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Abstracts

The entire process of peace-building in Afghanistan has been based on one operating principle, namely, a ‘light-footprint’ approach. Security in Afghanistan is extremely complicated, due to anti-Government spoiler groups, the narcotics trade, and regional warlords, in addition to the terrorist groups. This paper points out that several key security-related sectors in Afghan peace-building, including counter-narcotics measures, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), and the US-led Coalition force, have been so slow and ineffective, mainly because of the adoption of a light-footprint approach. Such a strategy is due to underestimating the security situation in Afghanistan and a lack of commitment to the entire peace-building process by the international community. Overall, Afghanistan is still too immature a state for a light-footprint approach to be adopted especially in the security sector.

Post-conflict peace-building has established fame and popularity. The demand for peace-building missions has increased in the post-Cold War period since a number of internal conflicts in Asia and Africa necessitated the building of newly-democratised states within their own territories. During this period, peace-building missions have been dispatched to Namibia, Western Sahara, Cambodia, Somalia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Eastern Slavonia, East Timor, Sierra Leone and Kosovo. Afghanistan is not exceptional.

Meanwhile, researching for peace-building in Afghanistan as a case study is considered to be particularly significant. This is because peace-building in Afghanistan is unique compared to other peace-building missions for the following four aspects.

First, most “post-conflict” peace-building missions are established after the internal conflicts are finished and the ceasefires are reached. However, in Afghanistan’s case, no ceasefire was reached between the military factions. For example, in Cambodia’s case, all political factions signed the 1991 Paris Peace Accords, including the Khmer Rouge, which were then followed by the establishment of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) in March 1992. In the case of Afghanistan, the Taliban was not invited to the Bonn Agreement held in November and December 2002. Furthermore, the four factions, including the Northern Alliance, which were invited and signed the Agreement, did not represent the majority of Afghan citizens.¹

Second, peace-building has normally been conducted as a single and individual mission. Occasionally, plural missions are involved in one state-building process, for example, in Haiti, Somalia and East Timor. In those states, a peace-enforcement mission was initially established in order to create peace, followed by peacekeeping or peace-building as a neutral actor. However, the situation in Afghanistan is totally different, where
the coalition forces are currently conducting ‘wars on terrors’ against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, in the so-called ‘Operation Enduring Freedom.’ On the same soil, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has been playing a supportive role as a peacekeeper to enhance security and help Afghan authorities retain ownership of the peace process. Furthermore, peace-building in Afghanistan has been positively introduced by a new type of security-building measure: the Security Sector Reform (SSR). The SSR process in Afghanistan consists of five pillars: creating the Afghan National Army led by the US; creating the Afghan National Police led by Germany; establishing the judicial sector led by Italy; counter-narcotics measures led by the UK; and enhancing the process of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) led by Japan.

Third, most peace-building missions help build new states which collapse due to internal conflicts among different religious or ethnic factions resulting in anarchy or near anarchy. However, in Afghanistan, the international actors, especially the US-led coalition eliminated the existing Taliban regime by force, and then tried to create their favoured regime and state. In other words, whether it is legitimate or not from the viewpoint of international convention or ethics, peace-building in Afghanistan, similar to the case of Iraq, has played a role in replacing an existing sovereign state with a totally different one.

Fourth, compared to many other cases, peace-building in Afghanistan has had to be conducted in a highly corrupt society and economy. On the one hand, Afghanistan is one of the poorest states as measured by UN economic standards. On the other hand, Afghanistan is infamous for having an economy that is virtually sustained by illegal industries such as opium production and smuggling. Therefore, the counter-narcotics measures should be a key issue for the peace-building process in Afghanistan. Combined with such an illegal economy, politics in Afghanistan have been contaminated by bribery and other corruption. Therefore, state-building in Afghanistan must necessarily be more complicated and difficult than, say, in East Timor which is simply an economically poor state.

The focus on peace-building in Afghanistan is also significant because its successful implementation holds particular importance for international politics. Afghanistan is located in the middle of two highly tense areas, namely the Middle East, and India-Pakistan. Therefore, if internal conflicts resume in this state, the domino effect could negatively influence its neighbouring states which could bring serious problems for international security. In other words, the stability of the state of Afghanistan will contribute to preventing a chain of conflict in Central Asia.
It is possible that peace-building in Afghanistan is one of the conditions for the eradication of terrorist networks in Asia. In fact, when the war in Iraq occurred in 2003, the remnants of the Taliban and other terrorist groups became active in Afghanistan.

Furthermore, peace-building in Afghanistan can be seen as a touchstone for several new approaches to peace operations advocated by the international society. For example, the UN has issued several official documents and policies regarding peace-building, post-conflict development and aid, such as *An Agenda for Peace* in 1992, *the Brahimi Report* in 2000, *the Millennium Declaration* in 2000, and *Report of the Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change* in 2004. Therefore, peace-building in Afghanistan as well as in East Timor and Kosovo should be given attention as possible models to meet the demand for a new type of state-building standard.

It is to be noted that the entire process of peace-building in Afghanistan has been based on one operating principle, that is a ‘light footprint’ approach. The light footprint strategy was in fact officially encouraged by the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan and his Special Representative in the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), Lakhdar Brahimi. This approach has been applied in the case of Afghanistan in particular due to the following three factors: a negative image among the Afghan people of a foreign presence because of British and Soviet incursions; lessons learned from heavily-involved peace-building in Kosovo and East Timor; and the ongoing US war against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban and a reluctance of foreign troops to be deployed in Afghanistan.

However, the continued volatile security situation in Afghanistan despite several years of international intervention encourages one to reconsider the legitimacy of the light-footprint approach to the security sphere. This paper will focus on the current key sectors directly affecting security in Afghanistan, that is, counter-narcotics measures, DDR, ISAF and the US-led coalition force. It will discuss why the above sectors, which are all important for the successful implementation of the entire peace-building process, have been quite slow and ineffective in developing their functions. This paper will also suggest that the four sectors are related to each other in enhancing the entire security of Afghanistan, and finally will give several recommendations on this issue.

2. Counter-narcotics Measure in Afghanistan

The opium industry has had a huge impact on the Afghan economy and society as
well as on the peace-building process. Afghanistan produces 87 percent of the world’s opium, and the income from its production and trafficking in 2005 was estimated at $2.7 billion, which is equivalent to 52 percent of Afghanistan’s legal gross domestic product.\(^5\) Since 2001 opium production has increased exponentially, and in 2004 poppy cultivation was present in 28 out of the 32 provinces in Afghanistan, and opium poppy cultivation increased 64 percent from 2003.\(^6\) This means that, unlike other opium-producing countries, opium production in Afghanistan is not limited to remote areas inaccessible to the government but to almost all areas in Afghanistan.

In fact, the poppy industry is very attractive to Afghan farmers. Afghan poppy farmers are expected to earn $2,520 per year, compared with $670 for other farmers.\(^7\) The poppy crop is relatively weather resistant, and is easy to store, transport and sell. Unlike legal crops, opium does not require fertilizers and irrigation.

However, opium poppy cultivation has had negative consequences for Afghan security, politics and the economy. According to Felbab-Brown, with profits in the tens of millions of dollars, local warlords can easily finance their militias and maintain their popularity by sponsoring local development projects such as schools, sewage and irrigation systems, and clinics. Even after the implementation of the demobilization process, some of the leading warlords’ militias accumulated profits from opium, making it easy for many warlords to reconstitute themselves.\(^8\)

The opium industry has also brought about several serious conflicts between international actors and Afghan militias that are drug traffickers. In fact, the battle between insurgent groups and the US-led coalition force in Sangin District of Helmand Province on 29 March 2006 wounded three Canadians and one American soldier. Helmand is the main opium poppy growing district in Afghanistan, and therefore there has been widespread violence since an aggressive counter-narcotics campaign started.\(^9\) In Helmand, the Taliban has forged an alliance with drug smugglers, provides protection for drug convoys, and carries out attacks to keep the government away and the poppy flourishing.\(^10\) As a result, legitimate commerce has also been negatively influenced since the opium trade undermines the authority of government and social institutions. Legitimate merchants in Pakistan in particular have suffered from the smuggling of opium and other products from Afghanistan.\(^11\)

Encouraging opium production also threatens the Afghan peace process politically by providing an opportunity for criminal organizations and corrupt politicians to enter the political space, undermining the democratic process. According to the International
Herald Tribune, up to 25 percent of the newly-elected Parliament was involved in the drugs.\textsuperscript{12}

Opium production has had a negative influence on the Afghan economy as well. Essentially, most of the profit from opium goes to a very few traffickers, warlords and militia leaders, rather than to the impoverished farmers. Opium production has also contributed to inflation, a rapid rise in real estate prices and is undermining currency stability. It is suspected that Al Qaeda and the Taliban have been involved in the laundering of money estimated to be $400,000, which has been made from drug-related activities. Estimating that the September 11 attacks cost $300,000–500,000. These terrorist attacks in the US would not have been possible without drug-related money laundering in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{13}

Thus, counter-narcotics is one of the most important measures in promoting peace-building in Afghanistan. It can be said that in the long term the major threat to stability in Afghanistan is unlikely to be terrorism or warlords but failure to eliminate organised crime and narcotics trafficking.\textsuperscript{14} Britain has been in charge of counter-narcotics measures in the Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan. The first programme to deal with the drugs issue was a British-sponsored poppy eradication programme, the so-called "buy-back programme", which provided monetary incentives for cooperation. However, the eradication programme presented a great security dilemma. Eradicating the poppy industry would help diminish the influence of factional warlords and the Taliban, and enhance the authority of the Afghan Government. However, an increasing proportion of the Afghan population earns their livelihood from the drug trade, and most of them have no equivalent alternatives. As a result, eradicating the poppy industry could impoverish these people. Thus, such an incoherent counter-narcotics strategy may further worsen the current security situation.\textsuperscript{15} In fact, the British-led $34 million "buy-back" was forced to be swiftly discontinued, and poppy cultivation actually increased in the targeted areas. Much of the money spent by the British eradication scheme in 2002 and 2003 ended up in the hands of regional warlords, and many Afghan growers agreeing to eradicate their crops never got any money.\textsuperscript{16}

Planting alternative crops has also been encouraged by the British Government. However, the value of the opium crop at “farm-gate” prices was $600 million in 2004, while the amount of money earmarked for alternative crops in 2005 was just $380 million. The alternative livelihood scheme has been so slow that it has not reached the stage to create a sustainable agricultural infrastructure.\textsuperscript{17}

Furthermore, disagreement between Britain and the US on how best to advance the counter-narcotics measures has fragmented donor support. The US State Department has sponsored the formation of a Ministry of Interior Organized Central Eradication Force. In contrast, the British continues to support an Afghan Narcotics Force supported by its own special forces. The competing strategies have impeded progress.\(^{18}\)

On the whole, British counter-narcotics measures have been far from effective and successful. Presumably, the international community underestimated the difficulty and intractability of the influence of the opium trade over Afghan society. The counter-narcotics strategy should be considered more comprehensively and conducted in a larger framework instead of depending on one contributing state to solve it.

3. Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) in Afghanistan

In general, the successful DDR of ex-combatants is crucial to achieving peacebuilding. Hikmet Cetin, NATO Senior Civilian Representative in Afghanistan, stated that, due to the fragmentation and polarization of the country, a direct outcome of the long years of occupation and civil war, securing success in the DDR project has an importance second-to-none in the immediate term in Afghanistan. He also said that it is only once the process is fully completed that establishing physical security and stability as well as securing the reach of the central government in the provinces will be possible.\(^{19}\)

On 22 February 2003, the Afghanistan’s New Beginnings Programme (ANBP) was established to conduct the DDR programme by the Afghan Government with Japan as a lead nation supported by UNAMA and UNDP. In early 2003, ANBP established a goal of 100,000 militiamen to be integrated through DDR. Implementation of the programme began in October 2003, following an initial reform of the Ministry of Defence. The DDR programme was first piloted during the run-up to the parliamentary and provincial council elections in 2003 as a means of implementing the electoral criteria that prevented individuals having links to illegal armed groups from standing as candidates. As a result, 34 candidates were disqualified from participating in the elections and 4,857 weapons were handed over by 124 candidates.\(^{20}\) About 16 months later, on 7 July 2005, the disarmament and demobilization portion of the programme ended, with more than 63,380 Afghan Military Forces troops disarmed, with up to about 53,000 having been assisted with reintegration.\(^{21}\)

However, it is generally agreed that the DDR process in Afghanistan was slow and
delayed by a lot of factors. The first factor which delayed the DDR was the historical and socio-cultural norms. Due to twenty years of civil wars in Afghanistan, the Pakistan border areas have been flooded with weapons. Pakistan became a major supplier of arms to the Afghan mujahedin. A lucrative illegal arms trade developed in the region. In particular, it flooded the North-West Frontier Province with automatic arms. A ‘Kalashnikov culture’ has prevailed, bringing about the proliferation of arms and common resort to violence in the Pashtun-populated border area. Because of the cultural affinity with weapons and a warrior culture, militias resisted surrendering their arms. Under these circumstances, the overall impact of the DDR programme in Afghanistan was limited.\(^{22}\)

The second factor of the ineffectiveness of the DDR process was the lack of support from the Ministry of Defence in the Afghan Government. Afghanistan presents an exceptional case on DDR implementation, in which the local Ministry of Defence has maintained a hostile position towards the process. While the Ministry of Defence has publicly endorsed the ANBP, it has taken a number of covert steps to prevent it. For example, in early 2004, the Ministry of Defence instructed local militia commanders in a number of districts to recruit new forces. This is a clear violation of its agreement with ANBP in the DDR process.\(^{23}\)

The lack of impartiality is also reflected in the slow process of the DDR in Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, there are informal militias, including various factional commanders’ private militias. They operate independently but are, in practice, not categorized as militias to be processed through the DDR programme.\(^{24}\) There is also a growing concern about the fact that several specific warlords are open to the reintegration of their militia into the Afghan National Army (ANA). This is a concern because the ANA should ideally consist of impartial army personnel who have not experienced the civil wars in Afghanistan. Although the success of DDR requires a consistent and universal implementation of the programme, this condition has not been applied in Afghanistan. Currently, the private militias who used to be controlled by the former Minister of Defence Muhammad Fahim have been favourably employed as new members of ANA. Thus, the DDR in Afghanistan, which should essentially expect confidence-building, has given rise to a distrust among the Afghan people.\(^{25}\) The quality of the entire DDR process received some criticism:

*The militia forces processed through DDR were those considered as the most expendable by the warlords. Commanders also retain large numbers of civilian followers, who may be mobilized as and when necessary. It has been suggested that many of these*
men, equipped with obsolete arms, have been put into the DDR process, while the full-time fighters and their more sophisticated weaponry have been held back.\(^\text{26}\)

It is to be noted that external factors have also negatively influenced the DDR process in Afghanistan. Astri Suhrke pointed out that many developing countries have become the grounds for "surplus weapons", which has made the disarming of ex-combatants and factions difficult. There has been a growth of international arms dealers smuggling the huge surplus of weapons from the former Warsaw Pact countries. Such illegal trade, violating principles of international law, have not been tackled effectively. Furthermore, even some Western governments have covertly supplied the Afghan insurgent forces with sophisticated weapons.\(^\text{27}\)

Thus, a lack of promptness and accuracy in the DDR operation in Afghanistan has affected security in Afghanistan. The concept of a light footprint is difficult to apply regarding DDR in Afghanistan where both the Afghan Government and the big powers are not willing to cooperate.

4. International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)

ISAF was established in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1386 on 20 December 2001 and was to be deployed in Kabul and its surrounding areas with a mandate of providing security for the Afghan Government and citizens, and UN agencies. In October 2003, UN Security Council 1510 paved the way for ISAF to expand its mission beyond Kabul. In carrying out this mission, ISAF currently conducts patrols throughout the 16 different police districts in Kabul and its surrounding areas. Over a third of these patrols are carried out jointly with the Kabul City Police. ISAF has been financed by common funding from the troop-contributing states.

Initially, ISAF was commanded by the British, and then in turn for six-month periods by the Turks, Germans and Dutch. In August 2003, ISAF came under NATO command. ISAF was the NATO's first distant expeditionary operation, which was legitimised in the first NATO invocation of Article 5 in the wake of the September 11 attacks.\(^\text{28}\) In short, ISAF was Alliance's first mission beyond the Euro-Atlantic area.

ISAF has been mandated under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and therefore can be categorised as peace-enforcement. However, its mandate is different from those of the previous NATO-led missions such as SFOR and IFOR, which were primary security
provider. ISAF has played, rather, a supporting role to enhance security and help Afghan authorities retain ownership.\textsuperscript{29} It is also to be noted that the number of ISAF personnel in Afghanistan has been relatively small compared to other like-minded peace-building or peacekeeping missions. For example, UNTAC in Cambodia had 16,000 soldiers and 3,500 civilian police officers; IFOR in Bosnia had 60,000 soldiers; and UNTAET in East Timor had 7,000 soldiers. The number in ISAF was initially 4,500, and then increased to 9,000 troops from 35 NATO and non-NATO troop-contributing countries.\textsuperscript{30} However, Afghanistan is much larger than East Timor in geographic size, and is, in fact, slightly larger than France.\textsuperscript{31} In reality, NATO has struggled to find troops to meet the demand for an adequate level of peace-building, and consequently, international troops in Afghanistan have had the lowest ratio to population and to the area of territory compared to other post-conflict operations.

Meanwhile, the security situation in Afghanistan should not be viewed optimistically and is rather worse than the other cases mentioned above. Afghanistan’s security crisis has been complicated, including the resurgence of anti-government spoiler groups, the burgeoning narcotics trade, the entrenchment of regional power brokers or warlords, and the rising incidence of banditry and general criminality.\textsuperscript{32} In fact, since Spring 2003 the security situation in especially the southern and eastern parts of Afghanistan has deteriorated considerably. In the interim report of the UN Secretary-General on the situation in Afghanistan published in March 2006, Kofi Annan indicated particular concern about suicide bombings and anti-Government element-related incidents. According to the official report, prior to 2005, there had been only five cases of suicide bombing in the preceding three years. In 2005, there were 17. By 23 February 2006, the annual total for 2006 already stood at 11. The number of anti-Government element-related incidents has also grown unabated since 2003. In fact, the frequency of such attacks during the latter half of 2005 and the start of 2006 (200 per month) was higher than during any of the previous reporting periods. Furthermore, it is to be noted that the Taliban and other insurgent forces have shifted their strategy from targeting coalition forces, in 2002 and 2003, to attacking Afghan civilians and personnel from NGOs.\textsuperscript{33} This demonstrates the deterioration of the security environment in Afghanistan. Kofi Annan concluded in the report that the democratization and state-building achievements of the past four years remain fragile.\textsuperscript{34} In 2004, 47 percent of Afghanistan’s administrative districts (169 of 361) were considered by the UN to be medium or high-risk areas.\textsuperscript{35}

Therefore, ISAF’s modest mandate and size has reflected volatile security in

Afghanistan. As the paper by the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit put it:

... the international community and even the international military forces appear plagued by timidity [in Afghanistan]. ...International military commanders assert they can only stay in Afghanistan with the consent of the factional commanders, and they cannot afford to be confrontational or assertive in their dealing with them. This attitude sells short of the moral authority of ... the military power of the Coalition and ISAF, and it sells out the people of Afghanistan for whom this may be the most pressing of all security issues.36

ISAF soldiers have been the target of assaults from the Afghan militias. For example, in November 2005, four occupants of an ISAF vehicle were caught in an explosion in the northern Afghan city of Mazar-e-Sharif, and one Swedish soldier died from his injuries after being evacuated from the incident.37 In May 2006, a light armoured vehicle was similarly struck by a roadside bomb, killing two Italian soldiers and injuring four, in the south of Kabul.38

The unwillingness of the US to co-operate with ISAF has also been a serious factor of the slow process of its mission. In fact, the US refused to provide airlift, intelligence, and extraction support for ISAF when there was discussion of expanding ISAF to five cities outside of Kabul in winter 2002.39 US peacekeeping policy has been reviewed since the attacks of 11 September, which led to a much more hawkish policy marginalising peacekeeping. In 2002, US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld commented on the ISAF, “We are already taking part in the peacekeeping force by providing logistics, intelligence, quick-reaction force support. I mean, that is big.” President Bush’s then-national security adviser, Condoleezza Rice, also said in an interview with the New York Times, “The US is the only power that can handle a showdown in the Gulf, mount the kind of force that is necessary to protect Saudi Arabia, and deter a crisis in the Taiwan Strait. And extended peacekeeping detracts from our readiness for these kinds of global missions.”40

Clearly, the limited scale of ISAF remains insufficient to bring stability to the entire Afghan state. A larger and more robust ISAF presence would arguably prevent Afghan warlords from resorting to force and would lead them to the negotiating table. Meanwhile, there has been a strong sense that without an expanded role for ISAF, the political process, disarmament and creation of a multi-ethnic national army have poor prospects. Given this, the International Crisis Group strongly recommended the expansion of ISAF forces to 25,000–30,000 troops.41 It can be said that ISAF has also inevitably adopted a light-footprint approach. However, the current fragile situation in Afghanistan requires harder
security measures conducted by ISAF.

It is also recommended that peace-building and security-building in Afghanistan should require more regional participation in expanding ISAF. ISAF and presumably the US could learn from Australia’s role in the INTERFET peacekeeping mission in East Timor in 1999, when Australia acted as the lead state in the UN-authorized operation and requested many neighbouring states to contribute to INTERFET. This was one of the major reasons why peacekeeping in East Timor had a good beginning. Therefore, although retaining guidance from NATO members, ISAF could win more respect from the Afghan public and the international community by having more regional contributors from Asia. Likewise, if there were more Islamic states involved in peacekeeping missions, then the Afghanistan mission, for example, would be more effective. Such Islamic states would be willing to get into Afghan communities, and be able to do more extensive and effective liaison work with local actors and officials.

Meanwhile, ISAF and other contributing states began a new type of civil-military programme commanded by military elements, the so-called ‘Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs).’ The PRTs have maintained a strong focus on ‘heart and mind’ activities, including the building of schools and clinics. Another objective of PRTs is, by conducting joint efforts with the Afghan Government, to bolster the legitimacy of the Government in the regions through improved security, and the facilitation of reconstruction and development efforts. Hiknet Cetin stated that this is especially important given that Taliban insurgents, warlords, drug traffickers, corruption and lawlessness still threaten investment and reconstruction efforts, and that instability poses the biggest obstacle to development in Afghanistan. As of August 2005, ISAF commanded nine PRTs and the U.S.-led Coalition, thirteen. The mission of PRTs was to deploy small groups of coalition soldiers, between 70-100 soldiers, in the major provincial cities to assist with security stabilization and provide reconstruction assistance. The focus of each PRT is unique. For example, the British PRT in Mazar-e-Sharif have focused on security, with patrols and even small outposts in an area of considerable factional animosity, while in Heart, the Italian PRT has emphasised reconstruction and cultural interaction.

However, PRTs have not won full support from the international society. The concept of PRTs has been criticized for blurring the lines between military and humanitarian actors and for duplicating the efforts of civilian organizations already providing schools, health clinics and water supplies. The criticism, especially by NGOs, are taken seriously. Most humanitarian actors claim that the construction of schools and clinics by the PRTs, their
use of white cars and civilian clothes etc. threaten the humanitarian space and risk endangering the lives of aid workers. Some NGOs working in Afghanistan have refused even to engage in a dialogue on the PRT issue.\textsuperscript{45}

Peter Viggo Jakobsen gave more balanced comments on the PRTs. On the one hand, he concluded that the PRTs have been successful because they have helped to extend the authority of the Afghan Government beyond Kabul, facilitated reconstruction and dampened violence. On the other hand, he also accepted that the PRTs only make sense as part of an overall strategy in which they serve to buy time while other instruments are employed to tackle the military threat posed by the Taliban and Al Qaida; infighting between the warlords; the increase in lawlessness and banditry; a booming opium poppy cultivation and the drug trade.\textsuperscript{46} Jakobsen’s comments should be paid significant attention for the following two reasons. First, the PRTs are not capable of addressing the security issue directly but can only contribute to the defusion of local animosity. In other words, the PRTs are a sort of secondary activity. This operation has a similarity with a more traditional type of peacekeeping operation which valued the principles of local consent and impartiality. Second, successful PRTs are related to the successful implementation of other security sectors such as counter-insurgency, DDR and counter-narcotics operations. In short, the PRTs can play a positive role within the rigid framework of security-building in Afghanistan.

5. The US-led Coalition Force (Operation Enduring Freedom)

Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) is the official code name used by the US Government for its military response to the terrorist attacks on the US of 11 September 2001. Especially, the term “OEF” refers to the war in Afghanistan. The force has consisted of troops from the US, Canada and the UK. The initial military objectives of OEF included the destruction of terrorist training camps and infrastructure within Afghanistan, the capture of Al Qaeda leaders, and cessation of terrorist activities in Afghanistan. On 2 May 2003, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld announced the end of OEF in Afghanistan. However, on 9 December 2003, the US military announced that it had resumed a major ground operation in Afghanistan in order to eliminate the remnants of Al Qaeda and the Taliban regime.\textsuperscript{47}

However, the Coalition force has been in a vulnerable position in Afghanistan. The remnants of Taliban and Al-Qaeda forces are employing guerrilla tactics, drawing on local
support, and operating in familiar physical terrain, where they have long years of battle experience under similar conditions. Retaliatory allied operations by heavy concentrations of troops will likely bring more losses to coalition forces. Losses of civilian life and property will result in adverse publicity from human rights organizations and the Muslim population around the world. Unnecessary loss of human life resulting from large-scale military strikes encourages terrorists' propaganda, which could facilitate recruitment of more Jihadis around the world. In reality, skepticism and distrust among Muslims across the world about US counterterrorist efforts have impeded international cooperation and may become an even bigger problem in the post-Al Qaeda era.

The initial approach to security in OEF was designed to limit the US presence on the ground in Afghanistan. Initially, a US force of less than 10,000 was deployed on the ground. This policy was based on an American “light-footprint” strategy. It has been said that from the outset the US deployed a minimum number of troops to Afghanistan in order to preserve troops for the war against Iraq. In 2004, the number of US troops in Afghanistan were doubled to 20,000 in order to offset the decreases in security that occurred in 2003 and 2004. However, security continued to deteriorate despite this counter-insurgency effort. Then, the US-led Coalition began to draw down its forces. In December 2005, US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld announced that the size of the US force in Afghanistan would shrink from about 19,000 now to about 16,000 by summer 2006, when the US will hand control of the southern provinces to ISAF. He said that a drawdown of US forces would not undermine joint efforts to improve security, and that the remaining US troops would continue to help train and equip the Afghan security forces on a variety of security projects. However, Afghan leaders have been concerned about the decrease in US forces, which would be a signal of a declining commitment of the US to Afghanistan. They have also expressed concern that ISAF lacks the capabilities to fight a counterinsurgency campaign against the Taliban.

According to Mark Sedra, the US military in Afghanistan has been forced to ally itself with several regional powerbrokers, providing them with money in return for the use of their militias in anti-Taliban operations. In these operations, individual commanders receive up to $10,000 per month in cash grants from the US. The relatively small number of US troops deployed in Afghanistan has prompted the Pentagon to rely heavily on local forces.

However, this situation has seriously affected Security Sector Reform, such as counter-narcotics operations in Afghanistan. The local warlords are unwilling to provide
local human intelligence to those who are destroying their opium business. US troops, which received assistance from them for counter-terrorist operations, are also a reluctant participant in counter-narcotics operations. This was one reason why these operations have not been successful. Milton Bearden, who was the CIA's main liaison to the mujahideen during the 1980s, expected a more pessimistic scenario. He claimed that much of the intelligence that the warlords have supplied to Washington has proved faulty. Furthermore, he warned that warlords would not be willing to co-operate with the US for much longer, since they would soon have enough resources to strike out on their own. He explained, "With $2.6 billion plus in poppies and another couple of billion that come through in the regular smuggling, at what point do the warlords not need us anymore?"

The US continues to finance Afghan warlords in order to hunt Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Afghan officials complain that US military operations have been conducted without any coordination with the Government. Furthermore, better pay in the US-funded militia units have reduced prospects for demobilising the militias for the DDR process. Many Pashtuns in southern Afghanistan expressed suspicion regarding US support for local warlords. Consequently, warlords have not been disarmed, forcing President Karzai to make room for them in the cabinet or to accept them as provincial governors. If this situation continues, peace-building will never be successful.

Therefore, it can be concluded that the problems of the US-led Coalition force are not only the number of troops, but also the underestimating of the potential of Al-Qaeda and the Taliban and a lack of commitment to the entire peace-building process. If the US had assessed its own capability of implementing its counterterrorism strategy more adequately and therefore had deployed a larger number of troops in Afghanistan with stronger commitment, it would not have needed to depend on local warlords to capture the remnants of Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, and the entire security sector in Afghanistan would have been more successful. The American light-footprint approach has undermined the whole security framework in Afghanistan.

### 6. Conclusion

This paper dealt with several key sectors relating to the security issues facing peace-building in Afghanistan, and analyzed their relevance within a light-footprint approach. Attention has been paid to a light footprint approach as an innovative concept in a post-conflict peace-building process. Such a strategy should be introduced in the sectors of
good governance, development and economic reconstruction. However, this paper argued that a light-footprint approach should not extend to the security sphere in Afghanistan.

The security issues in Afghanistan have to be considered within a 23 year history of intractable civil wars. Security in Afghanistan is extremely complicated, including anti-Government spoiler groups, the narcotics trade, and regional warlords, in addition to the terrorist groups. Considering these factors, the security issues in Afghanistan should have been tackled with a stronger physical commitment and political will. However, from the outset, the Bonn process did not adequately recognize the centrality of security to the entire enterprise. Without security, economic development and democratization are unattainable. Nevertheless, ISAF was initiated with an extremely modest size and mandate. A light-footprint approach should not be confused with a weak-footprint.

The small size of security-building forces such as ISAF and the US-led Coalition force have also negatively influenced other security-related sectors. Especially, the fact is that the US troops have inevitably hired regional warlords to make up for the shortage of their official forces, and consequently the US has been reluctant to commit itself to the counter-narcotics and the DDR sectors which have involved such regional warlords.

In fact, the counter-narcotics and the DDR sectors have also suffered from a lack of commitment. Much of the money allocated for the British opium eradication scheme has not been spent properly and has ended up in the hands of regional warlords. The British strategy for alternative crops has also been too weak to be functional. This paper recommends more positive involvement of the international community to DDR in Afghanistan because of the fact that the Ministry of Defence still manipulates the DDP process without impartiality and because the key warlords have not been demobilized yet.

This paper provides two recommendations in the security sectors to enhance peace-building in Afghanistan. These are promoting a monitoring system and more regional involvement. A new monitoring mechanism is urgently needed especially in the counter-narcotics and DDR sectors. Even if it is conducted by civilian personnel, they will enhance the effectiveness of military operations in counter-narcotics and DDR. More regional troops should also be included in ISAF and other peace-building missions in Afghanistan. The adoption of a light-footprint approach can be considered after these issues are tackled.

The scale and quality of international assistance for peace-building in Afghanistan should be based on a proper assessment of the capacity of the state. As the term “security first” indicates, the security sector has significantly influenced the entire process of peace-building. While it may be appropriate in the other spheres of the peace-building process,
Afghanistan is still too immature a state for a light-footprint approach to be adopted in the security sector.

2 NATO Briefing, January 2005, p. 8
5 International Herald Tribune, 25 November 2005
8 Felbab-Brown V. p. 58
9 International Herald Tribune, 30 March 2006
10 International Herald Tribune, 18-19 February 2006
12 International Herald Tribune, 25 November 2005
13 Felbab-Brown V. pp. 59-60
16 Felbab-Brown V. p. 64
17 The Economists, 16 April 2005
2004, p. 15
25 Tanaka K. p. 113
29 NATO Briefing, January 2005, p. 8
30 At present, the four top contributing countries are: Germany (over 2,200), Italy (more than 2,000), Canada (over 800), and Spain and France (each over 500). NATO in Afghanistan: Press Factsheet. http://www.nato.int/issues/afghanistan/050816-factsheet.htm. Accessed on 21 May 2006
33 Jones S. G. “Averting Failure in Afghanistan”, Survival, Vol. 48, No. 1, Spring 2006, p. 113
37 ISAF Press Releases, 26 November 2005
38 ISAF Press Releases, 5 May 2006
45 Friborg A. T. pp. 17-19
Security Issues facing Peace-building in Afghanistan: Is a light-footprint approach a panacea?


48 Rana S. “Afghanistan Military Campaign Enters New Phase”, *Strategic Insight*, The Center for Contemporary Conflict, 9 April 2002. For example, 16 civilians were killed in a US-led coalition bombing raid in the southern province of Kandahar on 22 May 2006.


51 *International Herald Tribune*, 25 December 2005


54 Felbab-Brown V. p. 65


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