Peacekeeping and National Interests
: Positive Factors Influencing Potential Contributing States

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Abstracts:
This paper will deal with international peacekeeping operations from the viewpoint of contributing states. States have been positively and willingly participating in peacekeeping. It is because they have been attracted by the benefits from peacekeeping which enhance their national interests. Many case studies in this paper will indicate that each national interest in peacekeeping embraces the characteristics of internationalism (international ambition) and/or nationalism (domestic concern). The difference in peacekeeping policy among each state is the difference of balance of their concern between international stability and domestic interests. Furthermore, this paper will illustrate that bigger states tend to value their commitment to peacekeeping with greater respect to international stability, and the smaller states with greater respect to domestic concern. Contributing states’ behaviour as an internationalist stems not only from their general but also specific views. Therefore, states maintain their peacekeeping policy consistently as far as their national interests are valid and significant.

Keywords: peacekeeping operations, contributing states, national interests, internationalism, nationalism

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Contents:

1 Introduction

2 International Considerations - General Foreign Policies
   2.1 A middle power’s peacekeeping role - Canada’s case
   2.2 The neutral states showing they can contribute usefully to international peace and security - Austria’s case
   2.3 A desire to develop a distinctive international policy as a new political power - Japan’s case
   2.4 The major powers’ expressing their concern for international stability and their gradual shift of their policy - US’s case
   2.5 A small power’s peacekeeping role - Malaysia’s case

3 International Considerations - Specific Foreign Policies
   3.1 Commonality with host states
   3.2 Concern about their national security
   3.3 The big powers’ intervention with their back-yard’s conflict
   3.4 Eastern bloc states’ desire to distinguish themselves from the Soviet Union - and their emphasise this after the break up of the Soviet Union and the bloc - Poland’s case
   3.5 Desire to prove one’s worth as a potential permanent member of the UN Security Council - Germany’s case
   3.6 Some states’ regional interests and responsibility
   3.7 Desire to support a Secretary General of one’s own nationality
   3.8 Rivalry with neighbouring states

4 Domestic Considerations
   4.1 Political factors
   4.2 Financial factors
   4.3 Military factors

5 Conclusion
1. Introduction

According to the statistics from *the Blue Helmet* (UN edition), 112 states out of the whole 181 member states of the UN have participated in at least one UN peacekeeping operation or more. The total number of contributing states to the UN operations is 905 states. Therefore, the average number of peacekeeping operations per contributing state is 8.1 operations. While it is considered that there are some criteria of selecting “positive contributing states” to UN peacekeeping operations, if one focuses it on the frequency of dispatching of the states to UN operations, one can assume that the states which contributed to at least 15 UN operations can suitably be called “a positive contributing state UN peacekeeping operations.”

According to this criterion, there are 27 “positive contributing states”. By dividing them into three classification; the great powers (the permanent members of the Security Council), the middle powers, and the Third World states, the 27 positive powers are divided as follows:

The great powers: 2 states
France (17 operations)
Russia (16)\(^1\)

The middle powers: 13 states
Australia (16 operations) Austria (20) Belgium (15) Canada (33) Denmark (19) Finland (19) Ireland (26) Italy (15) The Netherlands (20) New Zealand (18) Norway (25) Poland (20) Sweden (26)\(^2\)

The Third World states: 12 states
Argentina (22 operations) Bangladesh (22) Brazil (16) Egypt (17) Ghana (20) India (21) Indonesia (19) Jordan (26) Kenya (15) Malaysia (19) Nigeria (19) Pakistan (21)\(^3\)

Above classification can indicate that each power equally has some significant contributors. What should be pointed out here is that UN peacekeeping operations can indiscriminately provide each power with her own opportunity to perform contributing activities in various ways, which depends on their diplomatic, political or economic policy. In other words, all of the member states in the UN have a chance to participate in peacekeeping operations and to have potential to enhance their fame and prestige in the international stage by active participation in peacekeeping operations.
Meanwhile, in considering the real modality of peacekeeping operations from the perspective of the dispatching side, two points must be borne in mind, which are sometimes apt to be misunderstood or ambiguous.

First, contributing states normally have a self-interested purpose other than a charitable one behind their decision to participate in peacekeeping. Many states participate willingly with some exceptions. Factors in addition to “altruism” or “internationalism” make contributing states more disposed towards peacekeeping dispatches. In other words, as Alan James says, “… states will move if they judge that response to be in their national interests, nationally conceived.”

In his book “Peace Soldier: The Sociology of a United Nations Military Forces” in 1976, Charles C. Moscos gave the results of the interviews which he conducted with some military officers from most of the contributing states to the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), asking why their home country decided to take part in United Nations peacekeeping operations. Their answers were as follows:

A Canadian officer: “Canada takes part in United Nations peacekeeping because Lester Pearson wanted to win a Nobel Prize.”

An Austrian officer: “We’re here so Cyprus can make money off of us. The United Nations is one way the poor countries can suck off the richer ones. This is why the UN is here [rubs fingers in money-making gesture].”

A Finnish officer: “It is to Finland’s selfish interest to prevent wars. Any trouble spot can flare into a world war which will bring Finland right into the middle of it. What serves the noble purposes of the UN also serves the selfish purpose of our national interest.”

A British officer: “We’re in UNFICYP for a very simple reason. It gives us a good excuse to provide security for our sovereign base on Cyprus.”

A Canadian officer: “You know why Canada is in UNFICYP. It’s the old story - when you have trouble at home, distract attention overseas. Peacekeeping is to keep attention off Quebec. And besides, peacekeeping is good politics. Canada can’t be a major power on its own, and peacekeeping is one way to have a large international voice.”
A Swedish officer: “Sweden asks to take part in peacekeeping because it gives us a chance to have units in the field without costing much money. And it helps the impression of being a world power without actually being accused of imperialism. So we can be hypocrites - take part in international affairs while calling other imperialists.”

A Danish officer: “Denmark is in UNFICYP because it is always telling other countries how to mind their business. We are the greatest do-gooders in the world - we and the Swedes. Denmark has the belief that it can set the rest of the world’s troubles right. We are tremendously egotistical about how much we know. Like trying to bring down the Greek junta, or stop the Americans in Vietnam.”

An Irish officer: “UN duty is looked upon very favourably by the Irish Army. It gives us a purpose and boosts our prestige at home. The more money we make, the more prestige we have. Simple as that.”

These rather cynical comments might discourage those who prefer considering that contributing states are fundamentally motivated for idealistic and altruistic factors. However, they are noticeable enough to imply that despatching peacekeeping operations is decided with elaborate consideration of self-oriented dimensions from political, economic and social viewpoints. This is largely related with each state’s national interests. Furthermore, the term “interests” has been quoted even in the official statements concerning peacekeeping by some politicians from troop contributors. Even the United States, which remains a sole superpower, and is called “the World Policeman”, emphasises her “self-interest” in multilateral peace operations. In 1994 the US Ambassador to the UN, Madeleine Albright, argued:

So UN peacekeeping is not, in our view, a substitute for vigorous alliance and a strong national defense. When threats arise to us or to others, we will choose the course of action that suits our interests. We may act through the UN, we may act through NATO, we may act through a coalition, we may sometimes mix those tools, or we may act alone. But we will do whatever is necessary to defend the vital interest of the United States.

The second one is the fact that the intermediary organisation, often the UN, has a non-persuasive nature in deciding contributing states. This is easier to accept as a result of the first fact. James also argues, “... it is a grave mistake to conceive of the UN as the prime mover. ... It is very far from the case that the world organisation simply speaks, and the relevant states then hasten to comply with its wishes, in the manner of ciphers.” Therefore, it is normally state contributors rather than the UN which show a keen interest in participating in peacekeeping missions. It is true that dispatching states are usually finalised at the Security
Council, followed by host states’ approval of the candidate states’ services as peacekeepers, and that official invitation is always made from the UN. However, formal invitation is always on the understanding of some informal discussion which has already taken place between the UN officials and the delegates from member states which are keen to participate.

In other words, even if the UN endeavours to recruit state contributors, they will express a passive or negative response so long as conditions of peacekeeping operations do not meet with their national interests. This tendency has been consistently manifest in UN history for her conflict resolution issues. For instance, during the Korean War in the 1950s where the first UN forces in accordance with UN Charter VII were dispatched, the Secretary-General asked member governments to survey their resources to determine the nature and scope of the assistance they might, in future, render and to report on the progress made. The result was discouraging.

In all, 37 governments replied to his communication. Simple acknowledgements were received from 15 governments; 8 indicated that they could not participate at all in the projects being studied by the Committee, or gave only limited and conditional acceptance of the measures contemplated; 11 took certain minimum steps (largely in connection with the earmarking of forces for Korea) and gave assurances of active support for the principle of the Uniting for Peace Resolution.\footnote{9}

Meanwhile, as far as the peacekeeping mission in Somalia (UNOSOM) is concerned, after the two tragic incidents\footnote{10} in UNOSOM II 1993-1995, although the Secretary General had approached a large number of United Nations member states for contribution to military component of UNOSOM II, not a single positive response was received.\footnote{11} The above are typical cases which are indicative of the fact that the UN does not have an authoritative nature. Supposedly, this is one of the major reasons why ambitious vision of the creation of UN stand by forces, which has been advocated by many figures such as UN Secretaries General, other UN officials, politicians and academics, has not materialised.

However, this is not to say that more prerogative in the UN in her recruiting is desired, because peacekeeping operations themselves were initiated on a voluntary basis where a certain amount of credibility between the UN and member states has been established and fully-fledged peacekeeping activities are not possible without this credibility. Multilateral relations between states, for example diplomatic relations between contributing states and host states, are too complicated for the UN to be able to act persuasively.
Meanwhile, it is important to analyse motivations for participation from the perspective of the history of peacekeeping. What sorts of considerations, in general, motivate contributing states to willingly participate in peacekeeping operations? While each contributing state has its own vision towards participation in peacekeeping operations, there must be some factors in common on this issue; the relation between potential contributing states and their motivations for peacekeeping. Elaborate research can largely classify two categories - international and domestic considerations. It can be assumed that each political power; great powers, middle-powers, and small powers has her own international consideration towards participation in peacekeeping operations, whereas it is noted that some states have considerable domestic consideration in their participation. Furthermore, international considerations possibly consist of factors in terms of general foreign policies and specific ones, and domestic considerations stems from political, financial and military factors.

2. International Considerations -General Foreign Policies

As Wainhouse put it, “Participation in a peacekeeping operations is a voluntary act and (even) if a state has no “special interest” in a situation it will usually have a fairly high degree of “general interest.” The factor in this category stems from quite comprehensive nature. A peacekeeping policy here is the result of government’s overall foreign policy. Therefore, this policy is planned and practised in a long vision by government. The contributing states in this category, which can be called “internationalists”, have been consistent in their peacekeeping policy and reliable states for the Secretariat. In some cases, this peacekeeping policy has been one of the major foreign policies in the states. However, it should be noted that these internationlists also have their own national interests behind their consistent peacekeeping policy. For example the following cases are considered in this category.

2.1 A middle power’s peacekeeping role- Canada’s case

A number of middle powers have adopted a high profile on peacekeeping as an instrument of their central foreign policy. For example, Canada has placed active involvement in the UN and peacekeeping operations as one of its fundamental security policies as well as national defence and participation in NATO. As World War II concluded, principal Canadian officials and political leaders were obviously unwilling for their country to be relegated to the category of a lesser power. As on 4 July 1947 then Secretary of State St. Laurent put it, “the growth and strengthening of the United Nations must be a real cornerstone of Canada’s policy in foreign affairs.” Fears that small crises could escalate to major power confrontations
led to Canada’s willingness to contribute to UN-sponsored activities, if monotonously, to request belligerents to come to the conference table to settle disputes peaceably.\textsuperscript{15}

Peacekeeping operations have provided Canada, which is militarily a middle power with no colonial experience, with the best opportunity to show her own originality in her diplomacy. Meanwhile, Canada has continuously been aware of the United States as “an overbearing neighbour.”\textsuperscript{16} Therefore, it has been important for her to establish an original diplomatic policy against the US. This policy has been consistent since her membership of UN. During the Korean War, “Canada’s UN policy should support the UN’s general security functions as they existed prior to 1950; refrain from explicitly writing off any countries as indefensible and thereby keep the Soviets uncertain as to Western intentions; undertake particular defence commitments according to strategic interest, following the NATO model; and resist US efforts to turn the UN into an anti-Cominform and Western coalition.”\textsuperscript{17}

In fact, the middle powers are considered to be ideal as peacekeepers. On one hand, in a peacekeeping role which mainly focuses on mediation and arbitration, coercive nature of great powers and their colonial history have will make host states more apprehensive. On the other hand peacekeeping is one of the para-military roles which requires appropriate military equipment, mission skill, discipline of soldiers, and high morale amongst troops. Furthermore, middle powers can ideally possess logistical support capability, which is also another important factor in peacekeeping missions. Therefore, peacekeeping gives the middle powers a chance to have a leading role in international security issues. This can restrict the superpowers’ dominance.\textsuperscript{18} This intention is shared with most of the middle class contributors such as the Nordic States, Australia and New Zealand.

Canada’s performance for UN peacekeeping has been consistent and distinguished. She dispatched their contingents to 33 operations out of 44 in all UN peacekeeping.\textsuperscript{19} As a result, Canada has enhanced international fame and prestige as the best contributing state to peacekeeping operations, which has taken advantage of her status and capability as a middle power.

\textbf{2.2 The neutral states showing they can contribute usefully to international peace and security - Austria’s case}

Some European states such as Sweden, Finland, Austria and Ireland are especially motivated for peacekeeping operations because of their ideologically neutral position during the Cold War era. The Austrian Government construed that UN peacekeeping operations are compatible with her permanent
neutral policy in world politics, and therefore revised her national constitution so that her participation in peacekeeping became constitutional. ²⁰ Ireland also amended its Defence Act for the same reason.

Politically neutral states are more likely to be accepted by host states. For example, in initiating UN operations in the Congo in 1960, the host state, the Congo Government accepted only two European neutrals, Sweden and Ireland, as peacekeeping forces. In peacekeeping areas like the Congo, there was a potential risk of an escalation in internal warfare because of the Superpowers or great powers’ involvement, particularly, during the Cold War era. Consequently, neutral states’ contribution appeared to be in high demand. Stourzh also argued:

*Participation in actions where neutral services in a specific context and needed (Korean Armistice, Near East, Congo, Cyprus). The spectrum of activities of a conciliatory or mediatory, rather than merely protective, character, is large and need not be evoked in detailed here. Without going here into the much discussed problem of the compatibility or incompatibility of permanent neutral and collective security, it may be indicated that though some of these services may be rendered by non-members as well as members of the UN, membership in the UN does not damage, but rather increases the neutral state’s effectiveness in rendering these services.* ²¹

Meanwhile, it was reasonable that such politically impartial states have utilised their neutral character positively as one of the most important foreign policies, in giving a strong commitment to UN peacekeeping operations.

As far as Austria’s peacekeeping policy is concerned, she initiated her peacekeeping activity as a field hospital contingent in ONUC. At that time, in the eyes of the then Foreign Minister Bruno Kreisky:

*This new situation in the Congo presented the opportunity to establish Austria more firmly in the world organisation. He wanted the small neutral country of Austria to establish a strong profile in the international arena and to contribute to world peace and international security.* ²²

In the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP: 1964- ), the Secretary General U Thant contacted Austria and Finland on March 3, 1964, the day before the Security Council adopted the resolution establishing UNFICYP, because he was anxious to have non-member states of NATO. His request for Austria to send an infantry battalion of 700 to 800 men to UNFICYP did not materialise, because of the Austrian constitution which prevented the sending of army units abroad. However, Austria’s participation
in UNFICYP with a field hospital was welcomed, because it enhanced the pluralistic composition of the UN force. Being a neutral country, Austria fitted well into U Thant’s plans.23

After the establishment of the Austrian “International Service Law” of 1965, which circumvented the constitutional ban on the service of Austrian army units abroad, Austria patiently waited for seven years to dispatch her reserve battalion abroad, until May 3, 1972 when the 283-strong 1st Austrian UN Battalion took over control of the district of Paphos in the UNFICYP mission. Before her participation in UNFICYP, she tried to offer her battalion to UNEF, and attempted to send her contingents even to Prague in 1968. However, all attempts failed.24

In 1973 when a number of peace forces were demanded for UNEF II in the aftermath of the Yom Kippur War in the Middle East, the Austrian Government positively accepted the request of moving part of the Austrian battalion in UNFICYP to the Suez Canal, and ordered the contingents in Cyprus to move rapidly.25 Furthermore, in October 1974, this time the whole Austrian contingent in UNEF was drawn off to the Golan Heights, called “Operation of Concord”, to implement the mission of the disengagement of the Israeli and Syrian soldiers in order to meet the request from the Austrian Secretary General, Kurt Waldheim. The Austrian contingents complied with the UN request in a long peacekeeping journey, “Cyprus - Sinai - the Golan Heights” in only a few years.

This confirms that the Austrian government strongly desired to commit to peacekeeping operations and that Austria was also moved by her national interest. As a small neutral state, Austria’s ambition was to establish a strong profile in the international arena as Kreisky desired. To date, Austria has dispatched her peacekeeping personnel to 20 UN operations, one of the most consistent states along with the other neutral states.

2.3 A desire to develop a distinctive international policy as a new political power- Japan’s case

As far as UN policy or its peacekeeping in member states is concerned, some contributing states have had to adopt a passive policy relative to other active foreign policies. This is partly because such states joined the UN relatively late, or partly because they have had some restraints, for example, in terms of constitutional and other political and social aspects. In this context, Japan had suffered from this kind of dilemma during the Cold War periods.

Japan, which was a so-called “enemy state” on the establishment of the UN among the initial member states, was qualified to be a member of the UN in 1956. Even after membership, she could not join the
collective security policy in the international politics. This is partly because of her constitutional restraint which prohibits military activity, except national defence, and partly because her neighbouring states had an extremely negative feeling against Japan’s taking military initiatives abroad because of her imperial history. It is also because of a domestically insular atmosphere which kept both the government and public away from international political reality. Meanwhile, an extremely high defence budget in Japan’s Self Defence Forces (SDF), the second largest next to the US despite the constitutional restraint and protection under the US nuclear umbrella, coupled with her low profile on the international political stage relative to her distinguished economic performance, led to considerable pressure from the military to play a more active international role commensurate with her economic power. Furthermore, during the outbreak of the Gulf Crisis, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, and the following Gulf War between Iraq and the Multi National Forces, the Japanese “non-bloodshed” policy received serious international repercussion despite her considerable financial contribution.

These humiliations which Japan underwent were reasonably crucial enough lead to the then Prime Minister Miyazawa’s comment, “Japan’s international contribution should include some ‘sweating’ or dispatch of personnel to assist UN peacekeeping operations rather than relying solely on ‘a lavish scattering around of aid.’” Since then the Japanese Government has considered it necessary to contribute to UN peacekeeping operations with her desire to develop a distinctive international policy. The Government considered that peacekeeping was ideal as a diplomatic instrument to enhance her international political position as a new great power after World War II. That was also important for her in playing a significant role to modify and evolve the United Nations system which was still dominated by “old-fashioned security structure” led by the war-winning states. Furthermore, peacekeeping was a significant measure to legitimise the Japanese SDF’s para-military behaviour as non-reimperialism, in particular to the neighbouring Asian states.

Accordingly, Japan created the special law for peacekeeping dispatch “The Japanese International Peace Co-operation Law” in June 1992, which enabled the Japanese SDF and civilian personnel to be involved in overseas services, and became the lawful authority of Japan’s peacekeeping participation in UNTAC (Cambodia) in September 1992, in ONUMOZ (Mozambique) in December 1992, in UNAMIR (Zaire and Tanzania as Rwanda mission) in 1994, and in UNDOF (the Golan Heights) in January 1996.

However, despite the creation of “The Japanese International Peace Co-operation Law”, Japanese peacekeeping activity has not been full-fledged. As far as the so-called “assignments of the core units of peacekeeping forces” are concerned, the Diet eventually could not get consensus because of the opposing parties’ stormy resistance, and it was decided that the SDF would not conduct (in Japanese “freeze”) the
assignments of the core units of peacekeeping forces. Therefore, Japan's peacekeeping missions are limited to such as the logistic aids. Japan is still extremely circumspect about her personnel's security in operational areas. For example in UNTAC apparently Japan’s wish to keep the SDF in a relatively safe district was heeded, and in September 1992 the engineering battalion established its camp in the relatively calm province of Takeo to the south of Phnom Penh. This law specifically clarifies the withdrawal of the Japanese contingents when the peacekeeping guideline requirements cease to satisfy the Japanese Government. Furthermore, as this law is still under the restraint of the constitution, the Japanese contingents, for example, cannot deploy in the areas where peace agreements or cease-fires have not been reached. This was particularly inconvenient when the Japanese Government expressed her desire to participate in a peacekeeping operation in war-torn Rwanda (UNAMIR) without any sign of a cease-fire. The Japanese contingents were deployed outside the border of Rwanda to conform with lawful restraint, on the insistence of Takahara.

There was great scepticism about the relevance and effectiveness of sending the SDF to a refugee camp (in Zaire) for just three months. There was also anxieties over whether SDF personnel might be put in a situation where the single machine-gun which they brought with them had be used. Fortunately, no serious incident occurred.

Therefore, it can be said that Japanese peacekeeping participation has been promoted in order to satisfy her desire for distinctive international policy by the Government despite the urgent need of the lawful arrangement and sophistication. Acquiring peacekeeping achievements itself was a higher priority for the Japanese Government than to contribute effectively to them. Japan’s case is an obvious one where peacekeeping operations have been an instrument to meet the national interests behind her desire to promote a distinctive international policy.

2.4 The major powers’ expressing their concern for international stability and their gradual shift of their policy - US’s case

During the Cold War Era, dispatch of the permanent members of the UN Security Council to UN operations was restricted except in a few cases, partly because of maintenance of their neutral position in international politics and partly because of the fear that situations in disputed areas may deteriorate with rivalry, especially the one between the United States and the Soviet Union. Therefore, the involvement of the permanent members in UN peacekeeping in their early days was by voluntary assistance and a financial one. The former included airlifting small states’ contingents and providing aircraft. The US was, in particular, keen on the voluntary contribution; she provided airlifts and/or aircraft in UNTSO, UNEF I,
UNEF II, UNIFIL, UNMOGIP and ONUC by the 1970s. The US financial assistance to some UN peacekeeping operations was also remarkable. For example, of the total of $140 million of the costs of the peacekeeping activities in the Middle East and the Congo, the US, indeed, contributed something over $60 million. Therefore, it can be argued that the US, although she did not contribute to peacekeeping forces, to a large extent, involved herself in peacekeeping operations. This is because peacekeeping operations were considered to be a valuable instrument to prevent the escalation of regional conflicts which, otherwise, would have ignited the superpowers’ hostility during the Cold War periods. Neadler also pointed out:

In some situations, intervention to enforce non-intervention may prove incompatible with the wishes of the affected country or involve too great a risk of escalation into a wilder conflict. In these situations the most effective type of counter-action by the non-Communist countries is counter-action taken in the name of the world community under the aegis of the United Nations. The world organization has special advantages of acceptability and non-inflammability - because its actions are taken in the name of the community of nations as a whole.

US President Eisenhower’s response in the Congo crisis in 1960 is a good example in supporting this argument. When the two leaders of the Congo, President Kasavubu and the Prime Minister, requested the US to send her troops and other assistance to rescue anarchic situation in the Congo against Belgian involvement, Eisenhower declined the offer. It was because the US troops’ potential confrontation with the Belgian troops, an ally in NATO was considered to have serious political implications, and the US troops’ involvement in the Congo would lead to Superpower confrontation there. He promised US assistance in the Congo through the United Nations, otherwise the political leaders in the Congo would have gone to the final alternative, which was the Soviet Union.

Eventually, ONUC could implement her mandate of the Belgian troop’s withdrawal and the recovery of internal disorder, and it did prevent the superpower’s confrontation. Indeed, the US must have had little direct domestic interest regarding the Congo at that time. However, the significant financial assistance by the US in the Congo derived from her concern for international stability, which was, however, at the same time, her indirect national interest so as not to deteriorate the Cold War situation. In this respect, $60 million of her financial assistance was not expensive.

The conclusion of the Cold War confirmed that the Superpowers would not intervene in disputing areas for ideological reasons any more, and therefore they did not hesitate to dispatch their troops to areas for
peacekeeping. As a result, the Chinese, British, Russian and French troops were dispatched to peacekeeping in Namibia (UNTAG, April 1989-March 1990), and the Americans to the Iraq-Kuwait border (UNIKOM April 1991- ) as their first mission in the Post Cold War era.\(^{38}\)

In this era, the full-fledged Superpowers were positively involved in conflict management with enforcement measures. Most of these cases involved humanitarian issues, and the great powers were moved by the global order and global opinions rather than their domestic interests. The US intervened with anarchic Somalia (UNITAF) with much heavier arms, after the unsatisfactory accomplishment of the first UN peacekeeping operation (UNOSOM I). France also intervened military in Rwanda, an ethnically devastated state. All of the permanent members except China had leading roles in stabilising the political and ethnic order in the former Yugoslavia through their positive participation in UNPROFOR, IFOR and SFOR.

Thus, the visions of the major powers towards peacekeeping operations are, or have to be, broader. This presumably, to some extent, stems from the theory of “hegemony” and “free riders”; hegemonic leaders in international politics have to bear considerable political, financial and military burdens by actively involving themselves in conflicting areas, e.g. by sending their troops there, whose benefits smaller states are enjoying with far less burden. This is why the US is occasionally called “the world policeman”.

Another significant difference in peacekeeping policy between the major powers and the other powers is the priority of peacekeeping in their foreign policies. A consistent commitment to peacekeeping can be a cornerstone or one of the main foreign policies for many small and middle powers, which desire to gain their national prestige from peacekeeping in international politics. In contrast, in the US, “the strategy paper portrays UN peace operations strictly as a sometime tool for third-level American interests.”\(^{39}\)

Furthermore, the demise of the Cold War and the subsequent lesser need for their involvement in peacekeeping made the major powers less willing to do their job as “a world policeman”\(^{40}\) to manage conflicts. This theory leads to another one that the major states involvement in internal conflicts, which have significantly increased in number and magnitude, “have generally been of little global importance.”\(^{41}\) Even if they are involved in conflict areas, their military and political will to implement mandates declines.

This argument will lead to one conclusion; the major powers’ peacekeeping policy will be more selective and more self-interested in the Post-Cold War periods. As far as US peacekeeping policy in the Post-Cold war periods is concerned, it reasonably shifted from initial enthusiasm in the 1992-1993 period to
considerable downfall of her ambition in the 1993-1994 period. This was considered to be caused by several factors; the negative response of the Presidential Decision Directive 13 (PRD 13), the official reports of the review of US peacekeeping policy in February 1993, from the UN and within the US Parliament, and the significant US personnel casualties in the UN peacekeeping operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) and the subsequent decline of public support for the mission. On May 4 1994, PRD-13 was replaced by PDD-25 (Presidential Decision Directive 25) which was signed by President Clinton. PDD-25 was more thorough in pursuing her national interests, reassuring US peacekeeping policy to be “more selective and (cost) effective”. The summary of the key elements of the directive included:

*In improving our capabilities for peace operations, we will not discard or weaken other tools for achieving US objectives. If US participation in a peace operation were to interfere with our basic military strategy, winning two major regional conflicts nearly simultaneously (as established in the Bottom Up Review), we would place our national interest uppermost.*

Although peacekeeping can be a good investment for the US, it would be better and more sustainable if it cost less. The Administration is committed to reducing the US share of peacekeeping costs to 25 % by January 1, 1996, down from the current rate of 31.7 % ...

On 5 May 1994, Madeleine K. Albright insisted that the key questions be asked before, not after, new peacekeeping obligations are undertaken. These questions include the following:

* Will UN involvement advance US interests?*
* Is there a real threat to international peace and security?*
* Does the proposed peace-keeping mission have clear objectives, and can its scope be clearly defined?*
* If the operations is a peacekeeping- as opposed to peace enforcement- mission, is a cease-fire in place, and have the parties to the conflict agreed to a UN presence?*
* Are the financial and personnel resources needed to accomplish the mission available?*
* Can an end point to UN participation be identified?*
* What happens if we do not act?*

Therefore, US policy has had more flexibility in deciding whether to participate in peacekeeping operations, and her selection for them depends on the extent of her international and domestic considerations, following her national interests. For example, as far as her involvement in UNPROFOR, IFOR and SFOR in the former Yugoslavia is concerned, her most distinct efforts have been directed to protecting her interest in a stable Europe and a functional NATO rather than to compelling a cessation of
Meanwhile, the US despatch to Haiti (UNMIH) was considered to be a solution to a dilemma of domestic pressure to accept all refugees on humanitarian and political grounds on the one hand, and concern about the political and domestic consequences of accepting a large number of refugees on the other. This means that if conflicting disputes are outside of or only peripheral to the US’s (or the major power’s) interests, they will be more reluctant to be a positive contributor to the operations.

On the whole, while the US and the major powers are more concerned about global security and stability than the smaller ones, they are also moved by their national interests in contributing to peacekeeping operations although their interests may be less tangible or less direct than those of smaller powers. With respect to the US case, the significance of national interests in her peacekeeping policy was strongly emphasised by the Government after the conclusion of the Cold War.

Therefore, a difference in peacekeeping policy between the major powers and the smaller ones is the balance of their concern between international stability and domestic interests. The major powers inevitably take the former into more consideration than the smaller, although this consideration is less significant in the Post-Cold War periods. Another difference is the extent of selectiveness and flexibility of peacekeeping dispatch. The greater possibility of the major powers’ selective and flexible policy stems from the fact they do not have to adopt peacekeeping as a high profile in their foreign policies and their international considerations, which is significantly different from the smaller powers’ policy.

### 2.5 A small power’s peacekeeping role - Malaysia’s case

As mentioned above, small powers’ contribution to peacekeeping operations has not been less significant than that of the greater powers. Their remarkable foreign policy in peacekeeping, to some extent, stems from their characteristics of small states’ diplomacy. By their nature, smaller states are more advantageous in creating specific diplomacy than greater one. Bjol supports this by arguing that whereas the interests of the great powers are multilateral, the interests of the small state will be more narrow, sometime bilateral; the greater power has at its disposal a much larger diplomatic apparatus than the small one; the concern with prestige seems much less important in playing the small state role; and with respect to security policy, great powers have to protect their territories and their client states as well against their opponents. Therefore, small states have more tendency to be able to focus their foreign policies on participation in peacekeeping operation and retain its political will.

For small states participation in peacekeeping operations, which do not require heavy and sophisticated military equipment, was ideal military contribution to international security, and was, at the same time, the
best guarantee of the Third World countries’ total independence from ex-colonial powers. Also, most of the small powers’ fundamental motivation for their active participation in UN peacekeeping operations derives from desire to boost the relative status of the UN, particularly the General Assembly, against the superpowers and greater powers’ political domination. Furthermore, the historical fact that most of the peacekeeping areas have been in the Third World areas has also motivated their sympathetic dispatch.

Many small states have embraced the concept of non-alignment, which also has motivated their consistent commitment to UN operations, which has some extent of similarity to European neutral states’ peacekeeping policy. President Tito in Yugoslavia mentioned this conception of non-alignment and its preferable application to peacekeeping contribution:

*The question of non-alignment has been posed today in a far broader sense in view of the growing number of states and peoples participating in the active struggle for peace. The polarization of the forces of peace on the one hand, and the forces of cold war on the other, has been taking place at an accelerated speed in almost all the countries of the world with ascendant forces of peace. Thus non-alignment has been changing qualitatively, transforming itself into a general movement for peace and for the seeking for peaceful and constructive means for the settlement of various problems among nations. Active “non-alignment” means an increasingly broad and active participation in the struggle for the triumph of the principles of the United Nations.*

As one of troop contributors to UN operations from small states, Malaysia has had an ardent recognition of UN peacekeeping. Her ambition to be a regional political leader in Southeast Asia was recognised by her central role in ASEAN with Indonesia, and her enthusiastic commitment to the East Asia Economic Caucus (EAEC). Her intense protest against great powers’ nuclear testing also indicates her desire to win new recognition from the West.

Her commitment to peacekeeping operations has been consistent and stubborn. Malaysia remarkably took part in almost all of large scale of peacekeeping operations such as ONUC (the Congo), UNTAG (Namibia), UNTAC (Cambodia), Somalia (UNOSOM II) and the former Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR) with an enormous size of troop contingents.

A small power, Malaysia’s challenge to great powers for international issues was witnessed in terms of peacekeeping, particularly when Malaysia indeed increased her troop strength in Somalia at a time when
Western nations were withdrawing *en bloc*. In fact, the Malaysian Ambassador to UN, Razali Ismail stated on the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operation in 1994:

*Developed countries with their resources should assist developing countries to participate (in peacekeeping operations) by making available material resources. (However) We should not indulge in the cynical view that developing countries seek high-tech weapons through involvement in peacekeeping or that they participate to make money.*

Furthermore, in 1994 Malaysia came out strongly against the failure of the UN and some European powers to act forcefully against Serbian aggression and for condoning wanton and large scale abuse of human rights. She, therefore, called for extensive reform of the UN, such as composition, permanent membership and the veto system of the Security Council.

Thus, Malaysia has adopted strict stance towards UN and great powers. However, this challenge has, presumably, been strong appeal about her distinguished presence in Asia-Pacific region, which has played an active role to enhance small powers’ status in world politics. However, it is noted that the Malaysia’s challenge would not have been faded or less effective without her accomplishment for international peace and security such as her frequent dispatch and strong presence in UN peacekeeping operations. Peacekeeping operations have given rise to strong voice to the world stage for a small state Malaysia.

### 3. International Considerations - Specific Foreign Policies

This category focuses on contributing states from the perspectives of particular foreign policies. In this policy, contributing states are motivated by specific interests stemming from specific or limited diplomacy, and therefore it is probable that they are less consistent or willing towards other operations which are not related with the specific interests. Therefore, *so long as* such specific foreign policies are maintained, they can be called “an internationalist”.

#### 3.1 Commonality with host states

Basically, it should be preferable that dispatching states are neutral from the viewpoint of the Secretariat. However, from those of contributing states, they value commonality with host states, such as historical background, language and religion. Although it may be a secondary motivation, this factor should not be neglected. For example, Spanish dispatch to the Central American states (ONUCA) and El Salvador
(ONUSAL) reflects Spanish foreign policy due to historical and linguistic tie. Likewise, Brazil felt a special responsibility for UN operations in two Portuguese-speaking countries, Angola (UNAVEM) and Mozambique (ONUMOZ). According to a Brazilian Governmental official:

Brazil’s approach to participate in peace-keeping operations is a cautious one. We prefer to participate in UN’s missions in which there is clear consent and in which the linguistic, cultural and geographical features may assure a more effective participation of Brazilian troops and observers.

As head of the largest Islamic nation and chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), Suharto decided to have a significant commitment to peacekeeping in the former Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR) where the Bosnian Muslims were in a severely vulnerable humanitarian situation. Similarly, Egypt considered it its duty to come to the assistance of other Muslim nations, which explains why the majority of its forces were sent to UNPROFOR and UNOSOM. Russia’s participation in the UN’s ex-Yugoslav forces was probably related to her traditional role as the upholder of Slavic interests in the Balkans. Peacekeeping in the Middle East is also an attraction to small Christian States, where people have only a slim chance to visit their holy place.

3.2 Concern about their national security

The second interest in this category concerns national security. Especially in the areas where domestic political order was totally devastated due to civil wars, and therefore humanitarian factors were also threatened, such as in the Congo in the 1960s, Somalia, the former Yugoslavia, and Cambodia in the 1990s, many of their neighbouring states joined their peacekeeping operations (ONUC, UNOSOM, UNPROFOR and UNTAC, respectively) so that they could “contain” the instability. On the contrary, for states such as Egypt, El Salvador, Greece, Israel, Jordan, Namibia, South Korea and Zimbabwe, all of which have been beneficiaries of peacekeeping operations in the past, participation in peacekeeping is a sort of repayment for a debt for peacekeeping operations.

3.3 The big powers’ intervention with their back-yard’s conflict

The end of the Cold War brought one phenomenon to world politics and security; the satellite states or ex-colonial states of the superpowers which became free from superpower pressure undermined their political order which, as a result, threatened the “back-yard” stability of the great powers. In such cases, the great powers themselves dispatched their troops to their back-yard with consent from other small neighbouring states who supplied their military forces with them. In 1993, for example, the US troops with many small Central American states such as Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago participated in peacekeeping and
peace-enforcement missions in Haiti (UNMIH and MNF) in the aftermath of a military coup and the domination of the undemocratic regime in Haiti. Russian peacekeeping in Abkazia and Tajikistan might correspond to this category although there is a confusing element in the use of the term peacekeeping in Russia. Meanwhile, as far as peacekeeping activity by the regional superpowers is concerned, some non-UN peacekeeping operations might fit this category. Examples are Indian peacekeeping in Sri Lanka (1987-1990), Nigerian and some other African peacekeeping in Liberia (ECOMOG 1990-), and Australian peacekeeping in Bougainville, Papua New Guinea in 1994. However, some of the above missions about their legitimacy as peacekeeping operations are questionable.

3.4 Eastern bloc states’ desire to distinguish themselves from the Soviet Union- and their emphasise this after the break up of the Soviet Union and the bloc- Poland’s case

During the Cold War era, the foreign policy of the Eastern bloc states had to comply with that of the Soviet Union. As far as peacekeeping is concerned, during this period, the Soviet Union adopted negative and at best selective policy towards it, depending on her national interests. For example, she was willing to pay her financial assignments for UNEF II and UNDOF, whereas not for ONUC and UNIFIL in which she suggested host states’ burden of the costs. She did not send her contingents to any peacekeeping operations except one military observer mission. (UNTSO: 1973- ) Understandably, the Eastern bloc states such as East European states had no alternative but follow almost the same policy towards peacekeeping.

However, the demise of the Cold War made Eastern bloc states made possible to be free from political restrictions, and reasonably adopt their original foreign policy to express their desire to distinguish themselves from the Soviet Union.

Poland was the most typical state to have this national sensitivity. Even during the Cold War periods, she sent her military contingents to UNEF II (November 1973- January 1980) and to UNDOF (June 1974 to December 1993), both of which were, however, logistics missions. After the conclusion of the Cold War, she appealed adopting her political framework in the strong pro-Western policy by the membership of the NATO. For instance, on 2 February 1997, she formally joined “Partnership for Peace”, which was a programme in the NATO to create the intimate military relationship between the original NATO states and the ex-Eastern bloc states in terms of gaining of interoperability and compatibility with NATO structures, and she positively provided the places for the joint training with the NATO members.

As far as peacekeeping operations in this programme are concerned, in 1994 three exercises on peacekeeping operations were carried out, and a years later, there were tens of them, and the Polish troops,
staff officers and observers took part in ten exercise. Then, for the first time, a company of US Army was exercising peacekeeping operations on the territory of Poland.73

Understandably, Poland’s consistent peacekeeping policy stems from this ambition. Her participation in peacekeeping in the post-Cold War era has been significant in scope of her missions and in frequency of her dispatch. Her missions began from control and observation, then they were developed to logistic and engineering assistance to some international big contingents, e.g., in UNEF II, UNDOF and UNFIL, air transport of food to Ethiopia, up to the operational tasks in UNTAC, UNDOF74, UNPROFOR, UNAMIR and UNCRO as UN peacekeeping operations, and IFOR and the following SFOR as the NATO-organised peacekeeping operations. Particularly, her participation in the latters is significant accomplishment in the practical shift from “Partnership for Peace” programme. The Government report also said, “The fact that Poland has been chosen for the Common Effort mission (in IFOR), proves our aspiration to become a member of Euro-Atlantic security structures, and the praise of our army force.”75

Meanwhile, the Poland’s Government has earmarked her contingents 20 UN peacekeeping operations, 18 out of which was dispatched in the post-Cold War era, whose frequency is almost equiverant to that of the most consistent states such as Canada and Sweden.

Thus, a positive commitment to peacekeeping in Poland has played a vital role in adopting the politically independent policy from Russia and in her ardent shift to pro-Western policy and consolidating the tie with the NATO members after the Cold War.

3.5 Desire to prove one’s worth as a potential permanent member of the UN Security Council - Germany’s case

It is generally assumed that participation in peacekeeping has been a prerequisite for states which aim at the permanent membership of the UN Security Council. All of the so called “candidate” - Brazil, Germany, India, Indonesia, Japan, Nigeria and Pakistan - are now very significant troop contributors to peacekeeping operations.76

With respect to Germany’s case, the Foreign Minister Kinkel, to the 47th session of the UN General Assembly, 23 September 1992, made an initial reference to the question of a permanent seat for Germany on the UN Security Council by stating that that Germany would not take the initiative, but would state its claim if and when specific plans were to be made to change the composition of the Security Council. Nine month later, in July 1993, the government, responding to an official question of the Secretary-General,
declared its preparedness to assume the responsibilities of permanent membership of the Security Council. 77

During these nine months, the German Government shifted to the adoption to more active peacekeeping policy. On 2 April 1993 the German Government decided not to withdraw German fire control officers from the multi-national crew of the NATO airborne warning and control system (AWACS) squadron whose command and control systems were about to be used to assist the military enforcement of the no-fly zone over Bosnia Herzegovina authorised by the UN Security Council. This was a significant decision for the Government; since then German military contingents have involved themselves in enforcement missions. Moreover, at the end of the same month, German Government decided to earmarked an armed forces contingent consisting of as large as 1,640 men for transport, logistic and engineering work to UNOSOM II, which was also a peace enforcement operation under the Chapter VII of the UN Charter although the government insisted that the German forces be stationed in a pacified area and not be used in a combat role. 78

Obviously, during this term the German Government wished to demonstrate her political will and military capability to join any kinds of peacekeeping operations and conflicts management by challenging two peace enforcement missions. This was presumably a suitable campaign to win permanent membership of the Security Council.

3.6 Some states’ regional interests and responsibility

Some contributing states are motivated for peacekeeping dispatch in terms of specific interests and responsibility in disputing areas. For instance, deterioration of the political situation in the volatile Middle East area must pose the utmost concern to the states which have depended the economic lives on their natural resources. Such states have feared a devastating proxy war in the region during the Cold War era. Hence the inevitably more rapid and cautious reaction to arrange peacekeeping operations than the others. The deliberate attention of the US in the regions such as her participation in UNTSO from its initiation as military observers and her positive creation of the MFO with utmost care after the termination of UNEF II in the Sinai 1982, is a good example.

Some states have been willing to join peacekeeping with their political implications. In ONUC, although the growing non-aligned bloc in the UN supported the UN operation and supplied their troops as peacekeeping forces, they tended to be “Lumumbist” in their political references. 79
In this category, there are some examples that big powers have the feeling of responsibility for the dispute. For example, Britain had particular responsibilities towards Cyprus and establishing the peacekeeping operation there (UNFICYP), as its former colonial power and one of the Guarantor Powers of the treaties of 1960. On the similar context, the French initiative to conflicts management and the creation of peacekeeping operations in South Lebanon (UNIFIL), Cambodia (UNTAC) and Rwanda (UNAMIR), and to lesser extent, the Spanish counterparts in ONUCA and ONUSAL, apply to this category. China’s remarkably first consistent commitment to the regional efforts in Cambodia (UNTAC) also made her send 400 troops and 46 military observers.

3.7 Desire to support a Secretary General of one’s own nationality

This case is coherent and tangible. The Swedish ardent membership of troop contributors in the early days after the advent of peacekeeping operations were promoted by the Swedish Secretary General Hammarskjold. Indeed Sweden was one of the only two “white” troop contributors in ONUC, where both the local factions in the Congo and her neighbouring states did not prefer Europeans as peacekeeper. However, according to a governmental booklet of Swedish UN policy:

One reason for Sweden’s heavy involvement in the Congo mission was that Dag Hammarskjold’s vulnerable position as Secretary-General and the strong criticism aimed at him by the Soviet Union triggered sympathy and support for his work among all the major Swedish parties except the Communists ...

Meanwhile, When Australia accepted the offer of the troop contingents in UNFICYP late in 1971, “Perhaps this was not unrelated to the fact that new UN Secretary General, whose term of office had commenced on January 1, 1972, was (Austrian) Kurt Waldheim. … It appeared impossible to deny the Austrian Secretary General such a request, and it was deemed equally impossible to refuse to despatch a reserve battalion, which had been trained for seven years, when the first opportunity for active service arrived.”

Although peacekeeping contribution in Burma was limited to one operation, UNOGIL, prior to the inauguration of the Burmese Secretary General, U Thant, while he was taking office Burma participated in ONUC (August 1960-June 1964), UNIPOM (September 1965-March 1966), and UNTSO (1967-1969) which was the last operation so far. Likewise, it is also remarkable that in the 1980s when the UN was headed by a Peruvian Secretary General Javier Perez de Culler, Peru sent her military observers to two UN operations in the border between Iran and Iraq (UNIMOG: September 1988-October 1989), and Namibia (UNTAG: April 1989-March 1990).
3.8 Rivalry with neighbouring states

The eighth motivation stems from consciousness of rivalry with neighbouring states. For example as far as India’s peacekeeping is concerned, “it appears that inter-regional rivalry plays a part in her wish to retain a major peacekeeping role. By 1994 Pakistan had become the largest overall contributor of troops to UN operations (7,290, mostly in Somalia and Bosnia), and there was clear an element of sub-continent competition about such deployment from Africa.” France’s high profile to peacekeeping operations is presumably as the result of her strong feeling of rivalry with US and UK. Her negative impression with the US intention in Europe promoted her willingness to contribute to play a leading security role such as peacekeeping operations in Europe. Her rivalry with UK is understandable as a permanent member of the Security Council in the same region. South Korea, a emerging state as a troop contributor, “validates its own claim to multilateral assistance and asserts its role as a growing regional power by participating in UN missions”, obviously considering her neighbouring state Japan as a current regional superpower.

4. Domestic Considerations

Peacekeeping operations are the significant instruments not only for internationalists. Peacekeeping brings some beneficial factors in terms of domestic affairs in which the government expect more direct and tangible effect, compared with international considerations. This category can be divided into the following aspects.

4.1 Political factors

Basically, the public of contributing states express positive feeling about their states’ dispatch to peacekeeping operations. This is occasionally recognised by the results of the opinion polls which were conducted by the governments and mass media. For example, in May 1993, according to the opinion poll by the Japanese national broadcasting company NHK, 78.4 % of the respondents answered “The Japanese Self Defence Forces should be dispatched to peacekeeping operations.” This percentage was increased by about 10 points compared with the results of the similar questionnaires conducted by the biggest Japanese newspaper company of the year before. It is obvious that such public support urges the ruling party and the Government to promote their active participation in peacekeeping operations. As a result, they gain good impression and popularity from the public. Around the latter opinion poll, Japan sent her contingents to UNTAC, ONUMOZ, and UNAMIR.
Similarly, in Canada where the vast majority of the public support their state’s strong commitment to peacekeeping operations, the response to the public voice concerning peacekeeping operations is an important factor to retain the governmental position by the ruling party. The enthusiasm of the public towards peacekeeping operations are also remarkable enough to urge the Canadian Government decide to participate in ONUC.91

Meanwhile, participation in peacekeeping is occasionally motivated to stabilise domestic political situation. For example, the Yelysin’s policy of Russia’s involvement in peacekeeping operations after the Soviet collapse in the 1990s is partially motivated “to distract his political opponents at home”92 and “to response to pressure from the conservatives to do something.”93

4.2 Financial factors
One of the remarkable characteristics of UN peacekeeping in terms of financial aspects is that troops serving side by side is reimbursed on the same basis for identical services. This means that reimbursement is paid to each contributing state’s government by the UN without any considerations of the costs of each contingent such as those of military equipment in the operational areas and soldiers’ allowances, or of each states’ economic and financial performance such as the relative strength of domestic currency and price index in the international monetary system and inflation rate in her domestic economy. Therefore, it is possible that participation in peacekeeping operations could bring significant financial profits especially for some small states; they may desire to achieve profit from the reimbursement of the costs of troop contribution.

A 1990 survey of troop contributors revealed that their monthly per-person cost averaged $2,300, so the average contributor absorbed about 59 percent of the actual costs of keeping its troops in the field. But actual costs varied by $2,000 in either direction, from as little as $280 per month to as much as $4,400. The lowest costs contributor is thus “reimbursed” roughly 3.5 times as much as it spends, and the highest cost contributors a bit less than one-fourth of its costs.94 Furthermore, the strong foreign currency, US dollars, which will be obtained by reimbursement of peacekeeping operations, must be attractive to some developing states.

As a different view from financial aspects, peacekeeping is far less costly than conventional warfare and unilateral military interventions. The finance of UN peacekeeping operations is financed from the member states of the UN. Therefore, the great powers prefers to joining UN operations to their direct interventions in conflict areas. Russia’s President Boris Yeltsin placed considerable emphasis on participation (in UN
operations) could “strengthen Russia’s international prestige” - and added, “it will not require additional expenditure on Russia’s part.”

4.3 Military factors

Activation of the national military by joining peacekeeping operation is also a significant factor in terms of motivation. Small states may be especially attracted by peacekeeping, because they can enlarge their military scale by supplementing personnel and strengthening military equipment and facilities at the expense of the UN and other sponsoring organisations and states. Bullion also maintained this effect in terms of participation in peacekeeping operations of India and other South Asian states:

"Other ostensible reasons for (Indian) participation include ... the revenue to be earned by participation in such missions (Rwanda and Somalia). In this regard, it is also acknowledged by fellow South Asian nations Pakistan, Bangladesh and Nepal, who likewise make sizeable contributions to UN missions, that payment by the UN helps them offset the large standing armies they wish to maintain for local strategic reasons."

Malaysia is one of the states which has had benefits in her military by her participation in peacekeeping in terms of her experience and equipment procurement. The Malaysian Armed Force has been deeply involved in counter-insurgency operations the communist terrorist from the 1950s right through the 1980/90s, therefore its organisations and equipment were more geared towards this task. In going “conventional”, the UN Peacekeeping Operations provide significant experience to army personnel’s. Particularly, according to the interview with Colonel Kamarddin Mattin, Malaysia’s participation in peacekeeping operations in the former Yugoslavia provided valuable experience to the Royal Malaysian Air Force (RMAF) with the participation of its Tactical Air Control Party (TACP) team, operating the UN and NATO strike aircraft in identifying and fixing aerial target on the ground. Furthermore, participation in peacekeeping operations, in particular Bosnia, leads to procurement of military equipment towards conventional warfare requirement. This is especially so to the Army (The Malaysian Armed Forces) when Armoured Personnel Carriers, all-terrain’s vehicles were procured for the troops (in Bosnia) which later complemented the armoured capability development of the army. Malaysia’s history of counter-terrorists and other warfare has kept her deeply concerned about her military’s high proficiency, preparing for conventional warfare. In this regard, peacekeeping has provided her with good assist.

In totally another view, the conclusion of the Cold War, following the change of major regime, that is, the shift from communism or authoritarianism to democracy, may make militaries reconsider the purposes of their existence and identity. On this context, as Norden argued, “by engaging the armed forces in a
worthwhile, professional endeavour, international peacekeeping can help ease some of these tension.\textsuperscript{98} Therefore, maintenance of professionalism and high morale through operational tasks in peacekeeping could also be gifts to the national military. For example, for Japanese troops, whose military activity is restricted due to their national constitution, participation in peacekeeping operations is precious because they can have practical experience overseas with other military forces in peacetime and enhance their morale.

Recruitment to the national army can be easier for governments of contributing states; peacekeeping provides opportunity to “travel to participate in joint manoeuvres and training programmes”\textsuperscript{99} For example, in Sweden, all the personnel in Swedish UN operations are recruited as volunteers, in addition to their compulsory military service. However, the service in a UN peacekeeping operation is popular and it has not been difficult to get volunteers. This is recognised by the fact that when a new UN battalion is to be organised in Sweden an average of 2,500 men apply.\textsuperscript{100}

Meanwhile, in a heavily militarised state, sending her troops abroad when there is no external threat helping her to be free from military unrest and keep her government’s power. For example, Argentina, where the military has not been totally under civilian control, “may view peacekeeping operations as a means both of keeping their armed forces occupied outside the country rather than meddling in domestic affairs and of helping to rehabilitate them after an authoritarian era in which their integrity and professionalism were compromised.”\textsuperscript{101}

5. Conclusion

This paper confirmed the fact that each contributing state, while she is ambitious for the maintenance of international peace and security, is participating in peacekeeping positively and willingly because she is attracted by the benefits from peacekeeping which enhance her national interests. This paper indicated that each national interest embraces the characteristics of internationalism (international ambition) and/or nationalism (domestic concern) in terms of participation in peacekeeping. The difference in peacekeeping policy among each power is the difference of the balance of their concern between international stability and domestic interests, and there is a tendency that bigger states value their commitment to peacekeeping with greater respect to international stability, and the smaller states with greater respect to domestic interests. This is because international stability, although it is indirect, is a significant national interest for the great powers. The peacekeeping policy for greater powers is just one of some foreign policies, and the
effects which greater powers are expecting by participating peacekeeping is more diversified. Whereas smaller states’ peacekeeping policy is more significant than greater powers because they expect more tangible and direct effects from peacekeeping. However, the super- and great powers less ambition of their involvement in peacekeeping because of the demise of the Cold War, made the gap in the roles of peacekeeping between them and smaller powers narrower.

It is also noted that contributing states’ behaviour as an internationalist in terms of peacekeeping stems not only from their general views but also specific ones, in which states considers peacekeeping as a special instrument to enhance their specific foreign policy. This utility has been equally shared among each power.

On the whole, one witnesses a number of positive factors influencing contributing states to peacekeeping operations. The fact that peacekeeping has lasted until the present with evolving and expanding is the proof of the significance of these positive factors for contributing states.

Notes:
1 As far as the other permanent members are concerned, US (13 operations), UK (13) and China (8)
2 Hungary (14)
3 Nepal (14), Senegal (14), Fiji (10)
4 According to Findlay, many of the Caribbean states (and Israel) which participated in MNF in Haiti and thereafter in UNMIH, were pressured to participate by the USA in order to lend a multilateral character to a US-dominated mission. Russia pressured fellow CIS members to join it in peacekeeping in Tajikistan. (Findlay T. “The new peacekeepers and the new peacekeeping” in Findlay T. ed, Challenges for the New Peacekeepers, SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute), Research Report No. 12, Solona, Sweden, SIPRI, 1996, p. 7
5 James A. Comparative Aspects of Peacekeeping, The Dispatching End - The Receiving End, paper written for National Center for Middle East Studies, Cairo and the Jeffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, 1995, p. 1
6 Moskos C. C. Peace Soldiers: The Sociology of a United Nations Military Force, Chicago, The University of Chicago, 1976, pp. 103-104. According to Moskos, “58 percent of the officers explained their country’s participation in frankly cynical or national self-interest terms. This contrasted with only 5 percent of the officers who ascribed motives to their country which were fundamentally idealistic or altruistic, that is prevention of war, restoration of peace to Cyprus, service to the United Nations. Slightly over a third, 37 percent, characterized their country’s motivation in mixed terms, mentioning both cynical and idealistic reasons.” (Ibid. p. 103)
8 James A. *Comparative Aspects of Peacekeeping*, p. 1
10 They are the exchanges of shooting between the Pakistani soldiers (UN) and the faction led by General Aideed of 5 June 1993, and the 3 October 1993 incident in which the US Rangers came under concentrated fire by the same faction, both of which brought significant number of UN casualties. *United Nations Peace-keeping Information Note 1995*, pp. 127-160
11 Ibid.
13 Livingstone G. A. *Canada’s policy and attitudes towards United Nations peacekeeping, 1954-1964, with specific reference to participation in the forces sent to Egypt (1956), the Congo(1960) and Cyprus (1964)*, PhD thesis in Department of International Relations, the University of Keele, 1995, p. 303
14 Quoted from Parliamentary Debate, op. cit., 4 July 1947, 5078
16 James A. *Comparative Aspects of Peacekeeping; The Dispatching End - The Receiving End*
20 Takai S. ‘Several States’ Attitude towards UN Peacekeeping Operations”, *Journal of International Law and Diplomacy* (Tokyo), Vol. 91, No. 4, 1992, pp. 44-63
At that time, airlift capability of the moving was provided by the Royal Air Force, and the first cargo planes left Akrotiri Air Base on October 26 at 2020 hours, less than 22 hours after the first notices, which was quite a remarkable achievement. In the following 56 hours, 575 men, 45 vehicles and 170 tons of freight were flown to Egypt (“Operation Dove”).

It is said that the first international demand for Japanese contribution to international conflicts goes back to the Iran-Iraq war in 1987, when Japan, however, rejected the request especially from the US President Reagan that she sends minesweepers to the Persian Gulf. (The Daily Yomiuri, March 2, 1993)

During this crisis and warfare, Japan made a huge financial contribution to the MNF, amounting to eventual $13 billion. It was an enormous amount, considering the whole UN Peacekeeping budget is $3 billion a year. To collect this contribution, the government had to impose special taxes on its citizens. Eventually the Japanese Government sent the SDF as minesweepers to the Persian Gulf without any particular legislation in April 1991. However, this was criticised as being “too little too late”. In those days, the US pressure on Japan was considered significant. It is well-known that James Baker, then former US Secretary of State said during a speech to the Japan Institute for International Affairs in Tokyo in November, “Your check diplomacy like our dollar diplomacy of an earlier era is clearly too narrow.” (See Ito M. “Expanding Japan’s Role in the United Nations”, The Pacific Review, Vol. 8, No. 2, p. 285; Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Blue Note 1993, pp. 48-52; The Daily Yomiuri, February 12, 1992)

This factor is highly related with Japan’s ambition to have permanent membership in the UN Security Council. The decisive opportunity for recent active controversy of the Japanese permanent membership is, again, the Gulf war 1990-91. In those days, the Minister of Finance Ryutaro Hashimoto, implied the Japanese government’s irritation of not having detailed information of the war because Japan was not the permanent member of the UN Security Council. Also Yoshio Hatano, the Japanese former Ambassador to the UN, said, “My utterly unpleasant experience during the Gulf War has convinced me that Japan should insist on the fundamental democratic principle of no taxation without representation.” The then Japanese Prime Minister Tsutomu Hata also expressed in a Diet, “The new conditions surrounding the UN require Japan an active role as a permanent member of the Security Council.” As a symbol of its resolve, the ministry appointed its most senior diplomat, Mr. Hisashi Owada, an avid advocate, as its UN ambassador. Finally, on September 27, 1994, the Japanese foreign minister Yohei Kono officially expressed Japan’s desire for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council at a meeting of the UN General Assembly. [See...

30 Takahara T. “3. Japan” in Findlay T. ed, *Challenges for the new peacekeeper*, Solona, Stockholm, International Peace Research Institute, 1996, p. 58. As another example, according to UNTAC sources, after Japan’s first casualties in UNTAC, at least six Japanese police have abandoned their post and goes to Thailand. (*The Washington Post*, May 7, 1993) Also in UNAMIR, the SDF were criticised when they refused the request to look for a missing staff from the UN headquarters.


32 Takahara T. p. 62

33 Britain’s participation in UNFICYP 1964 and France’s participation in UNIFIL, which are deemed exceptional in this matter, were definitely motivated for responsibility as their ex-colonial powers.

34 This policy was initially advocated by UN Secretary General Hammarskjold and reassured in his review “The UNEF Experience Report” in 1958:

...In order to limit the scope of possible difference of opinion, the United Nations in recent operations has followed two principles: not to include units from any of the permanent members of the Security Council: and not to include units from any country which, because of its geographical position or for other reasons, might be considered as possibly having a special interest in the situation which has called for the operations... [Cordier A. W. and Foote W. *Public Paper of the Secretary-General of the United Nations: Volume IV Dag Hammarskjold 1958-1960*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1974, p. 282

35 *The Blue Helmet*, 1996


37 Ibid. p. 347

38 Their tasks of operations were as follows;

- China (UNTAG) --- Electoral supervisors
- French (UNTAG) --- Electoral supervisors
- UK (UNTAG) --- Signals squadron, electoral supervisors
- Russian (UNTAG) --- Electoral supervisors
- US (UNIKOM) --- Military Observers

Dr. Edward L. Warner said “We should not and will not become the world’s policeman, bearing the full burden of security in regions where many of our international partner also have interests.” in a opening statement before the senate armed services subcommittee on 13 April 1994.


According to Mark M. Lowenthal, senior specialist in US foreign policy in office of senior specialists, “(In PRD-13) specific provisions included US support for the ‘rapid expansion’ of UN peacekeeping; a commitment of US political, financial and military support to peacekeeping; and a willingness to have US forces serve under UN control in peacekeeping operations. However, the draft also allowed commanders of US units operating under UN control not to comply with ‘orders ... they believe to be outside the mandate of the mission’ as agreed to by the United States with the UN. ...The draft of PRD-13 reportedly ran into criticism from a number of sources. One source was from the UN, where Boutros-Ghali and his chief deputy for peacekeeping, Kofi Annan, both objected to the provisions concerning US commanders in peacekeeping operations not complying with certain orders. The UN officials felt this would lead other nations to do the same, severely undermining the concept of a UN command. More significant was a change in the US political consensus for peacekeeping and unhappiness with the PRD draft reportedly expressed by Secretary Christopher. Press accounts of the July 14 draft led to much criticism over US troops serving under UN command, including objections from Member of Congress. Congress also began to express dualism about the expansion of UN peacekeeping operations by rejecting Clinton administration requests for additional funding.” (Lowenthal M. M. “CRS Report for Congress: Peacekeeping In Future-US Foreign Policy,” *Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress*, March 21, 1994, pp. 7-8)

In Somalia, support for a continued US presence cam close to collapse after the October 3, 1993 raid by US troops on Farah Aidedd’s headquarters resulted in 18 US dead, 78 wounded and one held prisoner for a brief period. On October 7, 1993, President Clinton announced that US forces in Somalia would be withdrawn by March 31, 1994.

After 18 US Rangers were killed in Somalia on 3 October, 1993, a University of Mary poll of 803 citizens showed that 28 % favoured immediate withdrawal, 43 % favoured withdrawal by 31 march (the date specified by the president), and only 27 % favoured staying until “we have stabilized the country, even if this takes longer than six months.” Furthermore, a flood of calls made to Senator Bill Bradley’s office after the ranger incident was “overwhelmingly in favour of withdrawing US forces” from Somalia: Senator John McCain’s officer received 402 calls in one day, 400 of them favouring immediate withdrawal. (Daniel D. “5. The United States” in Findlay T. *Challenges for the New Peacekeepers*, pp. 93-94

PDD-25 has not been officially released.
Executive Summary: The Clinton Administration’s Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations, p. 801

Ibid. p. 805


Terriff T. and Keeley F. “The United Nations, Conflict Management and Sphere of Interest,” p. 520

Ibid. p. 525. In his address to the nation on 15 September 1994, President Clinton succinctly provided the rationale for US military intervention in Haiti, saying: “the United States must our interests - to stop the brutal atrocities that threaten tens of thousands of Haitians, to secure our borders and to preserve stability and promote democracy in our hemisphere and to uphold the reliability of the commitments we make and the commitments others make to us.” However, the US decision to resort to force in Haiti was three years after President Bertrand Aristide was overthrown. (Ibid. pp. 522-523)


Vukadinovic R. “Small States and the Policy of Non-Alignment” in Schou A. and Brundland A. O. eds, Small States in International Relations, p. 103


The Prime Minister Mahathir is well-known as a political figure who has a strong sense of regionalism. In a speech at the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in Kuala Lumpur in July 1997, he told the ASEAN countries that they should not depend on any foreign power, making reference to the US experience in the Vietnam War, which mad US official in the audience upset. (Chin J. “Malaysia in 1997,” Asian Survey, Vol. 39, No. 2, February 1998, p. 189

Each size is 3,400 personnel in ONUC, 891 in UNTAG, 2297 in UNTAC, 1,944 in UNOSOM II and 1,513 in UNPROFOR.


Quoted from Statement of Ambassador Razali Ismail to the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations, New York, 30 March 1994

Hassan M. J. “Malaysia in 1994,” p. 192

Hassan M. J. “Malaysia in 1995,” p. 129

They are Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua
Quoted from *España y las OMPs de Naciones Unidas* [Spain and UN peacekeeping operations], Paper delivered by the Director-General for International Organizations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, early 1994 (in Spanish, Unpublished conference paper)

The draft of the opening speech of a seminar on Brazilian - United Kingdom peacekeeping operations in 1998, unpublished.

Indonesia dispatched 297 peacekeeping personnel in total in 1995, 264 out of whom were stationed in UNPROFOR (15 civilian police, 220 troops, and 29 military observers) (*United Nations Peace-keeping Information Notes, 1995*)

Kane A. “Other new and emerging peacekeepers” in Findlay T. ed, *Challenges for the New Peacekeepers*, p. 118

James A. *Peacekeeping in a Changing World with Special Reference to the Middle East*, p. 4

Findlay, p. 9

The other contributing states to UNMIH and MNF from the Central America were Bahamas, Belize, Honduras, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Surinam and Togo.

In Tajikistan there was no peacekeeping principles such as local consent, impartiality and minimum force; no agreement among local factions in Tajikistan had been reached; Russian-led CIS peacekeepers had the invention of the Government in Dushanbe, but not of the opposition; and Russian peacekeeping in Tajikistan is regarded as a clear example or peace-enforcement action.

Although Fiji is a small state in the South Pacific region, she has possessed one of the largest military troops among her regional states.


The spectacular inauguration of Partnership for Peace took at the Biedrusko Field Training Centre, not far from the town of Poznan. There, the exercise nicknamed Cooperative Bridge was carried out, during which over six hundred troops from more than ten countries performed some elements of peacekeeping operations. During the first meeting of NATO countries’ troops with those from the former Warsaw Pact, military subjects were of minor importance. The troop did not “break the enemy’s defence” nor did they “capture the enemy’s defensive positions”. During the exercise, the troops tried to overcome the prejudices, that had accumulated for years, of the past enemies, and tried to win mutual friendship, and to
learn something that the previously forbidden publications contained. (*Polish Armed Force: illustrated

73 A month later, it was turn of the US Army, during the exercise “Cooperative Nugget” conducted on the
territory of the United States. (Ibid. p. 29)

74 In 1994, the Polish logistic contingent in UNDOF was replaced by an operational battalion.

75 *Polish Armed Force*, p. 23

76 The number of UN operations which each “candidate” states joined is; Brazil 16 operations, Germany 12,
India 21, Indonesia 19, Japan 4, Nigeria 19, Pakistan 21. (As far As the Japanese peacekeeping is
concerned, it was started after her domestic PKO Law was created in October 1992.)

77 Quoted from *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 2 July 1993 (in German)


Peacekeeping*, New York, St. Martin, 1993, p. 325

80 A Treaty of Guarantee signed by the UK, Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey, was one of the four documents
concerning the independent Republic of Cyprus presented in the Zurich negotiation in 1960.

81 China has continued to stress the Charter’s provision s for the peaceful settlement of international
disputes and has welcomed the strengthening of the UN’s role in preventive diplomacy. Vice-Premier
Quian Qichen in his address to the General Assembly on 29 September 1993 urged observance of the basic
principles of the Charter, namely respect for sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of
member states, and underlines the importance of regional organizations which, he said, should assume
greater responsibility for maintain peace and security. (Kane A. “Other new and emerging peacekeepers” in
Findlay T. ed, *Challengers for the New Peacekeepers*, p. 100)


83 Austria Documentation *In the Service of Peace: 35 Years of Austrian Participation in UN Peace


85 Ibid.

1997, p. 101

87 In UNPROFOR France at one point had doubled the number of troops of the next-largest contributor and
it was the only country to send reinforcements for the security of the safe areas declared by the Security
Council in June. She has paid a heavy price: 45 of her soldiers had been killed in Bosnia and Herzegovina
alone by August 1995. (Kane A. p. 101-102)
South Korea sent an engineering unit of 250 troops to UNOSOM II in 1993 as her first mission in UN operation. Since then she dispatched her peacekeeping personnel to UNMOGIP, MINURSO, UNOMIG and UNAVEM III.

In Canada, the public’s fervent support for peacekeeping operations was more boosted by Lester Pearson’s award of the Nobel Prize in 1963 for his leadership in the development of UNEF.

Granatstein J. L. ed, Canadian Foreign Policy Since 1945: Middle Power or Satellite?, p. 163

Crow S. “Russian Peacekeeping: Defence, Diplomacy, or Imperialism?,” International Relations, Vol. 1, No. 37, September 18, 1992, p. 40


Crow S. “Russian Peacekeeping: Defence, Diplomacy, or Imperialism?,” p. 40

Bullion A. p. 106

Interview with Mattan Kamaruddin, at Malaysian High Commission in London, in April 1998


James A. Comparative Aspects of Peacekeeping: The Dispatching End - The Receiving End

Thunborg A. “Sweden and United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Views on United Nations Peacekeeping Operations,” Australian Outlook, 1976, p. 369. As so many are interested in serving in UN forces in Sweden, both physical and mental qualifications are set very high. Apart from officers and some specialists, applicants must be between eighteen and twenty-five years of age and have completed their compulsory basic military training. (Ibid.)

Findlay p. 9

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