the performance of the Irish Defence Forces in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). The current situation in South Lebanon where the Irish contingent has been deployed is relatively calm. However, the authors' field research in UNIFIL in August 2019 convinced that there is an anti-UNIFIL sentiment among the local people in the Hezbollah-based town where the Irish peacekeepers are patrolling. Meanwhile, the Israelis have been traditionally provocative to UNIFIL. There have been four major military operations between Israel and Lebanon, where the UN troops were totally bypassed. Therefore, one cannot be optimistic of the performance of UNIFIL. Meanwhile, the Irish personnel has been motivated to participate in UNIFIL for various reasons. Most of them are based on the institutional and normative rationales. Furthermore, it is to be noted that the factors of motivation among the Irish largely depend on their age and military rank.

Keywords: Irish Defence Forces, UNIFIL, peacekeeping operations, motivation

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1. Introduction

Historically, there has been a wide range of literature of the studies of UN peacekeeping operations. This paper focuses the peacekeeping studies on the dispatching side, contributing states. The Republic of Ireland has been a consistently positive contributing state to UN peacekeeping operations. This paper will deal with Ireland's response to UN peacekeeping operations, especially, in UNIFIL in South Lebanon. On the one hand, UN peacekeeping operations have been required to push for a more robust response to the perceived threat from armed groups such as Hezbollah in Lebanon. In 2017, 61 peacekeepers were killed as a result of hostile acts, the highest number since 1994. Historically, there were a number of serious clashes between Israeli-

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related forces and Irish soldiers in UNIFIL. On the other hand, Ireland has had a strong commitment in UNIFIL. This paper will discuss about the motivation of Ireland and its military personnel in UNIFIL, based on the authors' field research in UNIFIL in August 2019.

This paper consists of three parts. The first part of the paper will deal with the historical analysis of the theory of contributing states' policy towards UN peacekeeping operations. This paper, which mentions some theorists of UN peacekeeping, indicates that the theory has been evolving. The second and the third parts of the paper will be based on the author's field research. The second part will concern the current situation in the Irish area of operations. The third part will deal with general and individual motivation of Irish contingents for UNIFIL.

This paper is still a tentative part of the author's whole research project on the policy of contributing states to UN peacekeeping operations.

2. The theory of states' motivation for participating in UN peacekeeping operations

The theory of the motivation studies of contributing states to UN peacekeeping operations has been evolving. The early periods of the studies focused this discussion on the pro-realist and pro-idealist perspectives. In terms of the pro-realist perspectives, for example, in 1990, Alan James, a well-known political realist, argued that, in peacekeeping operations, the question of which states should be invited to contribute to an operation, or whose offers should be invited, is often intensely political.¹

In 1995, Laura Neack also strongly supported the realist account of a state's participation in peacekeeping operations. Her main theory was that the particular interests that have been served by UN peacekeeping were those of the western middle-power states whose interests were served by the status quo. She pointed out that such middle power states such as Sweden, Italy, Brazil and the Netherlands were among top 13 major weapons' exporters to the developing world, which had frequently required and accepted international peacekeeping operations at the same time. Thus, she saw arms sales and peacekeeping operations at the same time: the pursuit of national interests.²

In 1997, David Bobrow and Mark Boyer also considered peacekeeping operations as "impure public goods" that have continued to be provided by the self-interests of contributing states, associated with maintaining some modicum of international system stability. They insisted that UN peacekeeping operations were "club goods"; some highly supportive participants remained members of the UN PKO relevant club for reason in pertaining to their status within the UN.³

Meanwhile, as a supporter of the pro-liberalist perspectives, in 2000, Andreas Andersson said that in regard to state participation in peacekeeping operations, there is a viable alternative to explanations based on *Realpolitik*. He emphasized that the purpose of peacekeeping was not only to end conflict but also to prevent its recurrence by promoting democracy. He mentioned that among the substantial contributors to peace support operations, well-consolidated democracies show the greatest propensity to participate. He indicated that participation in peacekeeping expressed self-interest, which is shaped by *Idealpolitik* instead of *Realpolitik*.⁴

Likewise, in 1995, Terry Terrif and James Keeley raised the theory that the involvement of many states in internal conflicts had generally been of little global importance during the post-Cold War era. They raised a simple question as to why so many states had been willing to be involved in the conflicts of peripheral areas, such as Africa and the former Soviet Union, by sending peacekeeping troops with less political motivations. This phenomenon could not fully be explained from a *Realpolitik* perspective.⁵

Furthermore, in 1996, Peter Viggo Jakobsen, who also had the idealist perspective, conducted a case study of the motivations underlying Chapter VII-led peace operations, in particular, operations in Kuwait (1991), Northern Iraq (1991), Somalia (1992), Rwanda (1994) and Haiti (1994). In conclusion, he pointed out that only in the case of Kuwait were national interests the significant factor in the explanation of providing peace enforcement.⁶ In other words, as David Wainhouse puts it, “Participation in a peacekeeping operation is a voluntary act and if a state has no special interest in a situation it will usually have a fairly high degree of general interest.”⁷

After the debate of the pro-idealist and pro-realist perspectives, in the 2000s, the more state-specific approach emerged. In other words, each troop contributor to UN peacekeeping operations began to define its interests differently in the post-Cold War periods. In 2000, as general foreign policies in international considerations of UN peacekeeping contribution, Katsumi Ishizuka focused on the peacekeeping policy of the US as a case of a great power, that of Canada as a middle power, and Fiji as a small power. He concluded that there is a tendency for bigger states to value their commitment to peacekeeping with greater respect to international stability, and the small states with greater respect to domestic interests. He continued that the greater powers, the more selective and flexible peacekeeping policy they enjoy. He also stated that the greater powers’ motivations for peacekeeping contribution has been affected by the change in the international political climates (such as the termination of the Cold War) than the smaller ones.⁸

Meanwhile, as specific foreign policies of international considerations of UN peacekeeping contribution, Ishizuka raised several factors, such as: commonality with host states; concern about national security; big powers’ intervention in their backyards; a desire for the permanent membership of UN Security Council; supporting Secretary-Generals from own countries; and rivalry with neighbours. Furthermore, as domestic considerations, he raised political, financial and military factors.⁹

In the 2010s, the International Peace Institute in the US established the research section “Providing Peacekeepers”. In the Institute, Alex Bellamy and Paul Williams conducted the survey on the policies of major contributing states to UN peacekeeping and concluded to lead the five major rationales of dispatching personnel to UN peacekeeping by states, which are as follows:

Political rationales: more voice in international security issues; pressure or persuasion by allies, great powers, or the UN; enhancing the states’ national prestige

Economic rationales: the compensation payments for troop contributing states; individual allowances; UN procurement contract

Security rationales: threat mitigation of particular conflicts; broader national and international security interests

Institutional rationales: the country’s armed forces, security sectors and bureaucratic dynamics; invaluable overseas experience for soldiers and officers; rehabilitation effect

Normative rationales: global good Samaritans; good international citizenship; an alternative to great power hegemony.¹⁰

3. A Current Situation of the Irish area of operations in UNIFIL

According to the field research by the author in August 2019, there are in total 435 Irish soldiers and officers, which is the seventh largest troop of all 44 troop contributing states in UNIFIL. The Headquarters of the Irish Unit, or the 114th Irish Batt, is located on the border with Israel, in Sector West of UNIFIL. The

deployment of the Irish Unit in the unstable border with Israel indicates the trust the UN has in the Irish due to their achievements and significant records as the UN peacekeepers.

In fact, the Israel and Lebanese sides are provocative to each other. In accordance with Secretary General's report in July 2019, UNIFIL verified the five tunnels near the Israeli town of Zar'it, south of the Blue Line, across from Ramiyah, Sector West. These five tunnels were discovered by the Israel Defense Forces.¹¹ It was perceived among UN personnel that they were dug by the Lebanese side¹², three of which crossed the Blue Line. It was in violation of Security Council Resolution 1701 (2006). Meanwhile, UNIFIL has called the Israel Defense Forces to suspend its illegal construction works in the Lebanese "reservation" area until an agreement had been reached between the parties, the Israel Defense Forces and the Lebanese Armed Forces. However, the works continued.¹³ Furthermore, Israel has continued to enter Lebanese airspace in violation of Resolution 1701 (2006). From February to June 2019, UNIFIL recorded an average of 100 airspace violations each month. Unmanned aerial vehicles accounted for 72 percent of the violations, and the other violations involved fighter aircraft or unidentified aircraft.¹⁴

From 18 February to 24 June, UNIFIL reported 333 ground violations of the Blue Line, 329 of which had been committed by unarmed civilians crossing south of the Blue Line.¹⁵ In the Irish area of operations, the Irish Unit set up several UN Positions, where about 30 strong Irish platoons have been deployed for the observation and patrolling tasks. According to the observation records kept by some UN Position, there are, on average, one or two daily cases of civilians approaching or stepping inside the Blue Line which is a border demarcation between Israel and Lebanon.¹⁶ Among the civilians approaching the Blue Line with binoculars are Hezbollah-related persons or even Hezbollah soldiers themselves pretending to be normal Lebanese citizens. They have been motivated to come to the Blue Line for obtaining information of the Israeli side, by which they can get rewarding money.¹⁷ One Irish officer said that there used to be a very tense situation between the Israel Defense Forces and several Lebanese people simply when the latter stepped in the Blue Line with a huge 4 Wheel Drive vehicle.¹⁸ On the Israeli side, their observation posts or towers are also standing at regular intervals.

In fact, among 14 villages where the Irish soldiers are in charge of patrolling is one major Hezbollah-based town, called Bint Jubayl. Bint Jubayl has been strategically important as a stronghold for Hezbollah, and therefore the town had been raided seriously by the Israel Defense Forces in 2006. Hezbollah, which is a Shia Islamist political party¹⁹ and militant group based in Lebanon, has, reportedly, received financial aid of \$1 billion annually from Iran as the cost of war against Israel. Therefore, there are a significant number of Hezbollah soldiers living in Bint Jubayl. However, the situation in South Lebanon has been relatively calm, especially, since 2006 when the war between Israel and Hezbollah broke out and the following "new" UNIFIL or UNIFIL II has been deployed. As a result, since there has been less cases and frequency of conflicts and wars against Israel²⁰, the income paid to Hezbollah soldiers has been decreased from \$700 to \$300 per month. Many Hezbollah soldiers attributed the decreasing amount of their income to the existence and deployment of UNIFIL near the border with Israel in South Lebanon. The lower income of Hezbollah militants has brought about the entirely economic decline in the town of Bint Jubayl. Consequently, the atmosphere of "anti-UNIFIL" has been created among the locals in the town. Likewise, the local people have been paid by Hezbollah for raising a large poster of Hezbollah with the photo of ex-Hezbollah soldiers sacrificing their lives in the conflict against Israel. They have also been paid for providing some information about the Israel Defense Forces. Such locals have been enforced by Hezbollah to say "I don't like Israel" and "I don't like UNIFIL" publicly.²¹ Hezbollah and the local supporters frequently say "We are forced to have UNIFIL."

In fact, apart from Bint Jubayl, there are other several conservative villages and towns in the Irish area

of operations. They take a cautious stance on the UN troops, in general. Some of them believe that UNFIL is pro-Israel, and that UNIFIL is sharing information with Israel. Therefore, they do not accept that not only UNIFIL personnel but also general foreigners take photos in their villages. In fact, one Irish officer claimed that the effectiveness of CIMIC (Civil-Military Coordination) depends on villages.²² Thus, such “anti-UNIFIL” perception requires the Irish battalion to conduct more cautious patrolling in the areas of Hezbollah-based or conservative towns.

The above case illustrates that the Irish contingent and presumably UNIFIL on the whole can't always enjoy local consent from the Lebanese side. Meanwhile, Israel has kept psychological distance from UNIFIL since its establishment in 1978. In fact, the dissatisfaction and bitterness have been typical of Israel's attitude towards UNIFIL. When UNIFIL II was created in 2006 in accordance with Security Council Resolution 1701, Timur Goksel, former spokesman for the UNIFIL, said that part of the great Israeli disappointment is a result of the expectations that UNIFIL, rather than being a peacekeeping force, would be a “combat force or an anti-terror force.”²³ In fact, since the deployment of UNIFIL in 1978, Israel has conducted the major military operations against the Lebanese side in 1982 (Operation Peace for Galilee), 1993 (Operation Accountability), 1996 (Operation Grape of Wrath)²⁴ and 2006 following the Resolution 1701 and the establishment of UNIFILII. The above four Israeli military operations indicated that the Israeli Defense Forces bypassed UN troops when it adopted the decisive option against the Lebanese side.²⁵ At each Israeli military operation against Lebanon or Hezbollah, the UN troops in UNIFIL, who were lightly-armed, has been faced with extremely dangerous circumstance. UNIFIL has been a UN operation as peacekeeping, based on Chapter VI of the UN Charter. It is generally perceived that Chapter VI-based peacekeeping operations are in more stable and less risky situation than Chapter VII-led so-called “peace enforcement” which are currently deployed in many internal conflicts in Africa. However, in South Lebanon, one can identify the intermittent risks of the recurrence of a major state of war between the state of Israel and Hezbollah in the future. It would be non-predictable and non-preventive for UN peacekeepers. Meanwhile, Chapter VII-led operations tend to be established in conflicting situations among armed groups and militias in internal conflicts even if the scale of conflicts is not as significant as intra-state conflicts such as those in the Middle East. In other words, the UN establishes Chapter VII-led operations to the predictable or already existent conflicts which continuously occur and therefore directly risk the lives of local people from the imminent threats from immoral warlords, militias or terrorist groups. Such peace enforcement includes not only relatively dangerous UN operations in Africa such as MONUSCO but also those in Timor-Leste in 2000s, namely, UNTAET, which has relatively low records of UN casualties. The UN tends to provide Chapter VI-led operations when the conflict is currently non-existent and future belligerency is unpredictable even if the potential risk and damage of the warfare is significant, like the case of UNIFIL which has high records of casualties. Therefore, the author's field research convinced that the theory “Chapter VII-led operations are more dangerous than Chapter VI-led operations” are not always applicable. Rather, the difference between Chapter VII- and Chapter VI-led operations is the matter of predictability and frequency of the conflicts and actual existence of conflicts at the moment, not the magnitude, seriousness, and potential of casualties in the conflicts. In this sense, although UNIFIL is a Chapter VI-led peacekeeping operation, the peacekeepers in UNIFIL including the Irish contingent cannot be optimistic about their mission in South Lebanon.

4. The Irish motivation for participating in UNIFIL

4-1. General motivation: its defensive, humanitarian and acceptable posture

First of all, it is to be noted that Tony Lawrence, Tomas Jermalavicius, and Anna Bulakh, wrote an article “Soldiers of Peace: Estonia, Finland and Ireland in UNIFIL”, in the Report of International Centre for Defence and Security, Tallinn, Estonia, in 2016. This article referred to the motivations of three small European states contributing states. It argues that traditionally, small states, including Estonia, Finland and Ireland, have pursued policies aimed at preserving their survival, including those – such as participating in UN peacekeeping – that strengthen international law.²⁶ Specifically, in terms of their motivations to join UN peacekeeping, the article compared to one another as follows:

Irish decision-makers tend to see peacekeeping above all as an essential component of a values-based foreign policy, while Estonian decision makers look for more tangible returns for their participation including, ultimately, an expectation that their readiness to provide security will ensure that they themselves are not left alone in times of crisis. Finnish decision makers also explain their contribution largely in terms of values, but, much more than Ireland, also justify it on the grounds of building the capability of the Finnish Defence Forces.²⁷

Ireland has strong “emotional” ties to the UN as “the cradle of its independence and an equally strong political and military commitment to UN peacekeeping.”²⁸ The value-based approach and liberal motivation for UN peacekeeping operations has been repeated at the author’s interview with the officials of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade in the Irish Government in February 2019. In accordance with the interview, the Irish officials of Foreign Affairs regarded the history of Irish contribution of UN peacekeeping operations as the simple but significant transference of “DNA” which the Irish Permanent Defence Forces (PDF) have had. They consider that international peace is important especially for small states such as Ireland, and therefore that participation in UN peacekeeping operations for Ireland is a significant international contribution. They simply said “Historically speaking, peacekeeping is fundamentally good. There should be no shift in the state’s policy towards UN peacekeeping operations.”²⁹ Meanwhile, John F. Quinn argues that it is necessary to analyse the theoretical basis for such a value-based ethical position for Irish peacekeeping operations. Quinn quoted Article 29 of *Bunreacht na hEireann* (Constitution of Ireland) in this context:

1. Ireland affirms its devotion to the idea of peace and friendly cooperation amongst nations founded on international justice and morality.
2. Ireland affirms its adherence to the principle of pacific settlement of international disputes by international arbitration or judicial determination.
3. Ireland accepts the generally recognized principles of international law as its rule of conduct in its relations with other states³⁰

Quinn argues that considering the absence of an assertion of the right to use force of arms in pursuing its interests, this is a remarkable statement for a sovereign country to make and in many ways is a prophetic declaration of the UN Charter’s prohibition of international conflict and acts of aggression.³¹ Irish Colonel Byern, Deputy Commanding Officer, Sector West of UNIFIL, mentioned a significant implication on this matter. He claimed that the absence of an assertion of the right to use force of arms and its defensive posture rather

than offensive in the Irish military can be recognized by its official name, “the Irish Defence Forces”, not “the Irish Armed Forces”.³²

In a similar context, it is significant to pay attention to Chiara Ruffa’s article “Military Cultures and Force Employment in Peace Operations.” This article compares between the French and Italian troops in the military cultures and its reflection in their policy and attitude towards the peace operations in UNIFIL in South Lebanon and ISAF in Afghanistan. French military culture is very cautious and consistently emphasizes an assertive fighting spirit. Meanwhile, Italian military culture is more humane. They came to consider themselves ineffective but good soldiers. As a consequence, in UNIFIL, the French troops prioritized operational activities, such as extensive patrolling or training of the local armed forces, and displayed high force-protection levels. The Italian troops focused on humanitarian activities, such as implementing development projects and distributing toys to children, displayed low levels of force protection, and did much less patrolling than the French.³³ When the author mentioned Ruffa’s article when he had an interview with an Irish officer, the officer clearly said that Ireland is definitely close to the Italian type rather than the French. While the French perceived UNIFIL as an ordinary military operation with a high threat level that calls for military skills, the Irish as well as Italian regard the UN mission as genuine peacekeeping and their required skills are constructed around cultural awareness with the belief of being good humanitarian soldiers.³⁴

In fact, UNIFIL’s official press admits that the mission attaches great importance to relation with its local population in the area of operations. For example, the soldiers in UNIFIL participate in community events and conduct training programmes for the people in the fields such as computers, languages, yoga etc.³⁵ Nitza Nachmias stated that UNIFIL’s humanitarian activities have helped to change even the concept of peacekeeping while highlighting the complex link between peacekeeping and humanitarian aid.³⁶

The Irish contingent has also valued a humanitarian aspect in their mission in UNIFIL. Despite the constraint of their location between the IDF and SLA/DFP to the Islam Resistance emerging from the north, Irish battalions did not stop offering humanitarian aid to the local people. McDonald cites the example of the 64th battalion, which suffered the biggest number of casualties in Lebanon but provided various forms of humanitarian assistance: donating \$1,700 to buy diesel oil for the Tibnin hospital; setting up medical clinics in Ayta Az-Zutt, Brashit and Tulin; buying glass for a damaged mosque in Quabrika, etc.³⁷ In 2008, at the International Conference for Support to Lebanon, the Minister for Education Affairs Noel Treacy announced that the Irish contribution will reach 5 million euros in bilateral humanitarian and recovery assistance in the aftermath of the 2006 war that cost Lebanon 1,200 deaths, over one million displaced, and large-scale destruction.³⁸

During the author’s interviews in the Irish Headquarters in UNIFIL, a number of Irish soldiers and officers referred to humanitarian missions as a core task in Lebanon. One officer stated that UNIFIL has been evolving since his first deployment in the 1990s. When he was first deployed in the 1990s, UNIFIL was regarded as a pure operational mission which supervised peace in the Blue Line between Israel and Lebanon. Currently, the officer stated that the first priority is to support local people, the second is to train the Lebanese Armed Forces, and the third priority is the operational mission. His statement might be rather exaggerated although he implied that the evolution of UN operations means the enhancement of local peace and the more focus on humanitarian activities.

Particularly, at the time of writing when the local situation is relatively calm with little significant political confrontation between Israel and Lebanon, the task of humanitarian assistance has been a greater motivation for Irish soldiers to participate in UNIFIL.

However, it is to be noted that some officers mentioned that the Irish personnel’s humanitarian activities

have had mixed effects. He said “the more contact with local people in operations, the better relation we will get with them, but the more risk you will be ambushed by armed elements who pretend to be normal people.”³⁹

Meanwhile, Irish Battalion Commander Lieutenant Colonel Kelly argued that the strengths of the Irish troops in Lebanon is “acceptability”,⁴⁰ which is another characteristics of Irish peacekeeping along with “defensiveness” and “humanitarianism”. He argued that the Irish contingents are more acceptable to local people in Lebanon because Ireland was not an ex-colonial power, and it had even been colonized by Britain for several centuries. Therefore, it can be argued that there would be a degree of sympathy with people in the Middle East, such as Lebanese and Palestinians.⁴¹ In fact, one Irish officer said, “Ireland is sympathetic to people suffering from conflicts. It is because of our history of being victimized by the UK.”⁴² Another said, “We are not Americans. We have a spirit of helping each other. We have a history of famine.”⁴³

4-2. Individual motivation: for soldiers, junior and senior officers

Furthermore, the author interviewed with a number of Irish soldiers and officers in UNIFIL, asking what their motivation to join UNIFIL is. For example, one Irish soldier said:

*I joined UNIFIL because it is tradition and culture. It is good that a small country like Ireland can contribute to world peace. I like to join UNIFIL because by doing so I can be in the military mood. So, I joined in peacekeeping in Africa and Kosovo. If Ireland had not joined peacekeeping, I would not be in military.*⁴⁴

Thus, many young Irish soldiers want to join UNIFIL as a practical site of military activities. Even another young Irish soldier answered:

UNIFIL is a chapter-VI mission, so it is peacekeeping. The UN missions in Liberia and Eritrea are totally different. They are peace enforcement. Personally, I prefer joining peace enforcement, because it is more close to the reality of military.

Thus, the willingness of Irish soldiers to join Chapter VII-led peace enforcement as well as peacekeeping is one of the factors which encourage the Irish Government and Defence Forces to adopt the “dual track” policy to UN operations. In fact, the Irish Government has been positively considering of dispatching a small number of the Irish Special Forces to MINUSMA, the most fatal UN mission at present.⁴⁵ Meanwhile, one soldier said that one of the good point of doing peacekeeping missions is mobility. He continued:

*I have been to many UN peacekeeping operations including UNIFIL(Lebanon), MINURCAT (Chad), and UNDOF (the Golan Height). I like UNIFIL, but I like UNDOF best. Because in UNDOF, I can go to many places such as Israel.*⁴⁶

As one interviewee put it, the experience gained in the complex, sometimes (often) hostile, peacekeeping environment in South Lebanon was invaluable, as an individual soldier/officer testing ones own abilities and self-belief, but also on an organizational (Defence Forces) level reinforcing benefits of training, equipment, organization, logistical support, etc. or highlighting gaps in these areas. It facilitated comparisons with other armies from other contributing nations.⁴⁷

Meanwhile, some Irish junior officers emphasized enhancing leadership as their motivations to be deployed in UNIFIL. One officer said:

*The good thing of the deployment in UNIFIL is exposure. Everyday, we are facing together. However, back in Dublin, we are facing once or twice a week. This is important for developing leadership.*⁴⁸

Another Lieutenant officer mentioned that it is significant for a junior officer like him to have an experience as a platoon commander. He said that such experience was possible only when he was deployed to UN peacekeeping operations like UNIFIL. Some of them said that they are very satisfied with their self-sufficient life as platoon commander with about thirty young subordinate soldiers in UNIFIL.⁴⁹

Meanwhile, it is to be noted that several senior officers, who have long experience as peacekeepers in UNIFIL, value the missions of UNIFIL as humanitarian. One senior officer compared UNIFIL with UNTAET in East Timor which was Chapter VII-led peace enforcement:

UN mission in East Timor was tense and challenging. So, it gave soldiers good discipline. East Timor Mission was more mobile, walking in the jungle, where they might come across militias. So, UNTAET was more satisfaction for young soldiers, who like challenges and adventure. Meanwhile, in UNIFIL, we can get to know locals because there is peace and situation is benign in Lebanon. We used to donate our blood for locals here. We even made a blackboard for children at school. Here we can make 100 from zero for local people.

One senior officer said that the essence of peacekeeping is the protection of local people, not the protection of UN personnel. Therefore, he said that the current popular international norms of Responsibility to Protect and Human Security should not be something new. The senior officer even mentioned that as the Irish peacekeepers are engaged in UNIFIL for a longer time, they tend to feel their humanitarian tasks as their individual commitment rather than their official duties in the Irish Defence Forces.⁵⁰

On the whole, the motivation of Irish contingents of participating in UNIFIL largely depends on their age or rank. Young soldiers tend to pursue their self-interest for participating in UNIFIL. They come to UNIFIL for new experience, improving military skill, going somewhere they don't know, or simply excitement. Many of them would not hesitate to be deployed to more risky operations such as peace enforcement. Meanwhile, the Irish military personnel such as junior officers with the ranks of Captain and Lieutenant are motivated to join UNIFIL in order to obtain military leadership in the practical site, namely, UNIFIL. They are generally motivated to be promoted to higher senior officers' ranks, and therefore, they are eager to raise their professionalism and leadership, such as training and educating their subordinate soldiers in their own platoons. Furthermore, the more senior Irish officers tend to identify the value of UNIFIL in their humanitarian activities, rather than pure operational missions. They focus more on supporting local people. Although senior military officers are required to prioritize strategic aspects in the mission, they tend to regard the humanitarian aspects as their individual commitment.

5. Conclusion

This paper dealt with UN peacekeeping operations, especially from the viewpoint of contributing states. This paper focused on Ireland, based on the author's field research in UNIFIL where the Irish Battalion has been deployed.

The first part of the paper dealt with the historical analysis of the theory of contributing states' policy towards UN peacekeeping operations. The theory has been evolving. The debate in its early days was simply

based on whether dispatching peacekeeping is under the “realists or idealists” perspectives. And the latest theory is based on the five rationales, such as political, economic, security, institutional and normative ones.

The second and the third parts of the paper were based on the author’s field research. The second part concerned the current situation in the Irish area of operations. The third part will deal with general and individual motivation of the Irish contingents for UNIFIL. The paper indicated that the situation of the Irish area of operations, which is close to the border to Israel, has not been so optimistic. Especially, the Irish area of operations includes Hezbollah-based town Bint Jubayl and other conservative villages, which are dubious and cautious of UNIFIL. In Bint Jubayl, the economy of the town depends on Hezbollah’s belligerent operations. In this sense, peace in UNIFIL areas is not always positive for some locals. Meanwhile, Israel has continued conducting provocative action, such as the interference of unmanned aerial vehicles above the Lebanese territory. Although Israel recognize a role for a buffer in South Lebanon, it has not been supportive of UNIFIL. Furthermore, the five major military operations against Lebanon in the past (in 1978, 1982, 1993, 1996 and 2006) illustrated Israel’s strong commitment and determination against Lebanon or Hezbollah. It has had serious potential of serious casualties of the UN personnel including Irish as well as Lebanese civilians. Since UNIFIL has been a Chapter VI- led peacekeeping operation, it does not necessarily mean peacekeeping has always been safer than Chapter VII-led peace enforcement.

In terms of Irish motivation for participating in UNIFIL, it has a large degree of institutional and normative rationale in accordance with Bellamy and Williams’ theory. The author’s interviews with the Irish contingent in August 2019 convinced that all most all of the Irish soldiers and officers showed the positive attitude towards their commitment to UNIFIL. They recognized both the individual and organizational benefits in military by participating in UNIFIL. The intrinsic nature of its defensive, humanitarian, and acceptable posture in the Irish Defence Forces encourages further strong commitment to UNIFIL. In particular, the Irish contingents’ consistent contribution to humanitarian sectors indicates the normative rationale of Irish motivation in UNIFIL based on altruism. Meanwhile, it is to be noted that even a small number of Irish officers mentioned the dilemma that too much altruism, optimism and humanitarianism might enhance the probability of the Irish contingents to be ambushed by armed elements. Furthermore, this paper indicated that the perception of the individual benefits of Irish contingents depends on their age and rank in the Defence Forces. The young Irish military personnel tend to identify the value of participating in UNIFIL in their individual performance. The junior Irish officers expect that UNIFIL provide a significant opportunity for them to boost their leadership and commanding skills in their platoons. The senior officers tend to identify UNIFIL providing a significant opportunity of supporting local people as a humanitarian mission. Meanwhile, the author’s interviews with the Irish contingents have hardly identified economic and security rationales for the Irish contingents. For example, in the interviews, there was no Irish soldier or officer who mentioned the benefits of financial allowance by participating in UNIFIL. Likewise, there was no Irish personnel who perceive the security advantage for Irish troops, such as the relation to the so-called Northern Ireland issue, or the regional security issues in Europe. The relation between Ireland and UNIFIL illustrates not optimistic local situation for peacekeepers and theory of liberal peace from the dispatching side of peacekeeping.

Endnotes

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- 10 Alex Bellamy and Paul Williams (eds.) *Providing Peacekeepers: The Politics, Challenges, and Future of United Nations Peacekeeping Contributions* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 18-21
- 11 UN Document S/2019/574 *Implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) during the period from 18 February to 24 June 2019: Report of the Secretary-General*, 17 July 2019, para. 2
- 12 Interview with UN personnel, Sector West, UNIFIL, 22 August 2019, Irish HQ.
- 13 UN Document S/2019/574, para. 4
- 14 UN Document S/2019/574, para. 9. In fact, during my field research in UNIFIL, the author heard the intermittent noise of unmanned aerial vehicles, or the so-called “drones” over the Irish areas of operations.
- 15 UN Document S/2019/574, para. 8
- 16 Interview with Lieutenant Molly, post commander of UN Position 6-52, 24 August 2019
- 17 Interview with a Lebanese UN interpreter, at the Irish HQ in UNIFIL, 26 August 2019
- 18 Interview with Captain Mahon, at the UN Position 6-52, 24 August 2019
- 19 Currently, there are three ministers from Hezbollah in the Lebanese Government. The presence of the ministers from Hezbollah is not preferable to the Lebanese politics, according to the political analyst of the Irish HQ in UNIFIL, Captain McDonagh. It is because Israel and Lebanon is still “technically” at war, and because Lebanon has received financial assistance from the US, a pro-Israel state, as a donor. Interview with Captain McDonagh, UN position 2-3, UNIFIL, 26 August 2019.
- 20 In reality, it is considered that there are multiple factors which decrease the cases and frequency of wars between Israel and Hezbollah. An Irish political analyst at UNIFIL Captain McDonagh claimed that neither Israel or Hezbollah is currently interested in conflicts in South Lebanon. For example, for the Hezbollah side, it is because it has been “too stretched” to the Syrian conflict, and because Hezbollah is getting concerned about local casualties in the case of conflicts against Israel. Interview with Captain McDonagh, UN position 2-3, UNIFIL, 26 August 2019.
- 21 Interview with a Lebanese UN interpreter, at the Irish HQ in UNIFIL, 26 August 2019
- 22 Interview with the Irish officer, at the Irish HQ in UNIFIL, 24 August 2019
- 23 Efrat Elron “Israel, UNIFILII, the UN and the International Community”, *Palestine-Israel Journal*, Vol. 13, No.4, 2007. <https://pij.org/articles/973/israel-unifil-ii-the-un-and-the-international-community>. Accessed on 4 October 2019
- 24 On June 1982, the Israeli 800 tanks invaded south Lebanon in order to attack PLO’s stronghold in East

Beirut. The UNIFIL soldiers with their light defensive weapons could not withstand the massive Israeli invading forces. On July 25, 1993, the Israeli Defense Forces launched a week-long attack, including artillery, warship and bombers, against Lebanon as a retaliation of Hezbollah's rockets attack to an Israeli village in late July 1993. As a result of *Operation Accountability* for Israel, or the *Seven Day War* for Lebanon, 2 Israeli civilian were killed, 120 Lebanese civilians were killed, and 300,000 Lebanese civilians were displaced. Meanwhile, on May 7, 1996, the Israeli Defense Forces conducted 1,100 air raids and extensive shelling against Hezbollah, and even a UNIFIL Compound at Qana was hit, which sacrificed 101 Lebanese citizens taking refuge there. 350,00 to 500,000 Lebanese citizens were displaced. The United Nations, *The Blue helmet: A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping, Third Edition* (New York: United Nations, 1996), p. 101. Katsumi Ishizuka "A Historical Analysis on UNIFIL: Relation between Its Initial Activities and the Current Situation in Lebanon", *Kyoei University Journal*, Vol. 5, 2007, pp. 11-30

25 In this context, Nitza Nachmias clearly stated that Israel accused UNIFIL of becoming part of the problem, not the solution. He maintained that Israel argued that UNIFIL was a biased, anti-Israeli organization, supported by Over 400 Lebanese military people. Nitza Nachmias "UNIFIL: When Peace is Non-Existent, Peacekeeping Is Impossible", *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 6, No. 3, Autumn 1999, p. 105

26 Tony Lawrence, Tomas Jermalavicius, and Anna Bulakh, "Soldiers of Peace: Estonia, Finland and Ireland in UNIFIL", Report of International Centre for Defence and Security, Tallinn, Estonia, December 2016, p. 5

27 Tony Lawrence, Tomas Jermalavicius, and Anna Bulakh. p.III

28 Ibid. p. 7

29 Interview with Ms. Julie O'Brien, Deputy Director, United Nations Policy, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Dublin, 19 February 2019

30 Article 29 of *Bunreacht na hEireann* (Constitution of Ireland)

31 John F. Quinn "Dreaming of Things that Never Were': Irish Soft Power and Peacekeeping in the Twenty-First Century", *Irish Studies in International Affairs*, Vol. 29, 2018, pp. 153-154

32 Interview with Colonel Byern, Sector West Headquarters, UNIFIL, 26 August 2019

33 Chiara Ruffa, "Military Cultures and Force Employment in Peace Operations", *Security Studies*, Vol. 26, No. 3, p. 393

34 Ibid. p. 408

35 UNIFIL Press Kit. Unifil.unmission.org.

36 Nitza Nachmias "UNIFIL: When Peace is Non-Existent, Peacekeeping Is Impossible", *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 6, No. 3, Autumn 1999, p. 110

37 "Irish Peacekeeping in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL): A Historical, Political, and Socio-Cultural Study", *UN in the Arab World*, Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs, Research Study, June 2013, p. 17

38 Ibid. p. 18

39 Interview with the Irish officers, the Irish Headquarters, UNIFIL, 24 August 2019

40 Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Kelly, Irish Battalion Commander of UNIFIL, Irish HQ, UNIFIL, 26 August 2019

41 Irish Peacekeeping in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL): A Historical, Political, and Socio-Cultural Study", *UN in the Arab World*, Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs, Research Study, June 2013, p. 15

42 Interview with the Irish soldier, the Irish Headquarters, UNIFIL, 24 August 2019

43 Ibid.

- ⁴⁴ Interview with the Irish soldier, the Irish Headquarters, UNIFIL, 25 August 2019
- ⁴⁵ Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Kelly, Irish Battalion Commander of UNIFIL, Irish HQ, UNIFIL, 26 August 2019
- ⁴⁶ Interview with the Irish soldier, the Irish Headquarters, UNIFIL, 24 August 2019
- ⁴⁷ Irish Peacekeeping in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL): A Historical, Political, and Socio-Cultural Study”, *UN in the Arab World*, Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs, Research Study, June 2013, p. 23
- ⁴⁸ Interview with the Irish officers, the Irish Headquarters, UNIFIL, 23-26 August 2019
- ⁴⁹ Interview with the Irish junior officer (Lieutenant), 25 August 2019
- ⁵⁰ Interview with the Irish officers, the Irish Headquarters, UNIFIL, 23-26 August 2019

